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This dissertation focuses on the Chinese vocational education and training (VET) system 
– an arena that recently has been gaining growing importance in Chinese economic reform. My 
central argument is that the Chinese state is trapped in a dilemma in which it faces two flawed 
choices with regards to its ongoing reform attempts to upskill the Chinese workforce in the 
coming decades. During the past decade, the central government has been taking steps to 
decentralize a school-based national skill development system and adopt a more marketized 
model that integrates extensive employer input. But currently neither a relatively centralized 
school-based system nor a decentralized employer-led model has produced the institutional 
conditions needed for upskilling to occur in China. In the absence of a private governance 
tradition, and lacking a role that proactive employer associations can play in coordinating 
coherent training agendas at the industry level, the skill development system has become focused 
only on the short-term specific needs of individual employers. 
The current pre-employment skill formation process downplays long-term and general 
skills-focused training. In this introductory chapter, I develop this argument through a review of 
the relevant literature. Then in the three following chapters, each of which is geared toward a 
separate research agenda, I identify (a) the disorganization of the VET system and (b) the skill 
formation dilemma in China. 
Chapter 2 examines subnational variation within the Chinese VET system. I find that 
partly because of decentralization, Chinese vocational schools have adopted four distinctive skill 
	
development patterns: the high performance model, the industry-focused model, the local 
market-oriented model, and the labor agency model. I argue that skill development models 
reflect a combination of two institutional and two organizational factors that endow each school: 
state support and strategies, local industrial structures, a school’s institutional legacies, and its 
ownership. Schools vary in these endowments, and, thus, they demonstrate differences in skill 
development patterns. 
Chapter 3 focuses on an important employer strategy that is a response to the local 
market labor shortage: collaboration with vocational schools. I find that driven by a major 
external labor market failure – the skilled labor shortage – employers seek to shift part of their 
traditionally firm-based training to the workforce’s pre-employment skill formation process. The 
decentralized VET system allows schools to customize their training programs according to the 
specific skill needs of collaborating firms without being bound to any industry-level standards. I 
call this “training for a targeted brand” model, and I argue that it is essentially an employer 
strategy that pursues externalization of internal labor market practices to fix the external labor 
market failure. Its product is a flexible reserve of students who are equipped with a considerable 
amount of specific skills that are valuable to a certain firm, but the firm is not bound by 
employment relationships to these workers. 
Chapter 4 compares and assesses the early outcomes of two ongoing apprenticeship 
reforms by the Ministry of Education (MOE) and the Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security (MOHRSS). I find that the MOE has continued with a decentralized and disorganized 
approach to its reform, giving individual schools and employers complete freedom to devise a 
program, whereas the MOHRSS has adopted a top-down model and withheld control over the 
institution building process. Based on a three-level theoretical framework, I find that neither 
	
approach has generated ideal skill development outcomes, although the decentralized model has 
achieved relatively desirable performance. I then argue that the Chinese state has been trapped in 
a skill formation dilemma: until effective civil society governance is institutionalized to 
coordinate the VET process, the system will continue to not deliver ideal outcomes, and this will 
confound the state’s long-term upskilling agenda. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Relevance and Research Questions 
 
The vocational education and training (VET) system has become a recent focal point of 
Chinese economic reform, gaining growing importance in the advancement of the skill 
development of the Chinese workforce, in employers’ strategies for tackling the increasingly 
significant shortage of skilled labor, and in the state’s recent institution building efforts under its 
overall industrial restructuring and upgrading agenda. To begin with, vocational schools have 
undoubtedly become an important labor market institution in today’s China. According to the 
official data, vocational schools have been training more than four times as many students as 
academic colleges and universities. Furthermore, under the estimated 90% initial employment 
rate, graduates from vocational schools comprise 79% of the newly-added urban workforce and 
51% of the second and tertiary sectoral workforce in 2014. Just ten years previously, in 2004, 
these numbers were 51% and 21%, respectively.1  
Employers are now engaging in extensive collaboration with vocational schools to tackle 
the problem of skilled labor shortage. According to Li and Sheldon’s (2014) research in the 
Yangtze River Delta area, collaborative strategies include providing various forms of financial 
support, transferring the latest technology and know-how to vocational schools, and co-
developing curricula and training materials. My own study in the Pearl River Delta region 
																																																								
1 These estimations are based on data from the 2004 and 2014 China Statistical Yearbooks.  
		 2 
indicates that firms also have established on-campus practical centers, dispatch teachers to work 
at schools, and help train schoolteachers in their own workplaces and training centers.  
Finally, a profound reform of the Chinese VET system has been put on the state’s agenda. 
The “Made in China 2025” guideline issued by the central government in 2015 announced 
continuing investment in human capital in the Chinese workforce as well as skill development 
reform agendas whose goal is industry restructuring and upgrading. The overall objective is to 
sustain the Chinese “economic miracle” into the forthcoming decades. According to the 
guideline, leveraging the VET system is a vitally important component of the central 
government’s “supply side reform,” which seeks to leverage the workers’ skill development 
process in order to encourage skill and industry upgrading by employers.  
Although media reports have made tremendous efforts to cover these developments in the 
Chinese VET system, scholarly understanding of this topic is still very limited, outdated, and 
somewhat biased. In particular, prevailing wisdom in the China labor field depicts the Chinese 
VET system as primarily school-based and state-centralized (Cooke 2005; Lai and Lo 2006) that 
requires central and local governments to tightly control the VET process. The system leaves 
schools very little room to devise their programs and does not offer any formal and stable 
institutional mechanisms to incorporate firms’ input into the training process. It has rendered the 
VET process in China ineffective and non-market oriented, and consequently, it often fails to 
accommodate the skill needs of employers (Durden and Yang 2006). More recently, scholars 
have found that student interns in electronics manufacturing firms are treated as unskilled 
seasonal cheap labor and that Chinese vocational schools are quasi-labor agencies that simply 
trade student interns with firms in exchange for unjustified commissions (Smith and Chan 2015; 
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Su 2010-2011). Among scholars, this depiction of labor agencies has in recent years become the 
dominant perception of Chinese vocational schools.  
These studies were based on methodologically deficient research. The centralization 
argument was based on very limited, secondary, and often piecemeal data that were collected 
primarily before or at the turn of the new century. The “labor agency” theory of Chinese 
vocational schools emerged from a research project that targeted Foxconn. In addition to the 
obvious industry bias, it is unclear whether the authors had implemented a sound school 
sampling strategy. I argue that these stereotypes correctly reflect several existing problems 
within a certain portion of the Chinese VET system, but they by no means constitute the 
mainstream perspective.  
Furthermore, the literature leaves unresolved the puzzle of the external labor market 
failure. The research implies that school-firm collaboration in China is a secondary labor market 
strategy employed by employers: unable to provide useful skilled workers, schools function as 
temp agencies that supply flexible cheap labor to employers. However, Li and Sheldon (2014) 
find, and my research confirms, that employers engage in a wide portfolio of collaborative 
activities with vocational schools, including various forms of technology and knowledge transfer 
to schools. If all of these practices are merely secondary labor market strategies to gain unskilled 
seasonal labor, then why would firms not simply rely on labor agencies (which currently in 
China provide cheap labor to employers) that do not have to bear these extra costs? More 
importantly, as is widely known, firms in China during the past decade have faced a major 
shortage of labor. This is a structural shortage of skilled workers: there is still a surplus of 
relatively low-skilled migrant workforce (Kwan 2009), but employers often cannot secure in the 
labor market technicians and other skilled workers (Chan 2010; Farrell and Grant 2005; Li and 
		 4 
Sheldon 2010). This structural shortage implies a major external labor market failure — that is, 
labor market institutions (e.g., temp agencies) cannot solve the skilled labor shortage problem, 
which is most urgent problem that employers face. If the hypothesis advanced in the literature — 
that vocational schools function primarily as labor agencies — is correct, then what has 
motivated employers to invest significant time and resources in the VET process? In other 
words, it is reasonable to suspect that vocational schools provide something more than what 
labor agencies provide —something that provides a partial fix the external labor market failure. 
My dissertation attempts to resolve this puzzle of external labor market failure by 
carefully examining the Chinese VET system and the interaction mode among key players in 
VET processes, including schools, employers, and the state. In broad terms, I am interested in 
what is unique about the VET system in China and how and why the system operates and is 
being reformulated. What forces actively shape this process? In particular, now that both 
employers and the state have been incentivized to leverage the VET system for various political 
and economic reasons, which of them is dominating the actual training process? Similarly, in the 
arena of school development and reform, what is the division of labor between the state and 
employers? In practical terms, I attempt to evaluate the capacity of the current Chinese VET 
system to upskill the Chinese workforce in the forthcoming decades, and I identify and examine 
the challenges that the skill upgrading agenda currently faces. 
To this end, each of the three following chapters carries out a separate research agenda. 
My objective in the first paper is to break the labor agency stereotype and on the basis of solid 
empirical research, establish a comprehensive scholarly understanding of the Chinese VET 
system. In particular, I seek to capture and account for variation within the Chinese VET system, 
which, as I will show, is important but is downplayed in both China studies and the Western 
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national skill formation system analysis. The second paper, which targets the external labor 
market failure, clarifies how and why that failure has driven employers to externalize part of 
their internal labor market practices and shift firm-specific training to workers’ pre-employment 
skill formation processes through collaboration with vocational schools. The third paper focuses 
on the state’s role in enforcing nation-wide reforms on apprenticeship. To compare and assess 
the early outcomes of the two ministries that have jurisdiction over the Chinese VET system – 
the Ministry of Education (MOE) and the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security 
(MOHRSS) – I use a three-level model of skill development that is derived from a 
comprehensive review of relevant theories.  
 
Argument and Relevant Literature 
 
I argue in this dissertation that the Chinese state is trapped in a dilemma caused by the 
fact that the state faces two flawed choices in its ongoing attempts to upskill the Chinese 
workforce during the coming decades. While the central government has been taking measures to 
decentralize a school-based national skill development system into a more marketized model that 
has integrated extensive employer input during the past decade,2 currently neither a relatively 
centralized school-based system nor a decentralized employer-led model provides the 
																																																								
2 This is conservatively estimated. Although Lai and Lo (2006) have documented a state-directed 
decentralization reform that started during the 1980s, their evaluation of this reform and that of 
others (e.g. Cooke 2005) during the early 2000s indicates that decentralization reform failed. 
Given the contemporary decentralized status quo that I have found, I assume that during the past 
decade (2006 to today) there have been great changes and decentralization in the VET system. 
 
 
 
 
		 6 
institutional conditions needed for upskilling to be successful in China. In particular, under 
decentralization reform, the state has given substantial authority to schools and employers to 
devise and carry out training programs. But these programs, I find, are guided by the short-term 
specific skill needs of the individual firms that collaborate in the process, and the program lacks 
independent industry-level skill standards. I contend that this disorganized skill development 
system is the product of the absence of effective private governance. What is needed, in other 
words, is the participation of employer associations to coordinate the diversified interests of 
firms at the industry level. Human capital theory and the literature on the post-war Western and 
Asian experience in skill development lay the foundation for my argument, which, first, 
identifies an important collective action problem in training and, second, suggests that several 
institutional arrangements are needed for skill formation models to be successful, but in this 
paper I find that these conditions are by and large absent in the Chinese case. 
The central mission of every skill development system is promoting an appropriate cost-
sharing structure to effectively engage employers and individual trainees (or households) for the 
sake of sufficient investment in human capital (Hashimoto 1981).  
Typically the state stipulates coherent institutional arrangements to frame this structure, 
while employers and individuals are motivated by various institutional and economic incentives 
to co-share the costs in different formats. Getting employers to pay is both a key and a difficult 
task. Policy makers and practitioners of advanced Western skill development systems — in 
particular, the state and labor unions — historically have made tremendous political and 
economic efforts to engage employers in skill development (Thelen 2004).  
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Transferability of Skills and the Collective Action Problem 
The challenge of engaging employers is accounted for by a theoretical problem known as 
the collective action problem in skill development, which is derived from the human capital 
theory advanced by Becker (1993). Becker sees skills as a unique type of capital associated with 
human beings. The process of skill formation, including education and training, is regarded as a 
form, and, indeed, as the most important form, according to Becker, of investment in human 
capital. Becker further specifies two types of human capital, which he calls general skills and 
(firm) specific skills. Skills that tend to benefit every firm to the same extent are known as 
general skills, whereas those that only benefit firms that offer the training are specific skills. In 
reality, most skills are what Stevens (1999) defines as transferable skills, which potentially can 
be capitalized on by other firms but not to the extent that they are subject to perfect market 
competition, wherein “the wage is driven up to the marginal product.” In other words, suppose 
different types of skills are located on a continuum wherein completely general skills lie at one 
end and completely specific skills lie at the other end. Most skills, including a notable proportion 
of industry-transferable skills, are situated between the two ideal types. In this dissertation, 
unless specified otherwise, I use the terms “transferable skills” and “general skills” 
interchangeably to denote skills that lean toward the general skills end of the continuum and 
“specific skills” for skills that lean toward the firm-specific skills end.  
Because of the transferability of skills, vocational training often is underfunded at the 
societal level. Analytically separating general from specific skills in a training process can be 
difficult. That said, employers obviously have strong incentives to focus their training efforts on 
relatively specific skills. This can be understood as an avoidance strategy to sidestep a major 
collective action (free-riding) problem: workers equipped with more specific skills are less 
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attractive in the labor market, and, thus, they are less likely to be poached by other firms than are 
workers who have more general skills, holding other factors constant. But Streeck (1989) argues 
that even in the case of completely specific skills, employers tend to insufficiently fund training 
when workers can quit whenever they want under a regime of free employee termination. When 
that happens, employers immediately lose their sunk investments in training.  
Individual trainees tend to underinvest in skills, too. A young worker who has just started 
or who has not yet started a career probably lacks the money and motivation to invest in human 
capital that will be of benefit only during later stages of his or her career. Such an investment in a 
young worker involves a high degree of uncertainty: workers simply cannot accurately predict 
what skills will be needed in the future, and this leads to an insufficient self-financing of skills 
(Streeck 1989). These realities make the investment strategies of individuals complicated, 
unpredictable, and often below the optimal. 
In addition, the skill formation process has externalities. That is, an individual receives 
returns for the investment by others in their own human capital, and firms that might not benefit 
directly from hiring these workers, can still capitalize on indirect investment in their human 
capital. For instance, if more people in an economy invest in human capital and the economy 
moves from a low-skill equilibrium to a high-skill equilibrium in which skills are better 
appreciated and rewarded, then every worker ends up better off, and firms benefit from the 
higher productivity and bonuses that the economic boom brings about (Finegold and Soskice 
1988). However, an individual or entity’s level of investment in human capital is often based on 
his, her, or its own cost-benefit calculation, which tends to fall below the socially optimal level. 
Overall, individuals’ and firms’ investment in human capital based solely on market logic tends 
to insufficiently fund skills. Lucas (1988), for example, proposed that to reach the optimal level 
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the US economy during the 1980s needed to invest almost three times more human capital than it 
did.  
In institutional theory, therefore, skills are deemed as public goods. Streeck (1989) 
summarizes the market failure in the provision of sufficient skill training as follows: 
 “…successful self-interested, utilitarian behavior in market environments 
requires the presence of collective resources, common values, and shared expectations 
that rationally acting individuals cannot normally generate, protect, or restore even if they 
fully recognize their vital importance. This is because such resources are in significant 
respects ‘collective goods’ which cannot be privately appropriated and to whose 
generation rational capitalist actors have therefore no, or no sufficient, incentives to 
contribute. As a consequence, the unbridled pursuit of self-regarding interests results in 
suboptimal outcomes not just for the community at large but also for economically 
rational individuals themselves” 
 
Every skill development system faces the challenge of getting employers to pay for the 
training, and, more specifically, to pay for both transferable and specific skills. In other words, 
the state should seek to ensure that training programs provide a balanced delivery of both general 
and specific skills. Some industry-level governance is needed to institutionalize a wide portfolio 
of skill standards to ensure skill transferability at the industry level. If training programs 
overlook firm-specific skills and focus only on general skills, employers will not be motivated to 
invest, because free riders can poach these workers. But in an overly decentralized skill 
development system, in which employers are invited to dominate the training process in an 
uncoordinated manner, the process will be dominated by the specific and immediate skill needs 
of individual firms. This can harm the employability of the workforce and, thus, labor market 
mobility. This outcome can increase the retraining costs of firms that constantly seek new 
employees from the external labor market.  
Western national skill formation systems have featured either a school-based model, in 
which the formation of initial vocational skills relies on the public education system funded by 
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the state, or a relatively decentralized employer-led system, in which firms significantly invest in 
the pre-employment skill formation process in direct formats. Both models, however, would not 
be deemed successful if they did not achieve a balanced delivery of general and firm-specific 
skills. Based on the experience of exemplar countries, I identify below several preconditions that 
are needed for national skill formation models to be successful. 
 
Preconditions for a Successful School-based Skill Development System 
In a school-based skill development system, the state serves as a major provider of initial 
vocational skills. The mechanism that compels employers to pay for vocational education is state 
mandatory taxes and special funds. Although taxpayers foot the bill, decisions regarding how to 
the use the money — who to subsidize, what programs to fund, and levels of student enrollment 
— are made by the state. In this system, a significant proportion of general skill training 
transpires through public education subsidized by the state.  
Systems that rely on the formal public education system to give the workforce initial 
vocational skills often are supplemented by extensive workplace-based continuing training that 
offers specific skills. The state often encourages this approach because it ensures that employers 
have a say in vocational training processes, and the approach prevents the school-based system 
from being disconnected from industry and overly focusing on general skills. A commonly 
employed state strategy is to subsidize firm-based training. Money collected through taxation 
comprises special funds that employers can obtain for training purposes. In the US, the 
Department of Labor funds two major federal-level training programs: Registered Apprentices 
and Job Corps. The Job Corps focuses on young trainees from economically disadvantaged 
families, and the Registered Apprentices funds training programs provided by employers or 
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groups of employers – sometimes with the help of labor unions – that imitate the much admired 
German apprenticeship system (Stone III and Lewis 2010). At the local level, states have 
experimented with similar efforts (Osterman and Batt 1993). Federal and state governments 
provide grants for employer-based training programs, and individual employers decide what 
programs to offer and what modules to include in the training. Scholars estimate that in the US 
these state-subsidized training programs have not been very influential (Parker and Rogers 1999; 
Stone III and Lewis 2010).  
More successful school-based national skill formation systems that feature mutually 
supplementary public and private trainings are seen in both Singapore and Japan. In the 
Singaporean model there is greater state intervention than in the US and Japan. Kuruvilla, 
Erickson, and Hwang (2002) ascribe the success of the post-war Singaporean economy to what 
they call a model of private-public sector collaboration in development. In this collaboration, the 
government runs a public education system that offers comprehensive vocational training, and it 
taxes the equivalence of 1% of the payroll of employees who earn less than $1,500 per month. It 
then uses these taxes to finance a special skill development fund. Firms that carry out training 
programs often recoup up to 80% of their contribution from this fund to cover their training costs.   
During the early 1980s, the state also encouraged foreign-invested firms to set up training 
centers in order to secure technology and skill transfer to the domestic industry. To incentivize 
firms, the Singaporean government offered participating firms preferential investment and 
market protection opportunities and it gave these firms preferred access to hire the graduates of 
the training institutes. The government later expanded this project to include other national 
governments, and it extended preferential opportunities to all firms from these countries. This 
model successfully encourages foreign firms to invest in skill development – ensuring that up-to-
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date technologies and skills are transferred to the Singaporean workforce – and it secures a 
sufficiently large high-skilled labor for the local establishments of these foreign firms. The state-
organized Council for Professional and Technical Education was created in 1979 to coordinate 
training in both vocational schools and employer-funded training institutes (Kuruvilla and Chua 
2000). In Singapore civil society actors do not play a significant role in this process. 
In Japan, firm-based continuing training is an integral part of the skill development 
system, which has played a vital role in the post-war economic miracle. Employers provide 
comprehensive and continuing vocational training to workers throughout their careers, and this is 
motivated by mutual commitments between employers and employees, both of whom expect 
lifetime employment. Employees/trainees, in other words, are culturally embedded in the Japanese 
employment relations system. The lifetime employment system features internal labor markets 
that provide workers with extensive on-the-job training, ubiquitous bonus payments, and job 
security in exchange for work commitment. This model ensures, first, that employers and 
workers co-share the investment in the formation of specific human capital and, second, that this 
arrangement is not undercut by potential free riders in the external labor market. It also ensures 
that employers have input into the skill development process throughout the development of their 
workers’ careers, and it guarantees that employers will benefit from their investment in training 
(Hashimoto 1979; Yu and Hashimoto 1980).  
As shown, in school-based national models, state-funded public education provides 
comprehensive general skill training, and this is supplemented by extensive employer-offered 
training that focuses mostly on specific skills. The approach of the Singaporean government is 
interventionist: to engage employers it funds employer-offered training programs and it 
encourages foreign firms to establish training centers. The risk of free riders is avoided through 
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comprehensive taxation and preferential trainee recruitment policies. The Japanese system, in 
contrast, is rooted in a unique employment relations system that features internal labor markets 
and lifetime employment. Through this arrangement, work commitment is ensured and the 
challenge of the collective action problem is avoided. In both Singapore and Japan, institutional 
arrangements incentivize employers to pay for training and ensure that employers will later 
benefit fairly from their investment.  
 
Preconditions for a Successful Employer-led Skill Development System 
In relatively decentralized employer-led or mixed systems, such as in Germany and the 
UK, employers directly participate in the pre-employment skill formation of the workforce 
through innovative institutional arrangements that coordinate cost sharing among all players. In 
the German dual system, the state has established an institutional framework for apprenticeship 
training that provides various resources and incentives to engage private players. During the late 
1960s, the German corporatist government inherited the craftsmanship tradition of 
apprenticeship training and enshrined the dualist system into the training law. Under this system, 
youths in both workplaces and schools are trained under contracts negotiated between employer 
associations and unions. The contracts concern the contents of training programs that last from 
three to three and a half years (Culpepper 1999a). The state, which does not seek to dominate the 
training process, establishes a tripartite institutional framework that allows private governance to 
autonomously coordinate skill development agendas (Streeck 1987). Underlying this 
arrangement is a specific rationale: the skill standards making and training process must have the 
capacity to accommodate industry needs and, consequently, must have the flexibility to keep 
pace with industry developments. State centralization often fails to meet this requirement. 
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Moreover, employer participation is crucial because the training process needs to be informed 
and partly funded by industry — ideally by transferring the latest technology and knowledge to 
schools and by providing trainees with real-workplace training experience. This process is 
particularly important in the case of vocational education, which focuses on practical skills rather 
than academic knowledge.  
Employers participate in this process through a collective format provided by employer 
associations and chambers. As noted, the corporatist social partnership in Germany has laid the 
foundation for the private governance of skill development. A tripartite framework encourages 
employer participation, and it coordinates the interests of employers and workers/trainees at the 
industry level. There is a general division of labor among key social partners, which is arranged 
as follows. Employers are approved, and training processes are monitored and eventually 
evaluated by industry, commerce, and trade chambers. The state, through the Federal Institute for 
Vocational Training, provides expertise to these players in designing the apprenticeship 
programs. Collective labor, which is largely absent in many other major countries, plays a unique 
role in the German system. In particular, the training contents of apprenticeship programs are 
negotiated between employer associations and unions at the industry level. At the level of 
individual firms, works councils have the right to co-determine issues that are workplace-specific. 
Works councils play a monitoring role: they help programs avoid deviations from stipulated 
training agendas and prevent the abuse of apprentices. By avoiding the collective action problem 
and, thus, underinvestment in skills, this institutional structure encourages cost sharing among: a) 
the state, which pays for vocational school operation; b) firms, which pay for workplace training; 
and c) apprentices, who contribute by working at lower wage rates than regular workers 
(Culpepper 1999a).  
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These private governance arrangements ensure that training processes are coordinated at 
the industry level and, thus, are not overly decentralized. Although employers receive trainees in 
their individual workplaces, the contents of training programs are stipulated by the collective 
governance framework, which prevents an over-focus on skills that individual employers need 
but are not transferable across firms.  
Even where such effective tripartite frameworks are absent, private governance can play 
a pivotal role in the setting of skill standards at the industry level. In the UK, which is another 
often-imitated national system, unions’ roles are largely absent. Training contents, therefore, are 
not co-determined by capital and labor, but employers do negotiate among themselves to 
determine what skill standards are to be stipulated. The state subsidizes training programs but 
leaves standards making, qualification, and program development to licensed private actors. A 
sectoral skills council (SSC), founded at each national industry level by employers, functions as 
an administrative body that establishes national vocational standards and issues certificates 
through approved awarding organizations. The certificate indicates that the receiver has been 
trained in skills relevant to a particular occupation. These widely transferable skills are 
recognized by specific national industries. The council-determined standards are used to guide 
both institution and employer-based training (Delebarre 2016).  
In summary, civil society actors, especially employer associations, and negotiations in 
skill standards making are vital for the success and sustainability of a successful employer-led 
national system. These negotiation processes – either between capital and labor or among 
employers themselves – help to secure the industry-level transferability of skills, and this 
prevents individual employers from dominating the training process and over-focusing on 
specific skills that they in particular need. The state engages employers either by funding training 
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directly, as in the UK, or through private governance that via employer associations and labor 
organizations pressures individual firms to invest in training.  
To avoid complicating my summary, I have not discussed several important problems 
and changes in these models of skill formation systems. Although I recognize these problems 
and changes, I portray these national models in their ideal formats only because this allows me to 
identify the necessary institutional preconditions for successful skill development and the 
rationales that underlie these preconditions I use these models to illustrate, first, the collective 
action problem in skill development and, second, the fact that in successful national models, 
institutional arrangements are geared towards actively engaging employers and achieving 
transferability of skills at the industry level.  
 
The Skill Formation Dilemma in China 
In this dissertation, I argue that in the absence of these institutional preconditions – 
including the interventionist state, a lifetime employment relations system and internal labor 
markets, or an effective private governance framework and proactive employer associations – the 
Chinese state during the last decade has faced a dilemma as it has sought to transform the 
Chinese skill formation system from a centralized school-based model into a relatively 
decentralized model that invites employers to participate and sometimes even dominate the 
training process. As shown, a school-based model can avoid an excessive focus on general skills 
if employers are motivated to participate in either pre-employment or workplace continuing 
training and if this training supplements training in initial vocational skills by public schools. But 
scholars have found that there is very limited firm-based training in Chinese workplaces and that 
most of it is, first, concentrated in foreign-owned firms or JVs (sometimes big SOEs) and larger 
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firms and, second, targeted at managerial and high-level workers (Child 1994; Cooke 2005; 
Warner 1993; Xiao and Tsang 2004). And the state has by and large failed to systematically 
motivate employers to participate in skill development (Cooke 2005; Lai and Lo 2006).  
Employers have failed to play an active role in part because of the absence of long-term 
employment relationships and work commitment in Chinese firms. With the breakdown of the 
internal labor markets in the Chinese state-owned sector and the informalization of employment 
in the emerging private sector during the economic reform, turnover has been consistently high 
in most Chinese workplaces. In response to employment instability, the 2007 Labor Contract 
Law encourages long-term employment relationships by imposing various termination 
restrictions on employers (Gallagher and Dong 2011). But the law stipulates the free termination 
of employees and it provides only minimal space for employers to protect their training 
investment in an employment contract. Article 22 allows employers to claim liquidated damages 
from an employee who has received professional and technical training and now initiates 
termination. But it requires the employer to “conclude an agreement specifying a term of service” 
in advance, and it stipulates that “the liquidated damages that the employer requires the 
employee to pay may not exceed the portion of the training expenses allocable to the 
unperformed portion of the term of service.” In fact, most employers would rather not sign this 
agreement for every training activity. This limited restriction over employee termination 
discourages employers from offering comprehensive workplace-based continuing training. 
During my field research, a great many employers complained to me about this issue.  
In response to the problem of insufficient workplace-based training, the government in 
recent decades has enforced a process of decentralization reform that invites employers to 
engage in workforce pre-employment training (i.e., the school-based VET process) through 
		 18 
technology and knowledge transfer. Lai and Lo (2006), who have documented the state’s 
decentralization efforts since the mid-1980s, conclude that decentralization reform failed during 
the early 2000s. I find that the state currently has largely withdrawn from the daily operations of 
schools, granting schools almost full autonomy to devise and carry out their training agendas, 
and it has encouraged employers to provide input to the workforce pre-employment training 
process. As a consequence, the discrepancy between the school-based VET process and the 
industry that concerned scholars a decade ago (Cooke 2005; Durden and Yang 2006; Lai and Lo 
2006) has been greatly reduced.  
Nevertheless, reform has gone to the other extreme in the respect that most employer-
dominated training programs now only focus on the specific needs of collaborating firms, and 
the state has neither established widely recognized skill standards nor motivated individual 
employers to coordinate coherent training agendas at the industry level. The progress of the 
Chinese decentralization process, in other words, has been extremely disorganized: individual 
firms have taken over the for-degree training agendas provided by vocational schools without 
effectively coordinating across programs. Judging from Western experience, the problem of 
over-decentralization could have been avoided if there had been either private governance or an 
effective skill credentialing system that guided the training agendas of individual programs. In 
post-socialist China, where civil society actors, especially employer associations and labor 
unions, are government-controlled and have little interest in coordinating the skill development 
of the workforce, private governance is largely absent. I find that the national skill credentialing 
system — the national vocational certificate system (NVCS) run by the MOHRSS — has been 
marginalized from the vocational training processes and from employers’ hiring decision-making 
processes because it has failed to take into account an important attribute of contemporary 
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Chinese industry: the different regions in China are at different stages of development, and, 
consequently, in these regions industries require training in different skills and techniques, even 
in the case of a single vocation. In other words, a one-size-fits-all approach to vocation 
certification is not useful in China. 
I conclude that the current Chinese skill development system is disorganized and 
disordered. Individual rather than organized employers have replaced the state as the dominant 
force in the vocational schools’ training process, but these employers have failed to 
institutionalize an effective system of coordination at the industry level. Thus, there is disorder. 
This disorder can be attributed in large part to two important causes: the absence of employer 
associations that have the capacity to establish coherent skill development agendas that cross 
programs; and the state’s failure to enforce appropriate skill standards at the regional and 
national levels, which has left skill development programs individualized and uncoordinated. 
This system accommodates the immediate and specific skill needs of individual employers (and, 
thus, it clarifies the external labor market failure puzzle discussed at the beginning of this 
introduction), but it downplays general skill training, which is also necessary. I contend, then, 
that the Chinese VET is trapped in a skill formation dilemma: In the absence of effective private 
governance to coordinate diversified interests of employers at large scales, neither a centralized 
school-based nor a decentralized employer-led approach to VET can deliver ideal skill formation 
outcomes, and this presents a challenge to the long-term upskilling agenda of the Chinese 
economic reform.  
Through an analysis of the experience of Guangdong Province – an information-rich case 
(Patton 1990) in terms of reform dynamics and school-firm collaboration – I empirically 
examine this skill formation dilemma in the Chinese VET system, the problems that it has 
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generated, and recent reform attempts by the state to partly remedy the disorder. I argue that 
VET policy makers and practitioners in Guangdong are faced with a paradox. On the one hand, 
the decentralization reform has successfully incorporated employers’ input in the training 
process, and this has shown promise in closing the gap between VET processes and the industry 
needs revealed by scholars a decade ago. Motivated by a skilled labor shortage and external labor 
market failure, employers have shifted their focus from a traditionally firm-based training to a 
workers’ pre-employment skill development process in order to secure firm-specific skills and a 
flexible reserve of labor. On the other hand, the system has generated several important problems. 
Individual schools are given too much autonomy without being bound to any industry-level skill 
standards, and because employer participation is disorganized, an industry-wide coordination of 
skill transferability is completely off the table. The MOE and the MOHRSS now enforce 
independent apprenticeship reforms, but the MOE continues to pursue a disorganized and 
decentralized approach that, with very little state intervention, allows experimental programs to 
devise training schemes that address the individual needs of collaborating firms. Once again, 
specificity overrides generality. To remedy this disorder, MOHRSS employs a top-down model 
that aims to revitalize the National Vocational Certificate System (NVCS), but this approach, too, 
is disconnected from industry and does not encourage employers to participate in the skill 
standards making process. I contend that the key problem lies in the absence of civil society 
governance in China. Employer associations and labor unions need to participate in the VET 
process, based on the Western experience, in order to coordinate employer needs and their 
diverse interests, on the one hand, and avoid the problem of training over-specificity, on the 
other hand.  
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This dissertation borrows from and holds implications for the comparative literature on 
national skill formation systems, including the Chinese system. Below I review this literature and 
examine its implications. 
 
Contributions from a Comparative National System Perspective 
Western skill development studies widely adopt a national system perspective (see 
Ashton, Sung, and Turbin 2000 for a review). Scholars focus on characterization, typologization, 
and comparison of national skill formation systems. One important approach to typology that 
many scholars employ classifies national systems on the basis of the main provider of vocational 
skills. These studies have identified several types of systems, including school-based systems in 
the US, Japan, Canada, France, Sweden, and Italy, employer-led or dual models in Germany, 
Switzerland, and Austria, and mixed models, such as those in the UK (Furth 1985; Green 1991). 
Exemplar Western and Asian national systems demonstrate distinctive models of school-firm 
interplay and varying levels of decentralization. Identifying common themes in these models is a 
useful exercise because it highlights the peculiarity of the school-based but employer-dominated 
Chinese system.  
Western skill development scholarship indicates that in both school-based and employer-
led models, a certain level of decentralization and employer input in the VET process is 
indispensable. Different systems adopt distinctive approaches to decentralization, and the process 
is not unique to China. In Japan and Singapore, school-based systems are supplemented by 
massive employer-provided workplace training. Germany’s employer-led system and the UK’s 
mixed model encourage employers to have direct input into the pre-employment skill formation 
process.  
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I argue that the Chinese VET approach to engaging employers is particularly 
disorganized and disordered. It features extensive school-firm collaboration that is instituted at 
the level of individual organizations and provides no industry-level coordination among schools, 
employers, or individual trainees. This disorder could have been avoided had China followed 
Singapore’s example and imposed strong state intervention or state-organized employer 
coordination, but China did not do this. Through decentralization reform, China’s central and 
local governments have given individual schools and employers full autonomy to develop their 
own training agendas. The NVCS has long been criticized and marginalized from vocational 
school training because, according to Kong (2015) and my own findings, it has failed to 
accommodate regional and industrial needs. Private governance that seeks to institute skill 
standards at the regional industry level is a superior solution, but this solution currently is not 
practical because in China there are few proactive employer associations. The important 
institutional arrangements that precondition the success of advanced Western skill development 
models by and large are absent in contemporary China, and because the Chinese state has not 
been able to engage employers systematically, as the Singaporean government did during post-
war development, its system suffers from disorder.  
I contend also that two important perspectives have been largely overlooked in the 
national skill formation system literature. First, the national system approach, which reduces 
national complexity to a single national modelled abstraction, downplays regional, sectoral, and 
even occupational idiosyncrasies within each country case (Crouch, Finegold, and Sako 1999) — 
that is, it overlooks potential subnational variation. While Locke (1992) suggests that subnational 
system analysis might provide a better understanding of industrial relations dynamics in general, 
particularly related to skills, Osterman (1982, 1987) identifies four employment subsystems—
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industrial, salaried, craft, and secondary—each of which features a distinctive model of skill 
development and HR strategies. This subnational system approach is particularly relevant to 
China labor studies, where regional differences can be huge and often explain many aspects of 
employment relations outcomes (Hurst 2009). 
The second perspective under-valued in the literature is an informal institution approach. 
National skill formation system analysis tends to focus on formal institutions and overlook 
informal institutions, which Helmke and Levitsky (2004) define as socially shared rules that are 
mostly unwritten and that exist outside of official sanctions. Nee and Ingram (1998) remind 
institutional scholars that individuals and organizational entities are widely embedded in social 
norms and informal networks, and this accounts for many important phenomena in 
organizational processes. K. Tsai (2006), L. Tsai (2002, 2007), and Nee and Opper (2012) find 
that in China informal institutions play important roles in a wide range of socio-economic 
domains. But studies in the skill development arena have failed to examine the roles of informal 
institutions. 
Consistent with trends in the Western literature, studies of the Chinese VET system adopt 
a national system perspective: that is, they often propose arguments or characterizations that 
pertain to the entire national system, but they overlook potential subnational variation, and they 
focus on formal institutional structures only. This literature sees a centralized school-based skill 
development system in China and it perceives major discrepancies between the vocational 
education processes and employer-based training. The literature depicts a VET system that has 
three key features: 1) a school-based model that has very limited employer participation; 2) a 
state-centralized system that is too rigid to be market oriented or accommodate industry needs; 
and 3) the presence in some Chinese vocational schools of student intern “selling” activities. The 
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third factor, combined with ineffective training processes, prompts scholars to stereotype schools 
as quasi-labor agencies. I examine each these features below.  
First, the literature portrays the Chinese VET system as a school-centered model 
characterized by very limited employer participation and input (Child 1994; Cooke 2005; Warner 
1993; Xiao and Tsang 2004;). Schools, including both public and a small number of private ones, 
are the main providers of workers’ initial vocational skills. Figure 1 illustrates the system’s 
structure in terms of age of enrollment. At the workforce’s pre-employment skill development 
phase, the VET system consists primarily of two types of schools: vocational schools/colleges 
attached to the MOE, and technical schools/colleges attached to the MOHRSS.3 A 15-17 year-
old student who wishes to pursue a vocational education can enter either a vocational school 
(zhongzhi) or a technical school (zhongji). The degree received at this level is equivalent to a 
high-school degree. Thereafter, s/he can choose to either enter the labor market or further pursue 
vocational education by attending a vocational college (gaozhi) or a technical college (gaoji or 
jishi xueyuan). Less frequently, vocational college graduates enroll in two-year degree-upgrading 
programs (zhuan sheng ben) to acquire bachelor (university) degrees. These schools and pre-
employment training comprise the main body of the Chinese skill formation system (Cooke 
2005). Employer-provided firm-based training is limited: it is concentrated in foreign-owned 
firms, JVs, and (occasionally) in large SOEs, and it targets only managerial and high-level 
workers (Child 1994; Warner 1993; Xiao and Tsang 2004). 
 
																																																								
3 In this dissertation, the term “vocational schools” covers both types of schools, unless 
otherwise specified. 
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Figure 1. Chinese Education System 
Age of 
Enrollment Education Institutions 
3-4 Kindergarten 
5-6 Pre-elementary school 
7-11 Elementary school 
12-14 Middle school 
15-17 High school Vocational school High school Technical school 
18-21 University 
Vocational college  Technical college 	  
University  
22-24 Master program 
                      Adult education 25-27 PhD program 
	  
≥28 	  
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According to the literature, the second key feature of the Chinese VET system is strong 
state control, which was not affected by the decentralization reform carried out during the mid-
1980s (Lai and Lo 2006). The state is the largest provider of initial vocational skills. Most 
vocational schools are state owned, and they are funded primarily by state educational spending 
(Cooke 2005). By giving funding responsibilities to local governments and introducing self and 
social funding mechanisms, the 1980s reform sought to diversify the financial sources of schools, 
but the central government continues to play a dominant role, and it remains a major provider of 
school funding (Schnarr, Yang and Gleissner 2008). During the early 2000s, state policies shifted 
towards a recentralization of both financing and the supervision of education funding (Murphy 
and Johnson 2009). With regards to curriculum development, specialty committees organized by 
local educational departments now reserve the right to approve the establishment of new 
specialties in vocational schools, which means schools have no authority to make such decisions 
themselves (Lai and Lo 2006). The MOHRSS and the MOE now largely control the graduate 
qualification system: the former is in charge of the centralized NVCS and the latter issues degree 
certificates. In other words, Lai and Lo (2006) conclude that the decentralization of the VET 
system in China is limited. During the reform, the central government transferred some 
responsibilities to the local level, but it continues to tightly control the entire system through 
national policies and directives. Local governments can only enforce these policies, and schools 
and institutions have no authority to develop their own programs. That the state maintains strong 
control over the VET system is not surprising: the ideological function of the education system is 
crucial to the post-socialist authoritarian regime (Althusser 2006). But state centralization has 
generated rigidity in the VET process (Durden and Yang 2006), which is supposed to be flexible 
enough to accommodate rapid technological change in industry.  
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Third, studies undertaken in the literature from a sociological perspective depict Chinese 
vocational schools as quasi-labor agencies. This literature posits two main arguments. First, the 
training quality and effectiveness of Chinese vocational schools is generally low (Woronov 
2012). Many vocational schools do not provide students with useful vocational skills. Instead, 
they carry out what Woronov (2012) calls a “mimetic labor” process wherein the schooling 
process constructs students’ social subjectivity of employable workers, but it rarely equips them 
with truly useful skills. Second, vocational schools sell student interns to businesses for 
unjustified commissions. Sociologists in a major Foxconn-focused research project revealed the 
abuse of student interns in Foxconn factories. Student workers were “forced” to work on low-
skilled assembly line jobs and perform supplementary seasonal labor tasks that are irrelevant to 
their specialties (Smith and Chan 2015; Su 2010-2011). Given their ineffective training and labor 
selling behaviors, Chinese vocational schools, scholars have concluded, are quasi-labor agencies. 
Smith and Chan (2015) characterize the internship work as a type of constraint labor, and Su 
(2010-2011) calls vocational schools “middlemen.”  
Contrary to the literature just reviewed, my research indicates that the Chinese VET is a 
disorganized and decentralized system that is distinguished by three features: 1) schools are 
given nearly full autonomy to devise training programs; b) the variation across vocational 
schools is beyond the mere labor agency stereotype; and c) it is dominated by individual 
employer-dominated school-firm collaborative training. With regards to the first feature, my 
study shows that the state has largely withdrawn from the daily operations of vocational schools, 
and it has given vocational schools autonomy to carry out VET processes. The state plays a role 
at the regional and national level, and its focus is strategic planning and the provision of financial 
support. The recent apprenticeship reform instituted by MOHRSS aims to recentralize the system 
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through direct intervention in program building, but the reform has not produced significant 
changes. These findings are inconsistent with the prevailing wisdom — that the Chinese VET 
system is state-centralized and that the state controls the school training processes.  
With regards to the second feature, both the Western literature and China studies have 
employed national system analysis. Western studies offer useful national system 
characterizations and typologies, but they often overlook subnational variation. The assertion 
that vocational schools are quasi-labor agencies reflects the important problems that affect some 
Chinese vocational schools, including the abuse of student interns and the low quality of training. 
But the assertion fails to capture the system’s larger landscape. Given the decentralized status 
quo noted above, variation across vocational schools is likely to be salient in China. From my 
sample of 25 vocational schools in Guangdong, I have identified four distinctive skill 
development models. These include but are not limited to the labor agency pattern.  
With regards to the third feature, I show that although the state has largely withdrawn 
from the daily operation of schools, employers have stepped in and now dominate individual 
training programs. This finding corrects previous findings by scholars that the Chinese VET 
system is a school-based model that provides very limited opportunities for employer 
participation. Scholars who seek to characterize and typologize national systems tend to focus on 
formal institutions. Yet as presented here, the China case indicates that informal arrangements, 
too, should play an important role when systems are defined. It is not surprising that the Chinese 
VET system frequently is defined as a school-based model, given that there is no institutional 
arrangement enshrined in law that stipulates that employers are obliged to participate in the 
workforce pre-employment training process. But careful examination of the actual training 
processes carried out by schools reveals significant deviation from this model. Indeed, I show 
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that long before the state’s current apprenticeship reform process was instituted, VET 
practitioners in China had developed a de facto apprenticeship training model that involved 
extensive school-firm collaboration.  
 
Methods 
 
The study is based on my two-month preliminary and one-year extensive field research in 
Guangdong Province that provides an information-rich case (Patton 1990: 181). Better known as 
the Pearl River Delta area, Guangdong for the past three decades has developed the most 
dynamic regional economy in China, and it now hosts the most advanced manufacturing and 
service industries. If Guangdong’s success is deemed to epitomize the achievement of China’s 30 
years’ economic reform, the province also epitomizes the most urgent problems that currently 
bottleneck the “made in China” model. Specifically, Guangdong’s fast economic development is 
impeded by a major shortage of skilled labor and by rapidly increasing labor costs and conflict. 
Correcting these problems will require industrial restructuring and upgrading, and, therefore, 
skill upgrading of the workforce. Guangdong state officials and employers have historically been 
especially effective at enforcing various innovative economic reforms, and so we should expect 
that Guangdong will lead attempts to resolve the skilled labor shortage through VET reform. 
Indeed, we should expect to see the most dynamic school-firm collaboration scenarios and 
various creative reform attempts in Guangdong Province.  
Furthermore, Guangdong is the biggest VET province in China, hosting more VET 
facilities that educate a bigger workforce than any other Chinese province. Guangdong 
vocational schools generate over one tenth of China’s vocational school graduates every year. In 
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addition, Guangdong shows tremendous diversity across its cities. The Pearl River Delta region, 
which includes the cities of Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Foshan, and Dongguan, has the country’s 
most advanced market economies and its best vocational schools. In contrast, peripheral areas, 
which include the cities of Qingyuan, Zhanjiang, and Zhaoqing, resemble the less developed 
provinces of China’s hinterland. I do not claim that Guangdong is a prototypical case. Instead, 
the province is representative of diversified scenarios within the Chinese VET system, and, 
hence, it provides an information-rich case. 
 
Data 
I collected three types of data during field research. First, I conducted 322 interviews 
with various stakeholders of the VET system. The appendix lists all my interviews. Those 
interviewed include: a) officials from the MOE and the MOHRSS and their local branches; b) 
presidents, administration, teachers, students, and parents from 25 schools; c) managements, 
firm-level union officials, and workers from 21 firms; and d) officials from 12 other 
organizations that include local official unions, think-tank organizations, NGOs, employer 
associations, and academic institutes. Some of the interviews took place during group meetings, 
which are very common in China. Individual and group interviews lasted two hours on average. 
These in-depth interviews constitute my major information resource for understanding the 
Chinese VET system.   
Second, to further explore the school-firm collaboration processes and interaction among 
relevant stakeholders, I have engaged in a great deal of participant and non-participant 
observation. I achieved this in various ways. First, I attended meetings whenever possible. My 
good relationship with government officials and school presidents allowed me to attend 
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numerous public and nonpublic meetings, informal conversations, and dinners, which provide a 
common forum for informal communication in China. I also participated in two ongoing reform 
projects – curriculum and apprenticeship reform – in Guangdong. I served as an external 
consultant for curriculum reform in Guangdong’s beauty sector from late 2015 to early 2016. I 
also served as a translator for the MOE’s apprenticeship consultants from the UK in April 2016. 
These experiences allowed me to gain valuable insider information regarding how different 
stakeholders within the VET system interact and collaborate. I also observed many training 
processes at schools, practical centers, and firms, as well as several skill competitions.  
Third, my research is supplemented by a considerable amount of secondary data that I 
collected during fieldwork. These data include relevant state policies, internal documents of 
governments, schools, and firms, and internet-based resources that provided background 
information on the schools and firms that I studied and important news and reports. These 
secondary data have two major functions. First, they allow me to triangulate from the firsthand 
data that I collected using the above-mentioned methods. Second, they provide information that 
my process tracing through interviews could not yield.  
 
Three Studies 
 
Each of the three following chapters is tasked with a separate investigative mission, but 
all contribute constructively to my central argument. Chapter 2 (How Institutional and 
Organizational Factors Explain Models of Skill Development in Chinese Vocational Schools) 
provides a school-centered study that seeks to break the stereotype that Chinese vocational 
schools are labor agencies. Methodological deficiencies in existing studies and the currently 
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decentralized Chinese VET system hint at the existence of variation across Chinese vocational 
schools that has not previously been detected by scholars. I ask, how and why do skill 
development patterns in the workforce vary across Chinese vocational schools? I examine a 
representative sample of 25 vocational schools in Guangdong and find that they do not all 
function as labor agencies. Instead, there is substantial variation in the effectiveness of school 
training, in funding sources, and in students’ skill levels and job market scopes. I identify four 
skill development models that schools typically adopt: a high performance model, an industry-
focused model, a local market-oriented model, and a labor agency model. I show that “labor 
selling” behaviors exist but are limited to certain poorly funded private schools. I argue that in 
China, skill development models reflect a combination of two institutional and two 
organizational factors that endow each school: state support and strategies and local industrial 
structures (institutional); and a school’s institutional legacies and its ownership (organizational). 
Schools vary with regard to these endowments, and, therefore, they demonstrate differences in 
skill development patterns.  
Chapter 3 (Externalizing Internal Labor Market Practices: “Training for a Targeted 
Brand” in Chinese Vocational Schools) focuses on an important employer strategic response to 
local market labor shortages: collaboration with vocational schools. I ask, how and why do 
employers who face skilled labor shortages seek collaboration with vocational schools? The 
literature suggests that collaboration between Chinese employers and vocational schools is 
limited and is merely a secondary labor market strategy that produces low-skilled operational 
labor rather than useful skills. In contrast, I find that schools do engage in “training for a targeted 
brand” activities that feature individual school-firm collaborations and employer-dominated 
training processes. Driven by skilled labor shortages, which reveal a major failure of the external 
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labor market, employers seek to shift part of their firm-based training to prospective workers 
during the latter’s pre-employment skill development phase. Through this process, schools enjoy 
a substantial technology and knowledge transfer from employers, and they integrate these 
transfers into their for-degree training programs. In exchange, they offer customized training 
processes to individual collaborating firms. I argue that “training for a targeted brand” is 
essentially an employer strategy that externalizes internal labor market practices in order to fix 
the external labor market failure. Working with vocational schools, employers externalize both 
their employment and part of their internal labor market practices. Of paramount interest in this 
dissertation is firm-specific training. This strategy generates a flexible reserve of students who 
are equipped with firm-specific skills that certain employers value, but employers are not 
committed to employment relationships with these workers. I also argue that this “training for a 
targeted brand” system emerged from the interaction of two variables: 1) the decentralized 
Chinese VET system and the autonomy that schools are given to carry out training processes; 
and 2) the skilled labor shortage that employers face.  
Finally, Chapter 4 (The Skill Formation Dilemma in the Chinese Apprenticeship Reforms) 
assesses the state’s recent reform efforts, part of which seeks to resolve the current disorder in 
the Chinese VET system through the enactment of relatively centralized apprenticeship reform. I 
ask, how are the MOE and the MOHRSS currently carrying out their respective apprenticeship 
reforms, and why have they generated different outcomes? Each of the two ministries has 
recently launched an independent reform that seeks to institute apprenticeship training in their 
own vocational schools, but each follows a drastically different approach to institution building. 
The MOHRSS has adopted a top-down model that uses very detailed central policies and “quota 
management” to establish every single experimental apprenticeship program. In contrast, the 
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MOE follows a collaborative model that legitimizes existing “training for a targeted brand” 
programs in vocational schools to maximize the input of individual schools and employers. I 
construct a three-level collaborative model of skill development that is based on institutional 
theory, the regulation school, and human capital theory, and I use it to evaluate the reform efforts 
of the two state ministries. I find that the MOHRSS’s top-down model has not been as successful 
as the MOE’s collaborative model. Indeed, the latter promises to address two key problems in 
skill development: the collective action problem and the accommodation of industry needs. That 
said, neither approach has successfully achieved a balanced delivery of both general and firm-
specific skills, and this can be attributed to the fact that proactive employer associations are 
absent in China. The MOHRSS’s top-down model is exclusively focused on general skill 
training, whereas the MOE’s collaborative model (training for a targeted brand) is overly focused 
on the specific skill needs of individual collaborative firms. I then argue that in the arena of 
current apprenticeship reform, the Chinese state has been trapped in a skill formation dilemma. 
Until effective private governance is institutionalized to coordinate the VET process, the system 
will continue to not deliver ideal skill development outcomes, and the state’s long-term 
upskilling agenda will continue to be confounded.  
Before turning to these three chapters, I present below empirical evidence that, on the one 
hand, is independent of the studies described in the following chapters but that, on the other hand, 
is crucial to the making of my central argument. This evidence provides an important empirical 
motivation for my entire research project. 
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Decentralization in the Chinese VET System: Empirical Motivation and a Start 
 
During my preliminary field research, the first thing that struck me as radically different 
from my impression of the Chinese VET system, given the literature, is its astonishingly high 
level of decentralization. There is a considerable diffusion of state authority to vocational 
schools, which receive from the state almost full autonomy to design the training process. This 
counter-intuitive phenomenon provided my initial empirical motivation to carry out this project. 
In this section I start the empirical analysis that leads to the three chapters that follow.  
Table 1 summarizes the level of authority diffusion that affects specialty establishments, 
student admissions and qualifications, and curriculum development across different types of 
Chinese vocational schools. In most cases, de facto decision-making falls at the school level or 
below, and the local government maintains authority only over a small number of issues, 
including the NVCS, a few mandatory courses, and specialty establishment (dis)approval. I 
examine below the three issues that are affected by authority diffusion. Even in the case of these 
issues, schools often find ways to circumvent state intervention and retain considerable freedom. 
 
Specialty Establishment 
In the literature, scholars argue that the state tightly controls the establishment of new 
specialties in vocational schools through local government-organized specialty committees and 
national specialty indexes. By strictly following the relevant specialty index that only updates 
every 3-5 years (Chen 2015), a specialty committee reserves the right to (dis)approve schools’ 
initiatives of establishing new specialties, which can leave a school with no space to maneuver 
(Lai and Lo 2006). What I found in Guangdong’s vocational schools, however, is different. In all 
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schools that I studied, officials share the belief that they can without difficulty set up new 
specialties. 
To decipher this process, we need to distinguish two circumstances. The first is what 
happens when a school wants to establish an indexed specialty. In interviews that I conducted, 
officials from the Guangdong Department of Education (GDDOE) and the Guangdong 
Department of Human Resources and Social Security (GDDOHRSS) who are in charge of 
school affairs confirm that they maintain laissez-faire attitudes toward schools:  
With only a few exceptions, establishing specialties in Guangdong vocational 
schools is completely free from state control…Schools enjoy full autonomy and need not 
be approved by us, including non-indexed specialties. The MOE’s policies require that 
non-indexed specialties have to be put on record in the provincial educational department, 
but Guangdong is more advanced in this than the national standards. We think that even 
non-indexed specialties do not have to be put on record, leaving autonomy entirely to the 
school. (Author: what about vocational colleges?) That is the same, except for one 
procedure – their specialty establishment has to be put on our record. Note that this is 
different from approval! …Vocational education needs to be suitable for local economic 
development. Schools should be able to adapt themselves to what the local economy 
needs – to be dynamic regarding specialty development and student enrollment. Leaving 
autonomy to schools, the schools will realize their potential to accommodate the market. 
This is our consideration (I: 5). 
 
Technical schools used to be firm-run schools, training skilled workers for firms. 
Training processes therefore have to be compatible with what firms need, and focus on 
practice. Therefore, the MOHRSS requires schools to be connected with employers and 
the market… We focus on how to encourage firm participation in our educational 
processes, including devising (programs), teaching capacity building, and curriculum 
making, to keep pace with modern technological development… And we government 
agencies do not get involved in this process, but let them collaborate freely. (Author: are 
schools free to determine specialty establishment and student enrollment?) Yes, 
completely free! (I: 8). 
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Table 1. Authority Diffusion in the Chinese VET System 
 
Ministry of Education MOHRSS 
Technical Schools Vocational Colleges Vocational Schools 
Specialty Establishment State-approval needed School School 
 “Direction” School School School 
Student Admission  
Gaokao – plus, however, a 
significant proportion of school 
autonomous admission School School 
 Qualification NVCS and school degree NVCS and school degree NVCS and school degree 
Curriculum development 
Department, and state mandatory 
courses 
Department, and state 
mandatory courses 
Department, and state 
mandatory courses 
 
Textbooks Teacher Teacher Teacher 
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The second question concerns what happens when a school wants to establish a non-
indexed specialty. This is probably the more important question given the fact that markets 
change quickly and indexes often lag behind. If schools are only allowed to establish specialties 
within an existing index — even if the state approval process is relatively loose — they can feel 
constrained if the index is outdated.  
As shown above in the interview quotes, the Guangdong government has given schools 
more room than national standards have to establish non-indexed specialties. But even without 
that extra space, schools have various ways to circumvent the index restriction. They can set up 
what is called a “direction” (fangxiang) under an old specialty, and very often the central state 
will later include the direction in an update of their specialty index. In Chinese vocational 
schools and universities that face similar index restrictions this is a common, state-consented 
practice.  It solves two problems: how to set up a “probation period” during which a new 
specialty is tested by the market; and how to tackle the problem of the rigidity of specialty 
indexes. 
In vocational education, for instance, robot-related training was established in schools 
during the past several years, when this industry emerged in China, but the specialty was not 
officially listed in the index until it was updated by the MOE in 2015. Schools circumvented the 
index problem by setting up robot-related training “directions” (e.g., Industrial Robots, Robot 
Application and Maintenance, and Smart Manufacturing) that they attached to existing indexed 
specialties, such as CNC, Mechatronics, Internet of Things, and Electronics Application. 
Because schools control curriculum development and the actual training processes (see below), 
the committee does not know what a school will teach under a new specialty direction or whether 
		 39 
it will differ from the original specialty. This practice is state-consented. An official from the 
Dongguan Bureau of Education (DGBOE) provides an example: 
Many schools would not establish a completely non-indexed specialty. The 
Robots, for example, was non-indexed until last year. But Dongguan Science and 
Technology School offered this specialty, and used the name Mechatronics with a 
direction of Industrial Robots… In student recruitment, they noted Industrial Robots; 
otherwise students would not understand what the specialty really is going to do (I: 11).  
 
This strategy has allowed schools to instantly react to important market changes and 
establish new specialties that are compatible with contemporary industry trends without being 
bound to a rigid index. While the MOE did not index any robot-related specialty until 2015, 
media reported that by 2014 nine vocational schools had established specialties, and 120 schools 
had established specialty directions on robots in the country.4 A similar case involves 3D 
Printing. Vocational schools established specialty directions to train specialized workers for this 
emerging industry prior to 2015, when the MOE eventually listed the subject in its specialty 
indexes. Indeed, many schools in my sample actually offered robot and 3-D printing related 
specialties in 2013 and 2011.   
Table 2 compares 2012 vs. 2016 vocational school graduates across industries in 
Guangdong. Paralleling the deindustrialization process and the continuous growth of the service 
industry in Guangdong, the educational focus of vocational schools has de-emphasized 
manufacturing and emphasized healthcare, social work, education, and arts training. The table 
also compares Guangdong to the 2014 national average. The proportion of graduates of the first 
and second sectors in Guangdong (agriculture, manufacturing, and construction) currently is 
significantly lower than in other provinces. Compared to the national average, Guangdong, 
which for years has focused on industrial upgrading, has generated more IT, finance, 																																																								
4 http://robot.ofweek.com/2015-06/ART-8321202-8440-28967449.html, March 5, 2017 
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management, and commerce talents. Also, as a province that is scarce in natural resources, 
Guangdong educates relatively few energy and natural resources students. As the table indicates 
(and irrespective of national specialty indexes), local governments have given schools freedom 
to establish and adjust their specialties in response to local market needs.  
 
Student Admission and Qualification 
With regards to student admission, a major threshold for vocational college applicants 
that is out of the college’s control is the gaokao system (the National Higher Education Entrance 
Examination). Other types of schools have been given full autonomy to decide who to recruit 
during a school year. Nonetheless, I have found that vocational colleges can admit the students 
they want even though these students might fail the gaokao. This is possible under reforms that 
central and local governments have experimented with in recent years. These reforms seek to 
“diversify vocational colleges’ student admission approaches,”5 including a gaokao system that 
is separate from universities and academic colleges and that focuses mostly on the practical skills 
of students.6  
Another reform that gives vocational colleges more autonomy to decide who to admit is 
experimental autonomous enrollment (zizhu zhaosheng). This year, for example, 50 vocational 
colleges in Guangdong have been given a quota of 22,609 autonomous enrollments, which will 
account for about 20% of the total planned enrollments in those colleges. Under this system, 
each school develops a test that includes paper exams and interviews to evaluate students beyond 
what the gaokao attests to. Passing this test, a student is exempt from all gaokao exams. 
Autonomous enrollment allows schools to recruit students who are not necessarily proficient at 																																																								
5 http://edu.qq.com/a/20140929/018346.htm, March 13, 2017 
6 http://www.gaokao.com/e/20161121/58325193cedbf.shtml, April 8, 2017 
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theory or who do not have wide general knowledge of math, Chinese literature, and English, 
which typically are the focus of the gaokao, but who, instead, have practical skills that lie at the 
core of vocational education. This system has been a central policy focus of the VET reform for 
many years, and over time schools have been granted expanding quotas.7  
Students can be admitted within the autonomous enrollment system even if they fail a 
gaokao, but to graduate they must overcome two major obstacles presented by the “double 
certificates to graduate” (shuangzheng biye) system: a school degree and a NVCS certificate that 
is relevant to a student’s specialty. The latter can be a constraint because it is nationally 
standardized. But I found that NVCS tests rarely act as real obstacles to student graduation. 
Many of the vocational schools, training institutes, and even state-authorized entities that carry 
out these tests have strategies to help students gain certificates. Moreover, schools have strong 
incentives to do the same because a low graduation rate would be a deterrent against student 
enrollment. In fact, during recruiting, many vocational promise students that when they graduate 
they will receive both certificates.  
 
Curriculum Development 
Although NVCS certificates are not difficult to obtain, allowing them to shape a schools’ 
curriculum development is problematic because the NVCS is disconnected from industry (Kong 
2015). I find, however, that the NVCS system is widely regarded as useless and, thus, it has been 
largely removed from vocational schools’ training processes. Many teachers and employers that I 
interviewed expressed this point of view decisively. Instead of centering curriculum development 
																																																								
7 The quotas given to Guangdong vocational colleges from 2012 to 2016 are 7,628, 9,475, 
11,690, 18,609, and 23,634, respectively (see: http://edu.ycwb.com/2017-
02/14/content_24203372.htm, April 8, 2017).  
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on skill credentials, schools pragmatically provide special additional training that typically lasts a 
couple of weeks and that gives students these certificates. As I will demonstrate in Chapter 3, 
employers have more input in school curriculum making than do the state and the NVCS.  
 
Table 2. Regional and Historical Comparison of Graduates Distribution across Sectors 
 
Guangdong 
2012 
Guangdong 
2014 
National 
2014 
Guangdong 
2016 
Agriculture 3.5% 5.7% 10.1% 3.2% 
Natural Resources and Environment 0.3% 0.1% 1.6% 0.3% 
Energy 0.3% 0.1% 1.0% 0.2% 
Construction 1.3% 1.7% 3.7% 2.2% 
Manufacturing 15.7% 12.9% 18.2% 13.2% 
Petro-chemistry 0.3% 0.5% 1.0% 0.4% 
Textile and Food 0.8% 1.5% 1.4% 1.2% 
Transportation 5.5% 6.0% 7.4% 6.5% 
IT 20.2% 18.6% 16.2% 16.5% 
Healthcare 9.9% 9.9% 9.8% 11.5% 
Leisure and Health 0.7% 0.3% 0.8% 0.3% 
Finance, Business Management, and 
Commerce 22.1% 20.6% 9.6% 21.5% 
Tourist Service 3.8% 3.9% 4.1% 3.0% 
Arts 3.6% 3.9% 3.5% 4.5% 
Sports and Fitness 0.4% 0.7% 0.7% 0.3% 
Education 6.0% 8.3% 6.2% 9.4% 
Legal Service 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 
Public Affairs and Social Work 2.3% 1.9% 1.7% 2.8% 
Others 3.0% 3.3% 2.4% 2.8% 
 (Sources: 2012 and 2014 data from Reports on Chinese Vocational School Graduates’ 
Employment Conditions 2006-2012 and 2014 by the MOE; 2016 data from the Guangdong 
Department of Education) 
 
 
In general, schools have been given nearly full autonomy over curriculum development 
by the state. Mrs. Feng, the Dean of Academic Affairs at Qingyuan Polytechnic, told me: 
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In total between 1,400 and 1,800 credit hours, no less than 50% application course 
hours, and no more than 26 hours per week; as long as they meet these standards, 
departments have full autonomy to devise their curricula (II: 49).  
 
I find that some schools can circumvent even these credit restrictions and mandatory 
political and ideological courses. In a meeting, Vice Provost of Guangdong Science and 
Technology Polytechnic explained the following to several collaborative employers who had 
concerns about mandatory political courses: 
All courses in the curricula can be changed freely, except for those mandatory 
courses. But, indeed, we have even changed a lot of those courses for you. The state 
policy stipulates that political courses have to have 36 credit hours. We now have 18 of 
them that are taught in the classroom, and the other 18 are application courses (meaning 
students use those hours to study vocational skills, as noted by the author). This indicates 
that we do have some strategies to maneuver curricula development. Nowadays our 
autonomy to devise curricula is quite considerable (II: 118).  
 
As this conversation indicates, when schools want to maximize their capacity to act on an 
employer’s interests, they can employ a variety of strategies to circumvent state restrictions on 
curricula. Additionally, teachers decide which textbooks to use, and many select self-compiled 
teaching materials provided by collaborative employers.  
In summary, contrary to what earlier scholars found, the Chinese VET system is very 
decentralized. The local state still formally maintains some control over specialty development 
and mandatory courses, but schools can employ various, sometimes state-consented means to 
bypass these restrictions. Taking this position as a start, the following three chapters together 
demonstrate that the process of decentralization has been disorganized. This has caused problems, 
including a skill formation dilemma, for Chinese VET reform.
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CHAPTER 2 
HOW INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS EXPLAIN MODELS OF 
SKILL DEVELOPMENT IN CHINESE VOCATIONAL SCHOOLS 
 
Introduction 
 
The vocational education and training (VET) system is gaining growing importance in 
China. According to the official data, vocational schools have been training increasingly more 
and four times as many students as academic colleges and universities do. Estimated based on a 
90% initial employment rate in respective sectors, graduates from vocational schools accounted 
for 79% of the newly-added urban workforce, and 51% of the second and tertiary sectoral 
workforce in 2014. These numbers were only 51% and 21% in 2004.8 In light of this, not only 
have employers been engaging vocational schools to tackle the local market skilled labor 
shortage (Li and Sheldon 2010), but the state has also enforced a series of reforms in recent years 
to facilitate a profound industrial restructuring and upgrading in China, for which, continuing 
investment in human capital and strengthening the VET system are deemed vital important 
institutional supports.9 
In sharp contrast to its growing relevance in practice, the scholarly understanding of the 
Chinese VET system is still quite limited and somewhat biased. In particular, prevailing wisdom 
in the China labor field stereotypes Chinese vocational schools as quasi-labor agencies, arguing 
that their by and large ineffective and non-market-oriented training processes (Cooke 2005; 
Durden and Yang 2006; Lai and Lo 2006) can generate only unskilled workers (Woronov 2012), 
who are “sold” to firms as seasonable cheap labor for unjustified commissions (Smith and Chan 																																																								
8 These estimations are based on data from the China Statistical Yearbook 2004 and 2014.  
9 According to the “Made in China 2025” by the central government in 2015. 
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2015; Su 2010-2011). These studies were based on methodologically deficient research, however. 
Earlier research was based on very limited, secondary, and often piecemeal data that were mostly 
collected before the new century. The labor-selling behaviors were revealed later by a research 
project that targeted Foxconn. In addition to the obvious industry bias, it is unclear to readers if 
the authors had implemented a plausible sampling strategy on the school side. These deficiencies 
of existing research hint unnoticed variation within the Chinese VET system.  
I argue that the “labor agency” depiction correctly reflects several existing problems 
within a certain portion of the Chinese VET system, but vocational schools maintain much 
variation beyond what this literature has depicted. In order to capture and account for this 
variation, I studied a representative sample of 25 vocational schools and 21 of their collaborative 
firms in Guangdong – an information-rich area (Patton 1990) with regard to its diversified VET 
scenarios. I identified four patterns of skill development across these schools, respectively named 
as the high performance model, the industry-focused model, the local market-oriented model, 
and the labor agency model. Schools under different models feature different levels of training 
effectiveness and funding sources, and graduates’ skill levels and job market scopes.  
As noted, a small amount of scholarship in English on Chinese VET already exists but is 
somewhat outdated and limited in scope, while this paper seeks to enrich our knowledge of the 
Chinese VET system through presenting a wide variety of vocational schools in China and 
explaining the distinctive skill development models they adopt. I draw linkages between distinct 
institutional and organizational factors, and the divergent models that are thereby produced for 
pursuing skill development. Concretely, I contend that state support and strategies, local 
industrial structures, a school’s institutional legacies, and its ownership are key factors in 
determining which skill development model is at work. Before delving into relevant literature 
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and my own argument, I briefly outline the structure of the Chinese VET system as an 
institutional background.  
 
Chinese VET System 
 
Figure 1 in the previous chapter has illustrated the Chinese education system with the age 
of enrollment. As shown, the VET system – at the workforce’s pre-employment skill 
development phase – mainly consists of two types of schools, i.e. vocational schools/colleges 
attached to the Ministry of Education (MOE), and technical schools/colleges attached to the 
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS).10 Pursuing vocational education, 
a student at his/her 15-17 years old can choose to enter either a vocational school (zhongzhi) or a 
technical school (zhongji). The degree one receives at this level is equivalent to a high-school 
degree. After that s/he can choose to either enter the labor market or further pursue vocational 
education by attending a vocational college (gaozhi) or a technical college (gaoji or jishi 
xueyuan). Not frequently happening, but a vocational college graduate may enroll in a two-year 
degree-upgrading program (zhuan sheng ben) in order to acquire a bachelor (university) degree.  
An important feature of the Chinese VET system is the dualist administration of the 
MOHRSS and the MOE. Table 3 compares the number of schools, teachers, and enrolled 
students in the MOHRSS vs. MOE schools in China and in Guangdong. As shown, the two 
ministries each run or administer a significant number of vocational schools in China. The MOE 
has more schools and teachers, and train more students, but the MOHRSS also has considerable 
VET entities. 																																																								
10 In this paper, unless specified otherwise, I use “vocational schools” as a general term that 
covers both types of schools.  
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Table 3. MOHRSS and MOE's VET Systems in 2014 
  MOHRSS Technical Schools MOE Vocational Schools 
Schools 2,818 (243 in Guangdong) 
8,930 
(574 in Guangdong) 
Teachers 194.6 thousand (20.8 thousand in Guangdong) 
1.1 million 
(89.2 thousand in Guangdong) 
Students 3.4 million (622.6 thousand in Guangdong) 
22.3 million 
(2.1 million in Guangdong) 
(Sources: national data from China Statistical Yearbook 2015; Guangdong data from Guangdong Bulletin on 
Educational Affairs 2014-2015) 
 
 
Relevant Literature and Argument 
 
Existing scholarly understanding of the Chinese VET system is limited and somewhat 
biased as noted. Early scholars (Cooke 2005; Durden and Yang 2006; Lai and Lo 2006) focused 
on a national system analysis. They depicted Chinese vocational schools as ineffective and non-
market-oriented entities, and ascribed this problem to state-centralization and therefore the very 
rigid VET system. As a result, vocational schools have by and large failed to accommodate skill 
needs of the industry. Later, critical theorists conducted field research in Foxconn – a major 
electronics manufacturer – and found extensive use of student interns as temp workers during 
peak seasons. In the name of interns, these students were found to be involuntarily performing 
assembly-line operational tasks under the dual control of both schoolteachers and firm managers 
(Smith and Chan 2015). Su (2010-2011) concluded that school-firm collaboration in China 
demonstrates a dual-commodification of labor and education – Through internship programs 
schools provide firms with flexible and cheap labor as an important but unjustified approach to 
revenues. Given their failure to produce useful skilled workers on the one hand, and the seasonal 
cheap labor selling behaviors on the other, Chinese vocational schools have for long been 
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stereotyped as running no more than labor agency businesses. While Su called these schools 
“middlemen,” mass media reported them as “illegal labor brokers” (hei zhongjie).11  
This literature has inherent methodological problems. Early research on the VET system 
was based on very limited and often secondary empirical evidence. Much of their data was 
piecemeal and collected before or around the end of the 20th century. With the deepening of the 
marketization reform in the VET arena throughout the past decade, we should expect to see an 
updated version of Chinese vocational schools today. The literature that focuses on the use of 
student interns has an obviously limited industry scope, i.e. only based on the electronics 
manufacturing industry which, according to Lüthje, Luo, and Zhang (2013), has frequently 
adopted a standard mass production system, and therefore has significantly more assembly-line 
jobs than many other industries. Indeed, these studies were solely based on a well-known 
collaborative research project that focused on Foxconn. Targeting one single employer, it is 
unclear to readers if they had implemented a plausible sampling strategy on the vocational school 
side. This very limited and potentially biased scholarly stereotype on Chinese vocational schools 
leaves space for more nuanced analysis of the system. It is reasonable to suspect much variation 
across Chinese vocational schools that is beyond the labor agency depiction.  
 In this paper, I argue that there is a lot more variation in the Chinese VET system than 
previously thought by scholars. Based on firsthand research of a representative sample of 
vocational schools and their collaborative firms in Guangdong, I have identified four models of 
skill development across these schools, respectively named as the high-performance, the 
industry-focused, the local market-oriented, and the labor agency model. I argue that the 
emergence of these models is explained by four important institutional and organizational 
																																																								
11 http://news.youth.cn/jy/201604/t20160419_7879083.htm, March 16, 2017 
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factors: state support and strategies, local industrial structures, a school’s institutional legacies, 
and its ownership. Following an inductive approach to theory building, my 25 school cases in 
Guangdong clearly illustrate these patterns and their linkages with these explanatory factors. 
Before delving into case analysis, however, I present a number of theoretical reasons for us to 
expect these linkages in the rest of this section. 
 
Local State Support and Strategies 
Nowadays, the state has by and large withdrawn from vocational schools’ daily operation 
and left them sufficient autonomy to devise and carry out their training programs as suggested in 
Ch.1, but central and local governments still provide various forms of support to schools, as well 
as conduct strategic planning that potentially changes the way that schools perform and interact 
with other players. To begin with, the MOE and the MOHRSS and their all-level branches are 
the administrator of Chinese vocational schools, and the primary funder of all public ones 
(Cooke 2005; Lai and Lo 2006). Estimated based on the China Statistical Year Book 2016, 
approximately 80% vocational schools are public ones, whose graduates accounted for 92.6% of 
the total vocational school graduates in 2015. Although the 1980s reform of the VET system 
sought to diversify the schools’ financial sources by placing more funding responsibilities on the 
local governments, as well as introducing self and social funding mechanisms, the central 
government still plays a dominant role and serves as a major provider of school funding (Schnarr, 
Yang, and Gleissner 2008). And in the early 2000s, there was a trend of state policies toward 
recentralizing the financing approach and the supervision of the fund of the educational system 
in general (Murphy and Johnson 2009). I found that state support is crucial to sustaining the high 
performance model of top-tier public schools. In this case, national and regional governments 
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provide tremendous resources in various forms to schools, in recognition of their achievement, 
but also in exchange for their cooperation on certain state-initiated projects.  
The state provides various supports also to private schools although to a much lesser 
extent. This is justified by the fact the education is essentially public goods that often entail state 
direct intervention to remedy a major collective action (free rider) problem (Streeck 1989). What 
I found in Dongguan supports this theory, and indicates that state support and regulatory 
strategies help avoid private schools’ short-term behaviors, and potentially move those trapped in 
the labor agency model up to the local market-oriented model.  
The second factor here is local state strategies. The state can enforce various reform 
agendas to restructure the VET system, some of which can engender fundamental changes to the 
way that practitioners interact with one another. And this role of the state has recently become 
more significant given the growing importance of VET in China’s economic reform. In the 
ongoing apprenticeship reforms documented in Ch.4, the MOE and the MOHRSS have each 
adopted a different approach to institution building, but both have imposed a certain level of 
restructuring on how schools and employers collaborate and train students together. In this paper, 
I present a case where Dongguan Bureau of Education (DGDOE) successfully enforced a reform 
over local market-oriented schools to reinforce their integration with local industry clusters. All 
in all, we expect to see different levels and forms of state support and strategies to be linked to 
different skill development models of vocational schools.  
 
Local Industrial Structures 
Vocational schools are inherently tasked with the mission of serving local industrial 
development, which entails extra direct input of local employers in their training processes 
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compared to other schools. The dominant industrial relations paradigm provides the insight that 
product market structures and changes are often reflected in labor market practices (Kochan, 
Katz, and McKersie 1986). As the Chinese VET system has become an increasingly important 
labor market institution for employers to tackle the problem of skilled labor shortage (Li and 
Sheldon 2014), the linkage between local industrial structures and vocational schools’ skill 
development patterns is expected to be strong and further gain strength. This linkage can be also 
derived from the regulation school pioneered by Boyer (1987) and Leborgne and Lipietz (1988), 
as well as the varieties of capitalism perspective (Hall and Soskice 2001). Both literatures 
consent on the fact that skill development systems – in their equilibrium conditions – are 
historically proven to be often compatible with the dominant production modes of an economy 
(Green 1992; Sorge and Streeck 1988).  
Here an often seen phenomenon is industry-cluster embeddedness of vocational schools. 
In geographers’ careful examination of industrial clusters’ formation processes, educational 
institutions are deemed indispensible infrastructures for the emergence and sustainability of a 
cluster. In turn, these co-located firms, with their economy of scale advantage, provide 
educational entities with various resources and job-market opportunities to incentivize them to 
customize training programs according to what local employers need (Feldman, Francis, and 
Bercovitz 2005). In both the US and Europe, community colleges are found to intentionally 
target industry clusters in which they are embedded. An industry cluster benefits from vocational 
schools continuous supply of skilled labor, but also actively shapes the local VET system 
through transferring technology and know-hows, as well as constructing formal and informal 
learning contexts for trainees (Rosenfeld 2000).  
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But even without salient industry clustering, both community colleges in the US 
(Dougherty and Bakia 1999) and vocational schools in China (Ch.3) are found to have strong 
local industry orientation, actively collaborating with important firms to serve dominant regional 
industry needs. It is therefore reasonable to assume that local industrial structures, especially 
dominant industries and leading firms, play important roles in the formation of vocational 
schools’ skill development models. In this paper, I found in Dongguan that local market-oriented 
vocational schools have historically emerged and embedded in district industry clusters, and 
therefore each have a strong clustered-industry focus.   
 
Institutional Legacies 
Institutional legacies are important in general for explaining organizational outcomes. 
This can be derived from the resource-dependence theory where institutional legacies are seen as 
important external resources that organizations can capitalize on, and devise their strategies 
against (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Relevant to the discussion here, two important institutional 
legacies are crucial to vocational schools’ development in China. The first is reputation. 
Prestigious schools can secure sufficient student supply, and attract better students (Monks and 
Ehrenberg 1999). Moreover, high reputation can be socially reproduced. Reputation is deemed a 
valuable organizational attribute that can generate high performance, which in turn reinforce 
their high social recognition and thus further sustain the high-speed growth. This theory has been 
well applied to the context of educational organizations; In particular, American business schools 
are the most frequently used examples by management scholars (Boyd, Bergh, and Ketchen 2010; 
Corley and Gioia 2000; Pfeffer and Fong 2002). Scholars also found in the American higher 
education system that reputation is often able to generate a premium for top schools to charge 
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high tuition (Peters 2007), which is consistent with my findings in some private “high 
performance” vocational schools in Guangdong.  
Frequently, reputation is embodied in various school rankings, which in the Chinese 
context are often associated with state recognition and generous support. In the higher education 
arena, state funding is found to often lean toward top-tier universities led by Tsinghua and 
Peking in order to build their international fame and competitiveness (Ngok and Guo 2008; Yang 
and Welch 2012). And I found that this same rationale applies to the VET field as well.  
Another important institutional legacy that is unique to many Chinese vocational schools 
is their industry connections dating back to the socialist centrally planned economy. Since the 
establishment of the communist regime, vocational schools have founded and operated by 
industry-focused ministries (e.g. the Ministry of Textile that was in charge of the textile industry) 
and/or their SOEs, tasked with the mission of training cadres and technicians for the early 
Chinese industrialization. By 1992, 4,392 technical schools had been established – about half by 
firms – which had generated 5.3 million technicians mostly working in SOEs (Xu 1993). The 
political and economic reform throughout the 1980s and 1990s first abolished those industry-
focused ministries12 – when ownership of these schools were transferred to the SOEs that were 
transformed from those ministries – and later in the late 1990s required SOEs to reduce their 
social functions and detach their schools.13 The result was that ownership of most vocational 
schools was ultimately transferred to the MOHRSS or the MOE.   
In other words, after the 1990s, the MOE and the MOHRSS own most, if not all, public 
vocational schools in China. But many schools could, to varying extents, retain their connections 
with those founder SOEs, many of which are still the leading firms of certain industries. Such 																																																								
12 http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1025/9893075.html, March 5, 2017 
13 http://www.gd.lm.gov.cn/gdlss/zcfg/zc/zypx/zypxjggl/t20000316_3701.htm, March 5, 2017 
		 54 
cases are most frequently seen in relatively centralized sectors, with SOE-dominated or even 
oligopolistic structures, e.g. telecom, construction, railway, and marine transportation. 
Consequently, many Chinese vocational schools fall into an industry-focused model where their 
development and revenues considerably rely on these leading firms and their subsidiaries and 
suppliers.  
 
Ownership 
Ownership itself does not directly lead to the emergence of any pattern, but it is often 
associated with the other three factors noted above. Privately owned vocational schools often 
find themselves in a condition of what I call “triple scarcity,” i.e. lack of state support, industry 
cluster embeddedness, high state and social recognition, or historically rooted major industry 
connections, and therefore have to at times resort to labor-selling businesses to make up the extra 
costs in their student recruitment processes. In the China context, private schools typically do not 
have comparable state support or inherited SOE connections, and tend to be less socially 
recognized than public schools. Alumni endowment that is an important revenue approach of 
American private schools is not a reliable tradition in China, and those limited endowments are 
concentrated in universities and academic colleges (also mostly public ones). We therefore 
expect private ownership of vocational schools to be associated with the labor agency model.  
 
Methods 
 
I studied 25 vocational schools in Guangdong Province during my two-month 
preliminary research in 2014-2015 and one-year intensive fieldwork in 2015-2016. I chose 
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Guangdong for two reasons. First of all, Guangdong is an information-rich case (Patton 1990) 
with regard to diversified VET scenarios. It is not only a most industrialized province in China 
with both high-end and low-end manufacturing and service industries clustered in its major cities, 
but also the biggest vocational education province, hosting 574 vocational schools and 243 
technical schools that respectively account for 6.4% and 8.6% of the total numbers in the country 
in 2014. 2.7 million students enrolled in these schools in that year, accounting for about 10.6% of 
the national total (See, Table 3). We therefore expect to see more dynamic scenarios of school-
firm collaboration in Guangdong than other provinces. In addition, Guangdong is where many of 
the above mentioned authors have conducted their studies. It is reasonable to update their 
theories based on research in the same political economic context.  
Table 4 lists the 25 schools that I have studied. As shown, this list has covered both 
vocational schools and technical schools. Within each type, I selected at least one high-end, one 
mid-range, and one low-end school, based on their training effectiveness, funding sources, 
graduates’ skill levels and job-market scopes, as well as official and social recognition. This 
approach enabled me to compare different types of schools as well as identify common themes. 
Also, these schools are located in a wide range of cities within Guangdong, from the most 
industrialized areas such as Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Dongguan, Foshan, and Zhuhai to the least 
developed areas like Qingyuan, Zhanjiang, and Zhaoqing. It is noteworthy that the high-end 
schools are not necessarily located in the most advanced cities, although local government 
support does play an important role in a school’s development, as I will show. In addition, 
Guangzhou, as the capital city and education center of the province, hosts the most and also 
many of the high-end schools. 
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Table 4. Schools Studied by Cities 
 Developed Areas Less Developed Areas 
Guangzhou Shenzhen Dongguan Foshan Zhuhai Qingyuan Zhanjiang Conghua Zhaoqing 
High-
end 
GDPST (MOE) I 
GDIP (MOE) I 
GZPYP (MOE) I 
BYTCBT (MOHRSS) I 
GDMTC (MOHRSS) I 
SZP 
(MOE) I 
 SDLVTS 
(MOE) 
III 
 QYP 
(MOE) III 
   
Mid-
range 
GDCP (MOE) II 
GZHSC (MOE) II 
GZRP (MOE) II 
GDCP (MOE) II 
GDMEC (MOE) II 
GZVSLI (MOE) III 
GDLNCIC (MOHRSS) I 
GZTC (MOHRSS) III 
 DGEES 
(MOE) III 
SDVTS 
(MOE) 
III 
  ZJHS 
(MOE) II 
 ZQMC 
(MOE) II 
Low-
end 
GDVCPT (MOE) II 
GZIT (MOE) III 
 Anonymous 
(MOE) IV 
 ZHHS 
(MOE) II 
  GZCHTS 
(MOHRSS) III 
 
Note: I, II, III, and IV correspond to skill development models in Table 5. See the interview list for full school names. 
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Data 
This paper draws on three types of data generated from the field research. The first 
consists of 322 interviews with various stakeholders of the VET system. In particular, the 200 in-
depth interviews with presidents, administration, teachers, students, and parents from 25 schools 
constitute my major information resource for understanding daily operation of Chinese 
vocational schools. My interviews with officials from the MOE and the MOHRSS, and their 
local branches not only granted me a useful overview of the VET landscape in both China and 
Guangdong, but also helped identify and connected me to representative school cases across 
different levels. Beyond that, the state itself is an important stakeholder of the VET system 
whose roles were also probed into through conversation. Likewise, existing literatures have spent 
great efforts to examine schools’ collaboration with firms as an important approach to vocational 
education. I therefore also conducted interviews with managements, firm-level union officials, 
and workers/trainees from 21 firms to examine their important input. In addition, I interviewed 
officials from 12 other relevant organizations including local official unions, think-tank 
organizations, NGOs, employer associations, and academic institutes who provided useful 
supplementary information. Some of the interviews took place during group meetings, which is 
very common in China. Individual and group interviews last two hours on average.  
Second, further exploring the linkages between vocational schools and relevant 
stakeholders, I have engaged in tremendous participant and non-participant observation over 
their continuous interaction. I achieved this via two primary ways. First, I was allowed by 
government officials and school presidents to attend various public and nonpublic meetings, 
informal conversations, and dinners – a typical way of informal communication in China. I also 
participated in two VET reform projects in Guangdong. Throughout late 2015 and early 2016, I 
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served as an external consultant for the curriculum reform in Guangdong’s beauty sector. And 
during April 2016, I was invited to be a translator for a team of British consultants for the 
MOE’s apprenticeship reform. These experiences allowed me to gain valuable insider 
information regarding how VET practitioners strategically link schools’ daily operation with 
those stakeholders’ various activities and innovative initiatives.  
Last, I have collected a considerable amount of secondary data to supplement these 
primary information resources, including relevant state policies, internal documents of 
governments, schools, and firms, and internet-based resources such as background information 
of schools and firms that I studied, and important news and reports. These secondary data not 
only prepared me for better and more strategic interviews, but also served to cover information 
that my process tracing through interviews could not yield.  
 
Four Skill Development Models in Chinese VET 
 
The Chinese VET system has demonstrated great variation across schools. I found that 
vocational schools in Guangdong converge into four distinctive skill development patterns based 
on a school’s training effectiveness and funding sources, and its students’ skill level and job 
market scope. Table 5 summarizes these features of the four models, and I examine these models 
in turn below.  
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Table 5. Skill Development Models of Vocational Schools 
 
 
 
High Performance Model 
The first is what I call the high performance model, where schools are able to target 
relatively high-end job markets and secure high tuition and/or state funding by providing high 
training effectiveness and levels of skills. Schools falling into this category have historically 
achieved great performance in these aspects, and are deemed “national key schools” that have 
gained great state support and social recognition. More importantly, these schools have been able 
to reproduce this high recognition overtime, further securing sustainable high performance.  
A school under this model can equip its students with high levels of skills, who are often 
employed by high-end firms across the country on relatively high-skilled jobs. Some excellent 
students are seen to work in research institutes and other vocational schools. Guangdong 
Machinery Technician College falls into this category in my definition, and they have a tradition 
Model Training Effectiveness 
Skill 
Level Job Market Scope Funding Sources 
I. High 
Performance 
Comprehensive 
High High 
High-end firms around the 
country, schools, and 
research institutes 
High or regular 
tuition, and state 
funding 
II. Industry-
focused Medium 
Medium-
high 
Local (provincial) firms, and 
research institutes 
Regular tuition, state 
funding, and non-
degree training 
revenues  
III. Local 
Market-
oriented 
Medium Medium-low 
Local (municipal or 
provincial) firms 
Regular tuition, and 
local state funding 
IV. Labor 
Agency Low Low 
Local or nation-wide, but 
low-end firms 
Internship and labor 
dispatching 
commission, low or 
zero tuition 
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of training top-notch students to participate in national and international level skill competitions. 
In the 43th WorldSkills Competition in 2015, players from this school won five medals including 
three of the five that the Chinese delegation won in total. Four of the five medal-winners were 
retained by the school as teachers, while the other one (a champion) was eventually hired by the 
China Institute of Air to Air Missile. The school president told me: 
We have many other students that also received training but did not participate in 
the final competition. They are excellent too. Many of them went to other schools as 
teachers. These students have systemic knowledge, consummate skills, and higher levels 
of work ethics and passion. Even if going to firms, they work on key technical positions 
(II: 189).  
 
Although not every student receives this kind of training, it indicates the high level of training 
effectiveness of the high-performance schools in general.  
Given the wide social recognition, schools under the high performance model have a 
steady supply of students, and are therefore well funded by student tuition. Baiyun Technician 
College of Business and Technology is one of the best private vocational schools in China, and 
has indeed been ranked the top one technical school in Guangdong by the Guangdong 
Department of Human Resources and Social Security for many years, overriding all public 
schools. An important and most striking evidence for Baiyun’s success is its much higher tuition 
than public schools. While the state stipulates tuition of 3,500 yuan/year for public vocational 
schools, Baiyun charges between 11,500-14,000 yuan/year. Even though there are quite many 
public schools available for students, Baiyun has been able to secure sufficient student supply 
despite the high tuition. A Baiyun official proudly explained to me why they are able to do so 
without conceding on enrollment: 
This is a word-of-mouth thing – the result of our great efforts on students’ 
employment outcomes and career development. There is no prize that can be compared 
with the students’ word-of-mouth marketing (II: 191).  
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My interview with a second-year Baiyun student in the architecture department confirmed this 
word-of-mouth marketing, and revealed how the school is able to reproduce that social 
recognition, as well as students’ willingness to pay for that. When asked why he chose Baiyun 
regardless of its high tuition, the student said: 
This school has conditions that are worth (the high tuition). I asked many senior 
fellows (before coming, and they said) as long as you want, you will be able to find better 
jobs than other schools… The school recently offered the XXX technology course, which 
is a cutting-edge and the latest construction-estimating program in China. The school 
offers this course to enhance our job-market opportunities (II: 197).  
 
High-performance schools offer comprehensive subjects, often targeting high-end 
industries and cutting-edge technologies. Within only four months in 2013, Baiyun established 
one of the few 3D printing programs in Guangdong. As an emerging industry in China, 3D 
printing is high-tech and expensive. An industry-used 3D printer costs from tens of thousands to 
millions of yuan. Baiyun have established two practical centers with 35 such printers plus 5 
scanning systems, in collaboration with two major printer providers in Guangdong. Their 
graduates are nowadays seen to be working in R&D, sales, technician, and administration teams 
in various 3D printer firms.  
Baiyun’s achievement indicates that private ownership in not incompatible with a high-
road approach to vocational education, although a lot of the low-end labor agency model schools, 
as I show soon, are also privately owned. I found that Baiyun’s internship programs are much 
regulated, and “labor selling” behavior does not exist here. Their agreements with collaborative 
firms have stipulated a number of requirements regarding the use of student interns: First, interns 
have to be put on positions relevant to their specialties. No assembly-line work is acceptable. 
Second, overtime work is only acceptable in occasional and justified cases. Finally, the 
agreements also clearly stipulate the stipends/wages, career development paths, as well as 
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insurance and other welfare benefits that firms should offer. Beyond these, the way that the 
school takes care of their student interns was quite surprising to me. A department head, Mr. Mo 
introduced: 
If a student does not like the intern position, we can change for him/her. If a 
student feels that this position is not suitable for his/her development, s/he can require 
change. (Author: how often does that happen?) Quite often indeed, I have tried to do this 
for some students five or six times. They just came back, not satisfied with the job. We 
communicated, tried to make it up, and got new positions for them… This is the baby-
seating job that we have been doing, and the service we provide for such high tuition (II: 
193).   
 
Public schools cannot exceed state tuition standards, but high-performance public schools 
have privileges over private and other public schools in that they can secure more state subsidies 
and various other resources. Mo compared themselves with peer public schools: 
Nowadays state support for public schools is quite considerable, but that for us is 
different. For instance, some special funding for practical center building can offer them 
100 million yuan, but when it comes to us, it may be 10 to 20 million. That is enough for 
them to purchase 10 to 20 German CNC machines, but only one or two for us (II: 193).   
 
In exchange, the state expects public schools to be cooperative in various projects that the 
state occasionally initiates. In 2000, VW started to establish their fourth China-based assembly 
plant in Foshan, investing in the first cycle 13 billion yuan as well as the latest and most 
advanced technologies. 4,000 skilled workers were expected to be in need by 2013 when the 
factory was designated to be in operation at its full capacity. They resorted to the local state for 
help. This challenging but also much admired opportunity was introduced to four best local 
public vocational colleges in Guangdong including Guangdong Industry Polytechnic. A school 
official, Mr. Jie, said that they “appreciate this opportunity for students to enhance their skills 
and improve their incomes” – After all, “there are not many firms as good as VW in China” (II: 
8). My personal observation of this VW factory confirmed this comment. The workshops are 
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equipped with high levels of automation, advanced robots, and other latest technologies, much 
better than a VW Germany-based factory, as well as many other Japanese carmakers’ workshops 
that I have visited.  
These students were sent to receive training in Changchun in Northeast China – where 
VW’s first joint venture (JV) plant in China is located. Jie recalled: 
We recruited over 100 (third year) volunteer students to do internship in VW’s 
HQ in Changchun… Throughout the six years’ collaboration from then on, we have in all 
supplied them with over 2,000 students. The Changchun factory is more developed. Just 
like a training center, experienced workers guide freshmen there. And then students were 
sent back to the Nanhai factory… About 800 students were eventually retained. The 
school spent a lot of money on this, mainly to subsidize teachers that go with the students. 
They (VW) did not give us any money (II: 8). 
 
According to my interview with a VW manager, these retained workers have been put on various 
positions, mostly as welders. Their initial wages range between 8,000 and 9,000 yuan/month in 
addition to very generous year-end bonuses. In comparison, Foshan’s minimum wage in 2014 
was only 1,310 yuan/month, indicating high-performance school graduates’ extraordinary job 
market achievement.  
 
Industry-focused Model 
The second model that many schools adopt is what I call the industry-focused model. A 
school under this model has specialized expertise in a certain industry based on its historically 
rooted connections with state administration and leading state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in that 
sector. These connections are an institutional legacy of this type of schools that were established 
by state ministries with authority over key industries under the socialist centrally planed 
economy as noted. Many schools have – to varying extents – retained their strong connections 
with those industries and leading SOEs, as well as the tradition of specialized education and 
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training for those sectors. These connections also enable schools to integrate up-do-date 
technologies and know-hows into their trainings.  
Guangdong Vocational College of Post and Telecom (GDCPT) is a telecommunication 
industry-focused vocational school. Founded in 1949, the school was initially tasked with the 
mission of training specialized talents (technicians and managements) for the industry under the 
centrally planned economy. From the 1950s to the 1990s, the school served as a technician and 
cadre school for the former Guangdong Post and Telecom Bureau. This sector underwent a 
couple reforms from the late 1990s on – the separation between the post and the telecom sector, 
and in 2000 the transformation of the telecom industry from a state ministry into a monopolistic 
Guangdong Telecom Corporation. Today, this corporation has retained its ownership of the 
school, different from many other sectors, but the education affairs of the school are 
administered by the MOE. The school currently has four departments: Information and 
Communication Engineering, Mobile Communications, Computer Science, and Economics and 
Business, indicating its strong telecommunication industry focus.  
Consequently, intensive knowledge exchange regularly takes places between the school 
and the telecommunication industry. On the one hand, the school offers a lot of customized non-
degree training for firms in the industry. Industry-focused schools are mostly, if not none, public, 
such that they cannot charge higher tuition, but non-degree industry-focused training has become 
an important approach to revenues for this type of schools. In 2008, the GDCPT founded a 
training company, providing state agencies, SOEs, MNCs, and other private firms with non-
degree training services. Nowadays, the school trains over 300 thousand person-days a year, with 
yearly revenues of over 100 million yuan from this business.14 On the other hand, knowledge and 
																																																								
14 http://www.gupt.net/?CorporateTrain/Business/Business_B/, April 2, 2017 
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technology are transferred from leading SOEs to schools. Since 2004, the GDCPT has 
established six firm-based practical centers including one with the Guangzhou Post Bureau, and 
another one with Guangdong Telecom. These leading firms have also dispatched 80 of their 
senior technicians and engineers to work part-time in the school as guest teachers.  
Industry-focused schools are most frequently seen in relatively centralized sectors 
dominated by several leading or even oligopolistic firms. In the GDCPT case, 
telecommunication is an extremely centralized industry where the “Big Three” including China 
Telecom dominate the industry nowadays, whereas the post sector is still by and large state-
monopolized. China Telecom and China Post and their subsidiaries and suppliers are long-term 
partners of the GDCPT. Guangdong Communication Polytechnic (GCP) was founded in 1956 by 
the former Guangdong Department of Communications, so that it has inherited not only its 
connections with both the railway and marine transportation sectors that are by and large SOE-
dominated, but also expertise on both transportation management and infrastructure building. In 
addition, foreign and domestic carmakers, as well as their JVs have historically gained 
connections with this polytechnic. The school thus also has an automobile department that 
maintains extensive collaboration with major carmakers and part suppliers including BMW, 
Bosch, Nissan, and Toyota.  
Graduates from industry-focused schools are consequently equipped with relatively high 
skills and consummate knowledge of a particular industry, and can often find jobs in that sector. 
In 2016, 61.5% of GDCPT’s graduates were employed in the telecommunication and its highly 
related IT industry. Top-ten employers all belong to the telecommunication sector, most of 
which are Guangdong Telecom’s subsidiaries and suppliers. As an industry-focused school often 
represents the highest level of vocational education of a sector, it can generate top-notch students 
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that achieve high-end job markets. Professor Guo from the auto department of the GCP related to 
me: 
We have students that went to work in research institutes. This is not a typical 
case in other schools’ auto departments… For instance, we have students hired by the 
Guangzhou Automobile Group’s Institute of Automobile every year. (Author: what skills 
of our students do they appreciate?) I think it is their strong manual skills. Even the R&D 
of auto products needs people to perform many such practical tasks (II: 88).  
 
Local Market-oriented Model 
The third pattern is the local market-oriented model. Schools here demonstrate more 
flexibility than those under the industry-focused model in terms of specialty and curriculum 
development without constrained by any historically rooted industry legacy. But their training 
effectiveness and thus students’ skill levels are not as high as the above two types of schools also 
due to the absence of those connections with leading firms. Students’ job market scopes are by 
and large within the city or district a school is located. Schools therefore follow very pragmatic 
and market logics, focusing on employment outcomes in local job markets. Consequently, local 
product market structures, especially local industry clusters, greatly shape the development of 
these schools. Market logics tend to underlie schools’ short-term behaviors, however, potentially 
including running labor agency businesses. Therefore, another important factor at work here (to 
differentiate from the labor agency model) is the local state support and strategies that help to 
avoid these short-term behaviors.  
To begin with, industry clustering often facilitates the emergence and reinforcement of 
local market-oriented schools. Dongguan is probably the best illustration of this phenomenon in 
Guangdong. An earliest and most industrialized city in Guangdong, Dongguan’s industrialization 
process during the past decades has resulted in and featured industry agglomeration, where major 
industries cluster in its 32 towns and an industrial park. Large-scaled and well-known industry 
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clusters include the apparel town named Hu’men, the knitwear town Dalang, the automobile 
town Liaobu, the furniture towns Houjie and Dalingshan, the mold towns Chang’an and Hengli, 
and the electronic towns Tangxia, Shijie, Shilong, and Chang’an. Dongguan’s VET system, 
consequently, has been historically integrated into these local industry clusters. By 2012, 18 
MOE schools had emerged in Dongguan, mostly located in industry towns instead of the central 
city districts (which is a typical case in many other Chinese cities). Table 6 has a list of these 
schools and which industry cluster/town they each belonged to before 2012. As shown, 11 of 
these schools were located in major industry clusters, each receiving funding from the respective 
town-level education bureau, and had a strong expertise and educational focus on the local 
industry cluster.  
In the late 2000s, however, the DGBOE observed a phenomenon that local vocational 
schools started to establish many “fast food” specialties, including accounting, management, and 
other business administration subjects. These specialties are at low costs of the schools compared 
with traditional manufacturing subjects that entail tremendous investment in equipment 
purchasing and practical center building. These new subjects are gaining growing importance 
given the deindustrialization process in the Pearl Rive Delta area throughout the past decade, 
admittedly, but it became a reasonable concern of the DGBOE that schools were prompted to do 
so only for “cost-efficiency” reasons. A DGBOE official, Ms. Zeng, related to me: 
Schools did this on the one hand to save money. On the other hand, it is appealing 
to parents who often belittle blue-collar workers. But graduates from these specialties 
cannot find high-skilled jobs. Accounting students, for instance, mostly end up working 
as cashiers in supermarkets. Also, development of local industries needs skilled workers 
(I: 11).  
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Table 6. Dongguan Vocational Schools and Industrial Clusters before and after 2012 
Before 2012 After 2012 District/Town Industrial Cluster 
School of Business and 
Economics of Dongguan 
School of Business and 
Economics of Dongguan 
Guancheng  
(central district) 
  Dongguan Vocational & 
Technical School 
Dongguan Sports School Dongguan Sports School Dongcheng 
(central district)   
Dongcheng Vocational & 
Technical School 
Dongguan Commercial 
School 
Dongcheng 
(central district)   
Nancheng Vocational & 
Technical School 
Nanchen 
 (central district)   
Dongguan Health School Dongguan Health School Daojiao   
Dongguan Science & 
Technology School 
Dongguan Science & 
Technology School 
Hengli Plastic mold 
manufacturing 
Humen Weiyuan 
Vocational School 
Dongguan Textile & Fashion 
School 
Humen Apparel 
manufacturing 
Dalang Vocational School Dalang Knitwear 
manufacturing 
Houjie Technical School Dongguan Light Industry 
School 
Houjie Shoes and 
furniture 
manufacturing 
Chang'an Vocational 
School 
Dongguan Electromechanics 
Engineering School 
Chang'an Electronics and 
metal mold 
manufacturing 
Tangxia Science & 
Technology School 
School od Electronics & 
Technology of Dongguan 
Tangxia Electronic 
manufacturing 
Changping Huangshui 
Vocational School 
Dongguan Electronics & 
Commerce School 
Changping Logistics and e-
commerce 
Shijie Vocational School Dongguan Information 
Technology School 
Shijie Electronic 
manufacturing 
Shilong Vocational & 
Technical School 
Shilong Electronic 
manufacturing 
Mayong Vocational 
School 
Mayong 
  
Liaobu Vocational & 
Technical School 
Dongguan Auto-Technology 
School 
Liaobu Automobile 
manufacturing 
Dalingshan Vocational & 
Technical School 
Dongguan Furniture School Dalingshan Furniture 
manufacturing 
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Here we see important local state efforts that aimed to further strengthen the ties between 
local vocational schools and the industry clusters they serve, and avoid schools’ short-term 
behaviors. In 2012, the DGBOE enforced a local VET restructuring and consolidation reform, 
reintegrating the 18 schools into 13, and enhancing the expertise of each school on its focused 
industry. Zeng continued: 
We reintegrated and renamed some schools, to enhance their local industry focus, 
and got rid of several “fast food” specialties. The bureau gave them money. We allocate a 
special funding of 30 million/year for schools’ equipment purchasing, but only for their 
industry-featured specialties in order to encourage them to reform (I: 11).  
 
Table 6 compares vocational schools in Dongguan before vs. after 2012. The result of this 
reform, as indicated, is that local vocational schools now each have an even neater industry focus, 
and even deeper integration with the local industry cluster.  
A school under the local market-oriented model is less able to receive national and 
provincial level government resources compared to the above two models, but can be even better 
funded than those schools if it is within a relatively wealthy city or district, as demonstrate by the 
Dongguan case. However, some schools may be in less developed areas but enjoy equally strong 
local government support. Qingyuan is one of the least developed cities in Guangdong, featuring 
a substantial component of agriculture in its economy. The Qingyuan government, however, has 
been impressively supportive for VET development. By offering generous support in various 
forms, the Qingyuan state encourages local schools to adapt their curricula to better serve the 
local industry. In Qingyuan Polytechnic, school officials appreciate the generous support from 
the Qingyuan Bureau of Education, and in return, they are motivated to establish specialties that 
are compatible with the local industrial structure, such as a featured Agricultural Technology and 
Management specialty.  
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Schools under this model generate graduates with middle-level skills that can secure 
themselves relatively good jobs. In Conghua Technical School that I have categorized into this 
pattern, I interviewed the recruiting manager of Gree, Inc., one of the biggest electric appliance 
manufacturers in the world. Gree’s HQ recruits students from the school on a yearly base. The 
manager told me: 
Our HQ factory has full production chains, but students will not be working on 
assembly lines. What we need are: First, students in Molding will work in our molding 
workshops; Second, students in Refrigeration will work on refrigeration detection or 
assistant refrigeration R&D jobs; Mechanics students will work in our Institute of 
Electromechanics, the Institute of Automation, or the Automatic Equipment 
Manufacturing Department, all relevant to their specialties (III: 1).  
 
Labor Agency Model 
The last is the labor agency model. This is the stereotype of Chinese vocational schools in 
literature. But I found that in Guangdong only a small number of schools, typically poorly 
funded private ones, fall into this category. These schools are under “triple scarcity” – They lack 
historically rooted industry connections (as in the industry-focused model), strong state support 
(as in the local market-oriented and the high-performance model), or high social recognition (as 
in the high performance model). They rarely receive additional state subsidies, as those resources 
typically target high-ranked and lean toward public schools. Neither is there any institutional 
legacy – social recognition or industry connections – for them to derive success from. 
Consequently, these schools cannot deliver effective training processes, and their students thus 
cannot acquire adequate vocational skills and decent jobs. The result is that schools are faced 
with insufficient supply of students, and therefore often have to offer lower than state-stipulated 
tuition in order to encourage enrollment. These schools are therefore further deprived of 
resources for improving their training capacity, and at the same time, have to very often resort to 
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“selling” these students as cheap labor to low-end firms for illegal commissions in order to make 
up that tuition loss, stuck in a vicious circle as a result.  
These schools have employed all kinds of strategies in order to attract students, including 
offering reduced or even zero tuition. Sometimes they give a considerable proportion of student 
tuition to teachers or other agents as commissions in order to encourage them to find students. 
These extra costs in the student recruitment process add to their already quite heavy financial 
burdens. Schools thus resort to certain forms of labor agency businesses in order to make up that 
loss. A frequently used strategy has been documented by literature, i.e. sending student interns as 
cheap labor to involuntarily engage in low-skilled, mostly assembly-line jobs in mass production 
factories, in exchange for commissions from these employers that are faced with labor shortage 
and high worker turnover. Further, although state regulation bans vocational schools from doing 
so, some private schools are seen to send student interns to firms in their second year. This 
practice compresses schooling time, rendering the training process even more ineffective and 
meaningless. Not equipped with sufficient skills, second-year student interns very easily fall on 
low-end operational jobs.  
Both central and Guangdong local governments are aware of this phenomenon. In 
Dongguan, for instance, the DGBOE has devised two strategies to tackle this problem. First of 
all, they limit the tenure of internship – for public schools, three to six months at maximum; for 
private schools, no more than a year – and forbid schools from sending student interns in their 
second year. At the same time, they offer private schools more funding. While state-subsidized 
tuition only covers the first two school years according to the central policy, the DGBOE offers 
one additional year tuition-subsidy. An interviewed official of the DGBOE related to me: 
The state’s support for private schools is not that big. They largely rely on tuition 
for operation… Many of them used to sell first and second year students to factories as 
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interns, while we have completely forbidden this behavior. Any school that is found to do 
so will immediately lose their license (I: 11).  
 
While it is unclear to me if these strategies have completely eliminated the “labor-selling” 
phenomenon in Dongguan private schools, it indicates that local state strategies and support can 
serve as important forces to prevent vocational schools from conducting short-term behaviors 
and running labor agency businesses.  
Indeed, labor agency schools are more frequently seen in inland provinces that are less 
developed, with surplus labor from the agricultural sector who typically lack accesses to 
industrial jobs in East China. Private schools under the labor agency model have thus emerged in 
these areas. Many middle school graduates who have decided not to continue to pursue higher 
education but are still under legal working age of 16 end up recruited and eventually sold to 
sweatshop factories in East China industrialized cities. 
As shown, Chinese vocational schools differ from one another with regard to levels of 
training effectiveness and primary funding sources, and students’ job market scopes and skill 
levels. Cases presented have demonstrated that this variation is linked to four explanatory factors, 
namely local state support and strategies, local industrial structures, a school’s institutional 
legacies, and its ownership. Table 7 summarizes these factors and their variation across four skill 
development models. I now turn to a discussion of these factors and how they account for the 
emergence of distinctive skill development patterns in China.  
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Table 7. Factors that Account for Variation in Skill Development 
 
Note: shading-highlighted cells represent dominant factors in the formation of a certain model 
 
 
Discussion 
 
In contrast to what the literature has presented, my investigations find considerable 
variation in vocational schools’ operation that was previously unknown to scholars. I argue that 
the combination of dominant institutional and organizational factors a school is endowed with 
influences its skill development pattern, and variation across schools in these endowments leads 
to the variation in their skill development models. I also argue that factors at work include 
institutional contexts such as state support and strategies, and local industrial structures, as well 
 Institutional Factors Organizational Factors 
 State Supports and 
Strategies 
Local Industrial 
Structures 
Institutional 
Legacies 
School 
Ownership 
High 
Performance 
High national and 
local supports, and 
having VET lead local 
industrial 
development 
Cutting-edge 
industry 
influenced 
Social reproduction 
of high state and 
social recognition 
Public or 
private 
Industry-
focused 
Medium-level state 
support 
Single industry 
focused 
Industry and 
leading SOE 
connections 
Most, if not 
all, public 
Local 
Market-
oriented 
High local state 
supports, and 
localization strategy 
of the state 
Local industry 
cluster 
embeddedness 
Local reputation 
and industry 
connections 
Public or 
private 
Labor 
Agency 
No or little state 
support 
No industry 
cluster 
embeddedness 
No industry 
connections beyond 
“labor trading”; low 
social recognition 
Most, if not 
all, private 
		
74 
as organizational endowments like institutional legacies and ownership. The evidence from the 
25 Guangdong-based vocational schools, described above, provides support for these arguments.  
As examined above and summarized in Table 5 and 7, the skill development approaches 
in the 25 schools exhibit different patterns. Although these patterns are a product of unique 
historical, economic, and political circumstances, their basic contours reflect the interplay of four 
important institutional and organizational factors whose relative influence varies across schools. 
As Table 7 shows, the four skill development patterns reflect combinations of institutional and 
organizational factors, as well as the dominance of specific factors. Dominant factors at work for 
each model are highlighted in the table. 
I find that high performance schools are characterized by a high level of training 
effectiveness, whose students are equipped with relatively high skills. Graduates from these 
schools find themselves working in high-end firms as technicians, managers (after several years), 
or performing teaching and research tasks in other vocational schools and research institutes 
around the country. In return, high-performance private schools can charge tuition higher than 
state standards but still secure sufficient student supply. Public schools cannot do so, but receive 
generous state financial support for their high-end approach to VET.  
The dominant factors here are a school’s high social recognition, and high state support 
that is also somewhat associated with its reputation. This high reputation is socially reproducible 
and thus can sustain a school’s high performance; It also poses an obstacle to other schools that 
strive to catch up. This is consistent with a major latecomer disadvantage in the strategic 
management literature (Lieberman and Montgomery 1988; Barney 1991) that “the rich get richer, 
and the poor get poorer” (Corley and Gioia 2000). Because these schools target national and 
provincial level job markets, they are less influenced by local industrial structures, and therefore 
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often offer comprehensive subjects. But cutting-edge industries assert themselves in these 
schools’ development in that schools often offer up-to-date subjects consistent with the latest 
industrial development trends in order to maintain their top-tier positions. 
The industry-focused model represents a contrast in that sense. These schools focus their 
subjects largely on a certain industry (or its highly related industries). Their training 
effectiveness can be very high, and sometimes represent the highest level of skills in that 
particular sector due to their historical connections with leading firms of the industry. Graduates 
are recruited by those leading firms and their subsidiaries and suppliers. Most if not all of these 
schools are public ones, such that they cannot charge tuition higher than state standards. But a 
very important revenue approach of these schools is non-degree training for the industry.  
These features are derived from an important institutional legacy of industry-focused 
schools. Established by industry-focused ministries in the socialist centrally planned economy, 
these schools have, to varying extents, retained their historical connections with those industries, 
especially leading SOEs. They have therefore inherited various resources regarding employment, 
technology, and expertise, as well as their roles as external training institutes for these firms, 
although most of them had formally detached from those firms by the beginning of the 21st 
century.  
Local market-oriented schools are middle-range or low-end schools. Their key difference 
from high-performance schools is the lack of a widely recognized fame. As a result, they target 
only regional (city and district mostly, sometimes provincial) job markets, and focus tremendous 
efforts on local labor market outcomes. They typically do not target cutting-edge industries and 
unique talents production, but aim to prepare middle-range workforce that are immediately and 
most useful for local firms. These schools are therefore very flexible with their specialties and 
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curricula, demonstrating a significantly higher level of local market orientation than the above 
two types.  
Local industrial structures are often reflected in these schools’ specialty and curriculum 
development. Historically, many such schools emerged in and became well integrated with 
regional industry clusters, and developed their expertise that is focused on and informed by that 
industry. Another important factor is local state support and strategies. As shown in the 
Dongguan case, the city educational bureau used both administrative power and economic 
incentives to reinforce local vocational schools’ ties with corresponding local industry clusters. 
But even in cities without significant industry clustering, e.g. Qingyuan, local state support often 
motivates schools to serve the local dominant industry needs. In addition, local state support 
helps avoid various short-term behaviors of schools. Every middle-range or low-end school has 
an instinct for local market orientation, which potentially leads to various short-term behaviors, 
but it is the local state support that often prevents them from falling into a labor agency model 
and conducting unjustified labor-selling behaviors.  
Finally, labor agency schools feature both low-end training and labor selling behaviors. 
These schools fall on the bottom proportion of a school ranking in terms of training effectiveness 
and students’ skill levels, but they are categorized into this type also because they engage in 
businesses of selling student interns and graduates to low-end firms as cheap labor in exchange 
for illegal commissions. Because many of them send students to work in their second school year, 
further compressing the already ineffective schooling process, these schools’ major labor market 
function is labor dispatching rather than education. It is better to describe them as quasi-labor 
agencies therefore, and their products as cheap labor instead of useful skills. Some schools in 
Guangdong are known to conduct these behaviors, but most frequently such schools are seen in 
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hinterland China to engage in inter-province labor selling activities. Indeed, Smith and Chan 
(2015) and Su (2010-2011) in their Foxconn-centered project only identified student interns from 
inland China including Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Sichuan, and Guangxi. 
These schools are mostly poorly funded private schools that are trapped in a “triple 
scarcity” situation, lacking support from either national or local governments, lacking 
historically rooted connections with key industries or regional industry clusters, and lacking 
reproducible social recognition. They rely on student tuition as the primary funding source, but 
due to low reputation, bear significant extra costs in order to secure student supply, often having 
to offer lower or even zero tuition to encourage enrollment. They therefore have to resort to 
student selling businesses to make up that loss. To be sure, private ownership is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for the labor agency model. Baiyun represents a scenario in 
which private schools have successfully used market mechanisms to achieve a high-performance 
model. And in relatively less regulated areas in inland China there must be cases where public 
schools engage in labor selling conducts too. I find that most labor agency schools in Guangdong 
are privately owned, however. This is likely because private ownership tends to be associated 
with the above-mentioned triple scarcity; Private schools typically do not have comparable state 
support or inherited SOE connections, and tend to be less socially recognized. 
The literature has revealed several important problems existing in some Chinese 
vocational schools, including low training effectiveness, and unjustified intern selling businesses. 
Although most schools I studied in Guangdong do not conform to the labor agency behavioral 
pattern as suggested, I do agree that there is space for Chinese vocational schools to improve 
training effectiveness, and their internship programs in general need to be better regulated – 
more so in some schools and less so in others. Even in the much-admired German apprenticeship 
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system, employers are often found to abuse the firm-based part of the training, and assign 
apprentices with various tasks “non-related to stipulated training agendas,” and there is wide 
concern about the training quality as well.15 German people have for long been struggling to find 
ways to remedy their system through various forms of state and social governance, but these 
problems have not prevented the German system from becoming an exemplar national skill 
development model. In fact, as media reports became widely reprinted and spread across the 
Internet, the MOE and the MOHRSS together enforced a series of policies in 2016 to regulate 
the use of student interns. Although the effects of these regulations are still to be examined, a 
more comprehensive view over the Chinese VET system should not be overlooked, and is indeed 
indispensible for elucidating several feasible pathways toward upgrading labor agency schools 
into more advanced models – generous state support and strategies, and leading firms’ input have 
been suggested in this paper.  
 
Conclusion 
 
I have developed a framework that focuses on the underlying institutional and 
organizational factors that shape skill development patterns in different Chinese vocational 
schools. I argue that skill development models – in the China context – reflect a combination of 
two institutional and two organizational factors that a school is endowed with, namely state 
support and strategies, local industrial structures, a school’s institutional legacies, and its 
ownership. Case studies of 25 schools in Guangdong demonstrate that the relative importance of 
																																																								
15 See the DGB (German Confederation of Trade Unions) 2016 Union Report, Ch.3 and 
following, available at: http://www.dgb.de/presse/++co++2d7d8286-6f95-11e6-8e3e-
525400e5a74a, March 20, 2017 
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these endowments vary across schools. Typically, it is one or the interplay of two factors that act 
as dominant factors that determine the emergence of a pattern. The cases also reveal that 
different combinations of factors lead to differences in skill development. Four distinctive 
models were identified: high performance, industry-focused, local market-oriented, and labor 
agency.  
This framework has enabled me to fill an important research gap in scholarship on the 
Chinese VET. The limited and somewhat biased labor-agency stereotype on Chinese vocational 
schools has hinted variation across schools that is previously unknown to scholars, and left open 
the research question what factors explain the potential variation. I find that substantial 
differences exist in Guangdong regarding a school’s training effectiveness and funding sources, 
and its students’ skill levels and job market scopes. Some vocational schools fall into the labor 
agency pattern, consistent with the existing stereotype, but most schools do not conform to this 
behavioral mode. Rather, those schools have adopted relatively advanced but also different skill 
development patterns that are beyond this model.  
This research is geared to break the stereotype on the Chinese VET system. But it is 
noteworthy that by identifying four skill development models, I have no intention to impose 
another stereotype, or a set of stereotypes, on Chinese vocational schools. The taxonomy 
represents a wide spectrum of vocational schools that I have studied in Guangdong, but given the 
regional variation in Chinese industrial development and local state strategies, the VET system in 
China should also demonstrate local characteristics. The Guangdong experience allows me to 
show the existence of variation, and provide a preliminary explanatory framework for that 
variation, but the nuances within the Guangdong system that I have suggested are subject to 
more empirical tests based in other areas. Future research is encouraged to identify and compare 
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potentially different skill development patterns in elsewhere China, as well as unique factors that 
account for that variation. Indeed, both Chinese (Cooke 2005; Durden and Yang 2006; Lai and 
Lo 2006) and Westerns literature (see Ashton, Sung, and Turbin 2000 for a review) have by and 
large focused their efforts on national skill development system analysis. This literature 
absolutely offers great insights especially from an international comparative perspective, but I 
encourage skill development scholars, especially those that focus on relatively decentralized 
systems like the one in China, to endeavor to capture and explain important subnational variation.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
EXTERNALIZING INTERNAL LABOR MARKET PRACTICES: 
“Training for a Targeted Brand” in Chinese Vocational Schools 
 
Introduction 
 
It is widely consented that China has witnessed the emergence and continuing expansion 
of secondary labor markets ever since the economic reform at the end of the 1970s. What 
Friedman and Lee (2010) called a “casualization of employment” process took place in China via 
various reforms in the state-owned as well as private sectors. Gallagher, Lee, and Kuruvilla in 
their edited volume (2011) further noticed several striking changes, including the rapid 
expansion of the non-state sector, reduced job security for state workers, the emergence of an 
informal sector, and the growing use of agency workers that further split the Chinese labor 
markets into the primary and the secondary sector, the latter often dominated by low-skilled rural 
migrant workers. Zhou (2013) estimated that 187.97 million Chinese workers are employed in 
the informal sector in 2009, accounting for 60.4% of the urban workforce. This expansion of the 
secondary labor market has led to the emergence of various labor market institutions. In 
particular, with more labor-protective state regulations being enforced from 2008 on, we have 
seen a rise of the labor dispatching industry in China (Xu 2008). These labor agencies provide 
employers with relatively low-skilled operational workers for relatively peripheral jobs at low 
costs (Liu 2016). Liu (2015) found that firms are using labor agencies as a secondary labor 
market strategy to avoid job security commitment and legal costs associated with internal labor 
market strategies.  
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This paper deals with another important labor market institution in China, i.e. vocational 
schools, which are said to be engaging in quasi-labor-agency businesses. Literature has 
documented employers’ use of vocational school students as a secondary labor market strategy to 
tackle the local market labor shortage. Student interns are found to be dispatched by vocational 
schools to work in low-end manufacturing firms in China, engaging in low-skilled operational 
jobs on various assembly lines (Smith and Chan 2015). In addition, vocational schools 
themselves are unable to provide students with important market-demanded skills (Cook 2005; 
Durden and Yang 2006), and therefore run no more than labor agency businesses, trading interns 
and graduates for unjustified commissions with employers (Su 2010-2011).  
Vocational schools have undoubtedly become an important labor market institution in 
today’s China. According to the official data, they have been training increasingly more and four 
times as many students as academic colleges and universities do. Further, estimated based on a 
90% initial employment rate in respective sectors, graduates from vocational schools account for 
79% of the newly-added urban workforce, and 51% of the second and tertiary sectoral workforce 
in 2014. These numbers were only 51% and 21% in 2004.16 If nearly 80% of the newly-added 
Chinese urban workforce are trapped in the secondary labor market, as the literature has 
suggested, who are training skilled core workers for Chinese employers? In addition, the labor 
agency depiction of vocational schools was based on a research project that focuses on Foxconn. 
In addition to the obvious industry bias, targeting one single employer, it is unclear if the authors 
had implemented a plausible sampling strategy on the vocational schools’ side.  
More importantly, this “labor agency” argument has left a puzzle unresolved, i.e. the 
external labor market failure. As widely known, the labor shortage in China is by and large a 
																																																								
16 These estimations are based on data from the China Statistical Yearbook 2004 and 2014.  
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shortage of skilled workers (Chan 2010; Farrell and Grant 2005; Li and Sheldon 2010), while the 
demand-supply ratio for unskilled labor in Chinese labor markets are much lower according to 
the MOHRSS’s quarterly labor market reports. Employers’ paramount problem would not be 
solved through working with vocational schools, therefore, if they could expect only cheap labor 
as opposed to useful skills from schools. But in fact, many employers are engaging in long-term 
collaboration with schools, and investing tremendously in their training processes (Sheldon and 
Li 2013; Li and Sheldon 2014). This would not be a cost-efficient strategy, given the much lower 
costs of acquiring cheap operational labor from labor agencies. Therefore, employers leveraging 
workers’ pre-employment skill development process must be motivated by a mix of various 
expectations, and beyond the mere demand for seasonal cheap labor.  
In this paper, I argue that, instead of a mere secondary labor market strategy, firms’ 
collaboration with vocational schools is a strategy that seeks to externalize their internal labor 
market practices – in particular, shifting traditionally firm-based training to workers’ pre-
employment skill formation process – in order to secure both high levels of firm-specific skills (a 
key advantage of the internal labor market strategy) and flexible employment arrangements (a 
key advantage of the secondary labor market strategy). I demonstrate this externalization of 
internal labor market practices through presenting a model of “training for a targeted brand” 
prevalently existing in Chinese vocational schools, and documenting the antecedents and 
consequences of this system.  
Based on my two-month preliminary (2014-2015) and one-year extensive field research 
(2015-2016) in Guangdong Province, I found that the emergence of this “training for a targeted 
brand” model is facilitated by the interaction between the supply and demand side of the local 
labor market. On the supply side, vocational schools nowadays enjoy tremendous freedom in 
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carrying out their trainings through the state’s decentralization reform since the mid-1980s (see, 
Ch.1), and therefore can customize their programs based on collaborative firms’ specific skill 
needs. On the demand side, employers have been faced with an increasingly significant skilled 
labor shortage, prompting them to seek constructive collaboration with vocational schools in 
order to prepare a reserve of skilled labor ready to work in their workplaces. This collaboration 
has been prevalently instituted across Chinese industries, and is becoming increasingly attractive 
to employers as it performs both external and part of internal labor market functions.  
My argument runs contrary to the literature on the Chinese VET system that regards 
employers’ use of vocational school students as a mere short-term secondary labor market 
strategy. I also contribute to the internal labor market literature through a discussion of 
employers’ strategies of externalizing their internal labor practices.  
 
Prior Literature 
 
Internal Labor Market 
The internal labor market literature defines two HR strategies that employers frequently 
adopt, i.e. internal vs. external labor market strategies. According to early scholars that advanced 
the internal labor market theory (Doeringer and Piore 1971; Reich, Gordon, and Edwards 1973), 
there is a major dual segmentation of the labor market, primary vs. secondary. Primary or 
internal labor markets provide relatively high pay and advanced working conditions, extensive 
on-the-job training, and job security for core workers, whereas peripheral workers are by and 
large trapped in the secondary sector and subject to intensive market competition. Skill and 
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technology specificity, and on-the-job training are critical to the emergence of internal labor 
markets, argued Doeringer and Piore (1971).  
Although this argument turned out to be faced with some empirical difficulties later 
(Althauser 1989), it has revealed an important fact that skills are a key concern for employers in 
determining to adopt internal vs. external labor market strategies. Firms use internal labor market 
mechanisms to offer extensive trainings to secure important firm-specific skills, and high skilled 
core workforce that are otherwise scarce (Davis-Blake and Uzzi 1993). On the other hand, they 
offer job security, and internal promotion opportunities to reduce turnover (retain these skilled 
labor), often with assistance of unions (Knoke and Ishio 1994). A number of important studies 
later engaged in further identifying more nuanced labor market segmentations, and different 
ways that the skill level and specificity are associated with different segments (Osterman 1982; 
Loveridge and Mok 1979; Lepak and Snell 1999), but scholars by and large agreed that internal 
hiring is associated with firm-specific skill needs of employers (Klein, Crawford, and Alchia 
1978; Williamson 1981), while external labor markets very often fail to offer high-skilled labor 
as well as specific skills (Williamson, Wachter, and Harris 1975).  
 
Emergence of Secondary Labor Markets in China 
Since 1970s, with the worldwide pursuit of flexiblization (Piore 2002), scholars have 
documented a shift of employer HR strategies from relying on internal labor markets toward 
secondary labor markets, including practices like production offshoring, manpower outsourcing, 
as well as temp agency recruitment (Abraham 1990; Cappelli 1995). In China there has been a 
similar tendency of employment externalization. The post-socialist employment relations system 
reform has featured “casualization of employment” and “breaking the iron rice bowl” (Friedman 
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and Lee 2010; Gallagher, Lee, and Kuruvilla 2011). This came hand in hand with a fundamental 
shift from internal to secondary labor markets in employers’ HR strategies, evidenced by the 
shrinking internal labor markets in the state sector, and the emergence and continuous expansion 
of an informal sector in China. Due to different working definitions being employed, scholarly 
estimates of the size of China’s informal sector vary, but are equally astonishing. Zhou (2013) 
estimated that 187.97 million workers are employed in the informal sector in 2009, accounting 
for 60.4% of the Chinese urban workforce. From 2008 on, the increasing legal costs for 
discharging workers derived from new pro-labor legislations have further prompted employers to 
resort to secondary labor markets, and their institutions (e.g. labor agencies) to acquire workers 
(Liu 2015). Researchers have found that the large-scaled and ever-growing labor dispatching 
industry in China is ready to provide firms with large numbers of operational workers as well as 
additional employment relations management outsourcing services at very low costs (Liu 2016; 
Xu 2009). 
Vocational schools as secondary labor market institutions: Scholars by and large regard 
Chinese vocational schools as secondary labor market institutions, and see school-firm 
collaboration as a secondary labor market strategy of employers, in pursuit of cheap and low-
skilled operational labor, as a short-term reaction to local market labor shortage. This depiction 
has two essential arguments. First of all, vocational schools have failed to be market-oriented, 
and their training processes are ineffective, therefore generating cheap labor only instead of any 
useful skills. While a successful VET system in fact must be connected to the market and 
flexible enough to suit the rapid technological change of the industry (Culpepper 1999a), the 
Chinese VET system has demonstrated a low degree of this market orientation – According to 
Durden and Yang (2006), vocational schools deliver programs with only curricula that are 
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outdated, over-focused on theory, and irrelevant to industry practice, therefore generating 
graduates that have mastered no market relevant skills. Cooke (2005) documented a mismatch 
between the demand of skills in the labor market and the supply of skills from vocational schools 
drawing on secondary data collected at the end of the 1990s. Woronov (2012) argued that 
vocational schools, instead of providing students with useful skills, carry out a “mimetic labor” 
process where students use the schooling time only to construct their social subjectivity of 
employable workers.  
The Western experience shows that firm participation is crucial to tackling this 
discrepancy between VET and industry. The German system has long been deemed an exemplar 
national VET model. Its much admired apprenticeship system is aimed at integrating in-
classroom with on-the-job training so that trainees gain not only general but also firm-specific 
skills that are immediately useful for prospective employers (Streeck 1992). This system entails 
effective civil society governance to make sure that employers are willing to participate and 
fairly share the training costs without discouraged by a potential collective action problem 
(Streeck 1989). In China, this civil society governance tradition is absent due to “unorganized 
interests” of private players under tight state control (Zhou 1993). In the perhaps more 
comparable Singaporean case where civil society governance is also by and large absent, the 
state assumes a bigger role, but still makes all efforts to motivate firm participation. Through 
encouraging MNCs to establish training centers, the state makes sure that skills and latest 
technologies are transferred from foreign firms to the local workforce, and on the other hand 
these MNCs’ local subsidiaries have sufficient labor supply (Kuruvilla and Chua 2010). The 
rationale underlying both strategies is consistent – to encourage firm participation in the 
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workforce’s pre-employment skill development process in order to make sure that VET 
processes are able to accommodate industry needs.  
Firms do seek collaboration with vocational schools in China, but their aim is said to be 
quite different, and their input in general limited. This pertains to the second argument of the 
literature: Schools function as labor agencies, and employers’ collaboration with them is very 
limited, and exclusively a secondary labor market strategy. In general, school-firm collaboration 
is limited and informal, depending on teachers’ personal connections with certain employers (Lai 
and Lo 2006). Further, this collaboration is regarded as firms’ short-term reaction to local market 
labor shortage. Critical theorists conducted field research in Foxconn – a major electronics 
manufacturing firm – and found extensive use of student interns as temp workers during peak 
seasons. Under the name of interns, these students are found to be involuntarily performing 
assembly-line operational tasks under the dual control of both schoolteachers and firm managers 
(Smith and Chan 2015). Su (2010-2011) concluded that school-firm collaboration in China 
demonstrates a dual-commodification of labor and education – Through internship programs, 
schools provide firms with flexible and cheap seasonal labor as an important approach to 
revenues. Clearly, this literature implies that working with vocational schools is a mere 
secondary labor market strategy of employers.  
 
External Labor Market Failure 
Scholars have observed an external labor market failure in China ever since the turn of 
the 21st century. As noted above, external labor markets often fail to provide important firm-
specific skills. This applies to various labor market institutions. Labor agencies offer only 
supplementary and often temp workers (Xu 2008; Liu 2016). Likewise, without sufficient firm 
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input in VET processes, vocational schools generate only general, and often low skills, as 
suggested by the internal labor market literature. This apparently cannot fulfill employers’ skill 
needs, as it is widely consented that the current labor shortage in China is a shortage of skilled 
workers (Chan 2010; Farrell and Grant 2005; Li and Sheldon 2010). While there is still a surplus 
of rural migrant labor in China (Kwan 2009), skilled workers are much more demanded by 
employers – The MOHRSS releases quarterly labor market reports, which show that the demand-
supply ratios of skilled workers across regional labor markets have been constantly higher than 
those of unskilled ones throughout the past decade.17 
A puzzle that the labor agency depiction of vocational schools cannot clarify, therefore, is 
why firms still invest tremendous efforts and resources in schools if they can acquire only low 
and general skilled labor from that. According to Sheldon and Li’s (2013) survey in a major 
industry park in the Yangtze River Delta region, 46% firms have established some collaborative 
programs with local vocational schools. More importantly, many firms are found to be providing 
all kinds of resources to schools and trainees that are beyond intern positions. These include 
financial supports in various forms, technology and equipment transfer, and co-developing 
curricula and training contents (Li and Sheldon 2014). In addition to these, my own study in the 
Pearl River Delta region indicates that firms also seek to establish on-campus practical centers, 
dispatch teachers to work at schools, and help to train schoolteachers in their own workplaces 
and training centers. If all of these practices are primarily a secondary labor market strategy, and 
solely in exchange for unskilled and cheap labor, it does not solve their paramount problem of 
skilled labor shortage. Also, why would not firms simply go for labor agencies instead? Given 
the much higher costs for firms to collaborate with vocational schools, these schools should have 																																																								
17 The reports are available at: http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/SYrlzyhshbzb/zwgk/szrs/sjfx/, March 
1, 2017 
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been acting as institutions beyond mere temp agencies. In other words, vocational schools must 
be performing some internal labor market functions and providing something more than what 
labor agencies can offer.  
Actually, both Li and Sheldon and my own study have found that firms collaborating 
with vocational schools are mostly aimed at gaining skilled labor. Well recognizing vocational 
schools’ failure to cater to industry practice, these firms seek collaboration with them to remedy 
this problem in order to gain skilled talents that they need (Li and Sheldon 2014). In my own 
research, employers seek to transfer firm-specific skills to the pre-employment training process, 
and eventually put those workers on skilled instead of operational jobs. Schools on the other 
hand, provide customized training programs to individual collaborative firms based on their 
specific skill and managerial needs without bound to any national or industry level standards – 
hence “training for a targeted brand.”  
 
Methods 
 
I conducted ethnographic field research in three industries – auto, robot, and beauty – for 
two reasons. First, they each represent an important sector in today’s China, respectively 
traditional manufacturing, modern manufacturing, and modern service. The latter two have been 
most recently promoted by the local state in Guangdong as a local industrial upgrading and 
restructuring strategy. While there is a general deindustrialization process in Guangdong’s 
traditional sectors, auto is somehow exceptional to this trend, being continuously regarded as a 
pillar industry in the local economy. Second, these industries have been commonly faced with 
the external labor market failure, i.e. insufficient skilled labor supply in Guangdong. Therefore, 
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while I am not arguing that the “training for a targeted brand” model is a universalized practice 
in every regional industry, these three do serve as information-rich cases (Patton 1990) to 
demonstrate the emergence of this China-peculiar model of VET. In terms of area focus, I 
studied Guangdong Province. While Li and Sheldon, as noted, based their research in the 
Yangtze River Delta region, their empirical evidence by and large supports what I found in 
Guangdong, the Pearl Rive Delta area, which can therefore serve as important triangulation.  
Indeed, I have observed such “training for a targeted brand” practices in many other 
industries, widely existing across different types of Chinese vocational schools. I have in total 
studied 21 firms and their collaborative programs with vocational schools that fall into a wide 
range of industries in traditional manufacturing (including construction), modern manufacturing, 
and service, as well as their overlapping sectors. This is illustrated by Figure 2. While these 
sectors share the problem of skilled labor shortage, as I will show soon, employers have their 
unique concerns in each sector, including labor market instability, firm-specific skill shortage, 
high turnover, and value-chain labor shortage. I also conducted research on the supply side. I in 
total studied 25 vocational schools in Guangdong.  
 
Data 
This paper draws on three types of data generated from the field research. The first 
consists of 322 interviews with various stakeholders of the Chinese VET system. In particular, 
in-depth interviews with managements, firm-level union officials, and workers/trainees from 21 
firms constitute my major information resource for understanding the complex dynamics of the 
“training for a targeted brand” programs studied. These programs were initially identified 
through my interviews with presidents, administration, teachers, students, and parents from 25 
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schools, who also provided valuable information regarding their collaborative roles with firms. 
As important supplements, I have also interviewed officials from the MOE and the MOHRSS, 
and their local branches, as well as officials from 12 other organizations including local official 
unions, think-tank organizations, NGOs, employer associations, and academic institutes, who 
have helped me understand the overarching institutional framework and state strategies that 
cover such “training for a targeted brand” practices.  
Given that this study focuses on a unique type of school-firm collaboration, I have also 
engaged in tremendous participant and non-participant observation over processes and 
mechanisms through which interaction takes place between employers and schools, as well as 
with other relevant stakeholders. I achieved this primarily through attending all kinds of 
meetings allowed by my good relationship with government officials and school presidents. 
These include many nonpublic meetings, informal conversations, and dinners that are a typical 
way of informal communication in China. I also participated in two ongoing reform projects in 
Guangdong. In a curriculum reform project, I served as an external consultant for the skill 
standards making in Guangdong’s beauty sector. With another apprenticeship project, I was 
invited to be a translator for the MOE’s consultants from the UK during April 2016. These 
experiences enabled me to gain valuable insider information regarding how school-firm 
collaborative programs engage different stakeholders of the VET system. In addition, I observed 
a lot of training processes at firms, practical centers, and schools, as well as a few skill 
competitions.  
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Figure 2. Collaborative Firms Studied by Industries 	
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Finally, my research is supplemented by a considerable amount of secondary data that I 
have collected during fieldwork. This includes relevant state policies, internal documents of 
governments, schools, and firms, and internet-based resources such as background information 
of schools and firms that I studied, and important news and reports. These secondary data not 
only serve as triangulation information for the firsthand data that I collected through above-
mentioned methods, but are also used to cover information that my process tracing through 
interviews could not yield.  
 
External Labor Market Failure in the Auto, Robot, and Beauty Industry 
 
Firms in Guangdong Province have been faced with a major external labor market failure, 
i.e. a shortage of skilled labor during the past decade. This has been massively documented in 
literature and mass media, which I do not repeat here. It is noteworthy, however, that it is a 
structural shortage of skilled workers as opposed to unskilled labor that has struck Guangdong 
and elsewhere China. According to an official report, the Guangdong labor market maintained a 
monthly shortage of 175 thousand skilled workers on average during the first three seasons of 
2015.18 Firms find it increasingly difficult to recruit workers equipped with the skills they need 
from the external labor market. This shared eager for skilled workers has eventually prompted 
employers, especially leading firms, to seek collaboration with vocational schools. As I show in 
this section, the auto, robot, and beauty industries each represent a different type of employer 
motivation for collaboration, but they share the general problem of external labor market failure 
– These firms are unable to find sufficient skilled workers through local labor markets or other 
																																																								
18 http://tech.qq.com/a/20160608/007066.htm, September 12, 2016 
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labor market institutions (e.g. temp agencies), and have therefore devised the strategy of 
establishing collaborative programs with vocational schools as a remedy.  
 
Auto  
In the auto industry, brand-specific skills account for a considerable proportion of auto 
maintenance workers’ essential skillset. The specific-general skills ratio certainly varies across 
industries, and may be much lower for electronics processing jobs, for instance, where 
operational workers perform by and large similar tasks from Foxconn to Flextronics. Within the 
auto sector, however, car models are very different across brands. In relatively advanced auto 
workshops, nowadays multiple car models are being simultaneously assembled, such that an 
operational worker needs to be familiar with parts of various models that are s/he assembles. A 
maintenance man in a 4S store has to be even better educated about all car models of a brand in 
order to be able to examine, prescribe, and implement repair and maintenance.  
In that sense, if skilled labor shortage is a common problem that all employers face, for 
auto employers, qualified maintenance men for their brands are even scarcer given this relatively 
big proportion of specific skills in a worker’s essential skillset. And brand-name carmakers often 
have to spend a lot of time and efforts on firm-based training in order to prepare a qualified 
maintenance crew. This typically includes building training centers that offer service to not only 
their own 4S stores but also authorized maintenance firms. In addition, 4S stores themselves 
assume a lot of on-the-job training responsibilities, and thus often complain about the time and 
efforts it takes to get a freshman ready to work independently. An auto maintenance firm 
manager estimated that without school-firm collaboration, it takes three months in order for a 
maintenance man to be able to perform maintenance tasks under senior workers’ monitor. To 
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show the difference, it takes only about one week initial plus one to two weeks’ on-the-job 
training under a senior worker in order to prepare a freshman to be a qualified independent 
assembly-line operational worker according to a workshop head from VW (Foshan). As a result, 
auto maintenance men are among the most wanted workers in Guangdong’s local labor market 
given the continuously expanding consumer market.  
In light of this, employers have developed the strategy of shifting part of their 
traditionally firm-based trainings to vocational schools, including agendas of co-building 
practical centers, and transferring technologies, training materials, and car models to 
collaborative schools. Schools, in exchange, are very willing to customize their curricula and 
training processes accordingly in order to accommodate collaborative firms’ needs. Kong from 
VW (Foshan) said: 
Our maintenance training needs more knowledge and skills (than operational 
workers), and our firm has a set of standards and skills… Many schools have a problem 
that they do not know what we need, because they do not know where students will 
eventually work at. So we collaborate with them on training… Many schools only train 
specialty (general) skills: basic knowledge on automobiles, automobile structures, 
assembling, and mechanical drawing etc. In our collaborative programs we will integrate 
our brand-specific knowledge: e.g. knowledge on electric circuits of Audi cars, and on 
maintenance of Audi cars (III: 69).  
 
Kong estimated that in collaboration with schools, they were able to secure 20% of firm-specific 
training for a maintenance worker in schools’ curricula.  
This program that Kong mentioned is what I call the “training for a targeted brand” 
model in the Chinese VET system, where an individual school and an individual firm co-
establish a school-based training program that focuses on training for this specific firm. Except 
for state mandatory courses and a limited number of theory courses, students in almost their 
entire training processes, have very few, if not none, opportunities to get to know other brands’ 
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technologies and equipment (in this case, cars). This prevalently exists in the auto industry. A 
school may collaborate with several brands simultaneously, but have different programs 
respectively correspond with those brands. In Guangdong Communication Polytechnic’s School 
of Automobile Application, for instance, students receive mandatory courses and general skills 
training in their first year, and as soon as entering the second year, they are asked to choose a 
brand-name program to enter, including the BMW Class, Toyota Class, Nissan Class, Bosch 
Class, and Volvo Class, where they started to delve into extensive brand-specific trainings and 
car model knowledge.  
An auto program in Guangdong Mechanical and Electrical College (GDMEC) offers a 
three-year collaborative program with Jaguar-Land Rover. Students in their first year receive 900 
credit hours training that are mostly mandatory courses including state-required political and 
ideological education as well as general skills training such as mathematics, Chinese literature, 
and computer science, in addition to a few auto-related theory courses. From the second year, 
however, they enter the practical center co-built with Jaguar-Land Rover, and started to receive 
brand-specific courses for 486 hours, and use only Jaguar-Land Rover’s car models. And in the 
third year, they enter Jaguar-Land Rover’s 4S stores to do internship to further their knowledge 
about those cars via learn-by-doing processes guided by senior workers, which account for 1,020 
credit hours. Throughout this entire process, students have no interaction with any other brands’ 
technologies. Interviewed students actually quite appreciate this concentration on a particular 
brand, and one of them related to me: 
We in our first year studied a wide range of things. So when it comes to the 
second year, we must focus on a specific brand’s car models. We should not be like, 
seemingly to know of many cars, but indeed unfamiliar with any. We have to be specific 
if we want to be an expert. This program provides such an opportunity, and has rich 
contents. It gives us a deeper understanding of a specific brand (II: 107-114).  
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Robot 
Robot manufacturing (and likewise 3D printing) is an emerging industry in Guangdong, 
and another promising sector where we see growing employer demands for such “training for a 
targeted brand” programs. Guangdong local governments have in recent years issued various 
public policies and subsidies to encourage an industrial upgrading agenda of “replacing workers 
with robots.” The most commonly seen industrial robots are robotic arms, but broadly defined 
robots indeed include 3D printers. By 2015, 159 major robot manufacturers were clustered in 
Guangdong. More importantly, robot manufacturers in and outside of Guangdong supply robotic 
arms for a wide range of manufacturing industries, replacing hundreds of manual workers. 
Estimated by the provincial government, by 2014, 23 thousand robots had been introduced into 
Guangdong workplaces, with a replacement of 151 thousand operational workers, whereas by 
2015, these numbers became 41 thousand and 269 thousand. The government expects to see 300 
thousand robots in Guangdong by 2020, by when about 1.95 million workers will have been 
replaced.19  
The fact that exponentially increasing robots are being introduced into traditional 
manufacturing workplaces calls for a profound change of the skill structure of the workforce. It 
is estimated that on average, with application of robots in a traditional workplace, operational 
jobs will be reduced by 19%, whereas the demand for technicians will increase by 17%.20 
Employers now need technicians to regularly perform installing, programing, and maintenance 
tasks.  
This demand for technicians is intensified by a major external labor market failure. While 
in the auto sector carmakers can rely on labor poaching to gain talents that they need with some 																																																								
19 http://gd.qq.com/a/20160411/020899.htm, September 12, 2016 
20 http://gd.qq.com/a/20160411/020899.htm, September 12, 2016 
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necessary retraining if not working with schools, this is simply not a feasible option for robot 
makers, given the fact that robot is an emerging sector and there simply are not enough qualified 
workers in local labor markets. In other words, retraining a traditional technician into a qualified 
robot maintenance man entails much more efforts than, for example, making a Toyota technician 
able to work on Jaguar-Land Rover models. And this obstacle often impedes potential robot-user 
firms from employing more robots. An official from the GDDOHRSS related to me: 
Replacing operational workers with robots is an inexorable trend of 
industrialization. But robots also need workers to maintain and repair. So the demand for 
skilled labor to perform maintenance tasks is huge, (not only in robot user firms) but also 
in manufacturing firms, and these jobs have a certain level of skill threshold. With robots 
become increasingly prevalently used, we are faced with this labor shortage, and we have 
been aware of that (I: 8).  
 
This threat to industrial upgrading has become a concern of not only the local 
government, but also robot manufacturers. While the local state has encouraged it as part of their 
VET system reform, employers are actively seeking collaboration with schools to prepare a 
qualified local workforce. Here they are working under a “training for a targeted value chain” 
model, a variant of the “training for a targeted brand” model. A robot manufacturer has strong 
incentives to train robot installers, maintenance workers, and programmers for not only 
themselves but also the production chain that they lead, including existing and potential user 
firms of their machines. As a result, an increasing amount of robot-related training programs are 
emerging in Guangdong nowadays.  
3D printing is a very similar emerging industry, with leading printer suppliers working 
closely with schools, aiming to prepare a workforce for the local labor market where themselves 
and their potential buyers are needy for such talents. Guangzhou Baiyun Institute of Business 
and Technology’s (Baiyun) Mechatronics Department has both robot and 3D printing programs 
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in collaboration with brand-name equipment providers. The department chair offered a good 
summary of their collaborators’ mixed incentives: 
Jiehe 3D Printer’s collaboration with us, a very important incentive for them, is 
that we train students that will serve to advertise their printers. Because our students were 
trained with their printers, we become a constant worker provider and training base of 
theirs. It is very important that we co-train workers that they need… Winbo Company is 
the same. Our graduates every year serve as a major talent pool for their worker 
recruitment. I give them however many they need. An American firm named Heke 
(unclear to the author), when entering the Chinese market in 2012, brought their latest 
five-axis machines. After negotiations, we became their strategic collaborator in the 
South China area. Many firms bought their machines but do not know how to use them. 
Programming and operating are not something that a regular worker can do, but need 
strict training. Unable to use the machines after buying, firms have this talent shortage 
concern… Then we have an agreement: Heke gave equipment to us for free, while we 
provide them with a whole resolution on talents (II: 193).  
 
While highest-skilled R&D jobs are left to PhDs and Masters, vocational school 
graduates are mostly seen in the middle-range job markets of these industries, taking jobs such as 
installers, operators, maintenance, programmers, and salesmen. But they are sometimes seen to 
be performing assistant tasks in R&D as well, such as designing, 3D modeling, and raw material 
development.  
 
Beauty 
The “training for a targeted brand” phenomenon also prevalently exists in the service 
sector. In the beauty industry, for example, firms are faced with the problem of high labor 
turnover, and thus are motivated to work with schools in order to prepare a stock and continuous 
supply of labor in order to make sure that job vacancies are immediately filled by workers that 
are ready to work in their workplaces. A Guangdong Department of Education (GDDOE) 
research group based on their own survey in the Guangdong labor market reported that 83% 
beauty firms are faced with the problem of labor turnover and shortage. These employers 
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therefore often have to offer relatively high wages in order to retain and attract talents. The 
average wages of a beauty worker is reported as over 4,000 yuan/month in 2015, while the local 
minimum wage in Guangdong only varies between 1,210 and 1,895 yuan across cities in that 
year. 
In addition, leading firms in the beauty sector also share with robot manufacturers the 
incentive to train for value chains. Leading beauty firms not only provide beauty services in their 
own salons, but also supply brand-name products (e.g. cosmetics and equipment) to their 
franchisees as well as small entrepreneurial businesses. A firm therefore has the incentive to 
transfer their brand-specific knowledge and know-hows across the industry as widely as possible 
with the aim to expand their product market share. In an interview (III: 15), the president of a 
leading beauty firm used “incubators” to describe their collaborative programs with schools, 
training graduates to become not only their own employees, but also potential entrepreneurs. For 
the latter case, the firm will provide them with various supports including technology, expertise, 
and even capital. That way, the brand’s products and equipment are widely used across the 
market.  
Many employers therefore decided to shift a significant proportion of their firm-based 
training to the workforce’s pre-employment skill development process by establishing 
collaborative programs with vocational schools. The same report as above mentioned indicates 
that 77% of the surveyed employers conduct hiring through vocational schools, and many of 
these are under the “training for a targeted brand” model.  
As shown, firms in all three sectors have various incentives to work with schools to train 
students with firm-specific skills before recruiting some of them as formal employees, while 
schools benefit from this collaboration regarding graduates’ employment, and knowledge and 
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technology transfer from firms. In exchange, they are willing to offer customized curricula based 
on skill needs of individual firms at work. The decentralization in the Chinese VET system (as 
Ch.1 has suggested) has left sufficient room for vocational schools to maneuver their training 
processes in order to accommodate a collaborative firm’s needs. This autonomy, in combination 
with employers’ enthusiasm for collaborating with vocational schools in the context of external 
labor market failure, has resulted in the “training for a targeted brand” model, to which I now 
turn.  
 
“Training for a Targeted Brand” 
 
The external labor market failure has prompted employers to seek to dominate and 
customize vocational schools’ training processes, and shift part of their firm-based training to the 
workforce’s pre-employment skill development process, to both reduce training costs and secure 
a flexible labor reserve for them to counter labor market instability and/or high turnover. This 
“training for a targeted brand” model features individual school-firm collaboration, and 
employer-dominated training processes on the one hand. On the other hand, it renders vocational 
schools’ training processes over-focused on individual collaborative firms’ specific skill needs 
but overlook general skills. In this section, I showcase these features and shortcomings of the 
“training for a targeted brand” system.  
 
Individual School-Firm Collaboration 
Different from the German apprenticeship system, a key feature of this “training for a 
targeted brand” model is that collaboration is by and large institutionalized at the most 
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decentralized, individual school-firm level. This is partly due to the absence of effective civil 
society coordination among private players in China. The official chamber in Guangdong, the 
Guangdong Provincial Enterprise Confederation (GEC), lacks interests in workforce skill 
development. A department director, Ms. Li, related to me: 
To be honest, our confederation is doing nothing with regard to education and 
training. (Author: why not?) We lack the capacity, and enough employees, and we cannot 
understand what firms need. We used to have a department of training, which was closed 
later, because they could not develop any business (IV: 15). 
 
The MOHRSS that runs the National Vocational Certificate System (NVCS) also lacks 
confidence about industrial associations’ capacity to coordinate employers such that they are 
reluctant to authorize these bodies to run industry-related certificates. My interview with an 
anonymous official from the MOHRSS that is in charge of the VET affairs revealed this concern 
of the state: 
Employer associations in China are under-developed… Traditional industrial 
associations are not real employer associations, but rather former government institutions, 
whereas those associations self-organized by firms do not have sufficient capacity [to run 
vocational certificates]… We certainly hope to maximize their role, but they themselves 
are still under development. Whenever they have sufficiently reformed, and can really 
represent specific industries, they may be able to assume a bigger role (I: 2).  
 
While employers are by and large excluded from the NVCS’s skill standards making, the NVCS 
itself – the only skill credentialing system in China – has been marginalized from schools’ 
training processes given its disconnection with industry practices as suggested in Ch.1.   
While various forms of labor organizations – labor unions and works councils – in 
Germany assume important responsibilities in workers’ skill development processes at both 
industry and organizational levels, official unions in China, the ACFTU, and their firm-level 
union committees play only limited, if not none, roles. A former union official in Guangzhou 
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told me that the only function that unions perform in workers’ skill development nowadays is 
organizing skill competitions within firms (IV: 11).  
While employer and labor organizations lack interests and necessary capacity, formal and 
informal school networks can occasionally serve as coordination platforms. In the beauty sector, 
the Guangdong Health Vocational Education Association (GHVEA) is where major beauty 
programs in Guangdong form coalition and start to coordinate on curriculum development and 
standards making at the industry level. Such cases are not commonly seen in other sectors. But 
even in beauty, the GHVEA lacks governability over its membership. The chairwoman, Ms. Li, 
is a retired former healthcare school president. She is now leading a group of four full-time 
workers in the association. She regarded the GHVEA as a “service platform” that lacks 
governability over its 32 member schools and six member firms – “Even paying member fees is 
voluntary” (IV: 7). About the association, an active member school’s director had this to say: 
As a platform and communication mechanism that connects schools and the state, 
and promotes skill competitions, the association plays some role… But, commitment 
needs clear rights and obligations. What can they give us? If we do not obey their 
standards, what sanctions can they impose on us? Nothing. My boss told me: whatever 
the association tells you to do, if useful for our specialty development and consistent with 
what you think, you listen; Otherwise just ignore it (II: 65).  
 
Clearly, it is really members’ strategic cooperation, instead of any compulsory mechanism, that 
brings members together in GHVEA. It is therefore suspicious if the association can impose 
industry-level curriculum standards on its member schools, as doing so obviously conflicts with 
members’ self-interests in serving individual collaborative firms’ specific training agendas.  
Without any industry-level coordination or binding standards imposed by the state or 
unions, skill development under the “training for a targeted brand” model is extremely 
customized, focusing on specific skills of a certain brand or firm at work. Given the absence of 
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state regulation regarding a reasonable cost-sharing structure among firms, schools, the state, and 
individual trainees, it is unclear if public schools are justified to engage in this kind of targeted 
training for one single firm in their degree programs. But this “training for a targeted brand” 
phenomenon has already become a prevalent and indeed state-consented practice in the Chinese 
VET system. In fact, both the MOE and the MOHRSS have been promoting such school-firm 
collaboration, and many schools strongly encourage departments to find their “partners” and 
regard that as an important criterion for teachers/department officials’ performance evaluation.  
 
Employer Dominated School-based Training  
Consequently, it is typically an individual collaborative firm instead of the state or any 
industry-level governing bodies that dominates training processes in a VET program under the 
“training for a targeted brand” model. This domination is realized through three major 
mechanisms. The first is co-developing specialties and curricula, where schools are often willing 
to accommodate a collaborative firm’s needs. They consult with the collaborative firm what 
curricula to set up in a program at the beginning of the initiative. A school is usually very willing 
to incorporate modules that the collaborative firm cares about into their curricula. A firm-
dispatched teacher in a beauty program once showed off to me some advanced beauty machines 
unique to their firm and how they have integrated those firm-specific technologies and skills into 
the training process: 
We follow modules provided by the firm and teach the courses. And these (what 
we taught) can be immediately used when (students) go to our firm. We are the Taiwan 
Natural Beauty Group, and have a unique business model. Firms in the beauty sector all 
have different models, so that they have different standards and processes… We have in 
our curricula, for instance, training for a special skin detector – a machine we use prior to 
all other beauty care procedures. Whereas other firms use only gross observations, we 
believe naked eyes can lie, so that we use a special instrument… Another example is 
body examination, for which we use a machine to examine people’s irises in order to 
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detect past and potential health problems… So our teaching is very different. Some of our 
regular courses, other schools have never even heard of (III: 5).   
 
In their program’s training plan, not surprisingly, I saw 12 specialty-core courses, nine of which 
are named by the Natural Beauty Group or its brand name, including a course named “Natural 
Beauty Health and Iris”. These courses teach techniques and know-hows that are based on 
specific services this group provides in their salons, and use textbooks that are also provided by 
them.  
Zhang Songwen directs a department that has collaborative programs with both auto and 
robot manufacturing firms. He compared a program with Nissan and another with a robot 
provider: 
Nissan inputted five to six hundred credit hours and two textbooks into our 
curricula, to train maintenance workers for them. At the beginning they have teachers 
come over and teach those courses. Later our teachers learnt how to do it… According to 
their standards, they require students to learn how to repair machines in a fast way, how 
to ensure security, and how to fill out some procedural forms… This is different from a 
robot manufacturer, who typically requires specific trainings about designing, installing, 
and debugging their machines (II: 174).  
 
The second mechanism is technology transfer from firms to schools. Collaborative firms 
often provide schools with important equipment used or produced in their workplaces. Here a 
frequently employed strategy is co-building on-campus brand-name practical centers. A practical 
center as such contains important equipment – cars, beauty machines, robots, or 3D printers – of 
the collaborative brand. And most, if not all, application courses take place in these centers. In 
Guangdong Communication Polytechnic’s auto school, for example, I saw at least five brand-
name training centers including BMW, Bosch, Nissan, Toyota, and Volvo, each with the latest 
car models and/or equipment from respective collaborators. Students enrolled have to choose a 
brand as their concentration at the beginning of their second school year, and form brand-name 
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classes accordingly. Each class in their specialty-core courses uses car models of the particular 
collaborative brand only. Trainees thus receive only limited, if not none, training about other 
brands.  
In the beauty sector, likewise, different programs use different firm-provided training 
materials – usually firms’ internal training documents – and work in practical centers that are 
built in imitation of real workplaces of the firm. A school official from Qingyuan Polytechnic 
introduced their beauty practical center to me: 
Ellehuis Beauty invested a lot of money in our school, and built a practical center 
that is exactly the same as their beauty salons. What students do in there is almost the 
same as in a real salon… And they put all what their employees use everyday there. Even 
the furnishing of the center (is the same as stores), where our students study and provide 
services to peer students and teachers as a practice. The entire operational process is the 
same, including for example activating a VIP card (II: 49) 
 
In Baiyun, I was showed their two brand-name 3D printing practical centers. One of them is co-
built with Jiehe 3D Printer, with 20 printers and programs, and five scanning systems provided 
by the firm for free, whereas the other one is with a company named Winbo that also donated 15 
printers and programs.  
Technology transfer is often associated with knowledge transfer, which serves as the last 
mechanism for firm domination. Three strategies are typically adopted here. First, employers 
often offer textbooks (training materials) as well as workers to teach at these programs. Schools 
rely on employer-provided training materials especially for new specialties that more general 
textbooks are still unavailable. Zhang Songwen introduced how they compiled their training 
materials for the Industrial Robots specialty: 
Since the emergence of the specialty, every school is compiling their own 
textbooks. There is no available textbook, so we compile by ourselves, or even use firm-
provided textbooks… There is no textbook that is suitable for every firm. In our specialty, 
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we compiled textbooks based on certain equipment, which are therefore only compatible 
with that equipment. If you apply them to other equipment, it will not work (II: 174).  
 
Knowledge transfer also often involves dispatched firm teachers. A collaborative firm 
sometimes sends trainers to teach in schools. In beauty, they always dispatch a teacher to work as 
a full-time teacher in the school to teach application courses. In a beauty program, I met a firm 
trainer, Ms. Xie, who works full-time at the school. She has been well integrated in the 
workplace that sometimes she even represents the school to attend various meetings of the 
GHVEA. She teaches about 60% of the program’s specialty-core courses in students’ second 
year, where she ensures that specific skills of her firm are delivered to students. A typical 
division of labor between these firm-dispatched trainers and schoolteachers is that the former 
teach application courses (e.g. beauty technics), while the latter teach theory courses (e.g. beauty 
basics). In other industries, firm teachers are more seen to be part-time working in the school. Mr. 
Kong from Jiehe is a firm engineer. He is dispatched to Baiyun every year to teach a one-week 
intensive course on installation, debugging, maintenance, and user know-hows of their 3D 
printers.  
In addition, knowledge transfer often involves firm-provided training for schoolteachers. 
In Guangdong Communication Polytechnic, the auto department chair introduced how BMW 
provided systemic training for their teachers: 
BMW is a typical case: Our own teachers…have received trainings and become 
BMW-certified trainers, the same as their own trainers. A few of our teachers have 
acquired their top-level trainer certificates, very skillful. So they are schoolteachers, as 
well as BMW trainers. They also sometimes go to BMW’s training centers and teach 
courses there. They renew their BMW certificates every year… We have a BMW training 
center on campus, so BMW also sends their employees to receive training here (II: 88).  
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Very often, multiple domination mechanisms are employed at the same time to ensure 
successful transfer of firm-specific skills to the VET process. Mr. Mo from Baiyun had a good 
illustration of this: 
Winbo provided us with not only free equipment, but also great support in our 
curricula development at the beginning… At the same time, they send their engineers to 
teach courses here… They also carry out teacher-training processes. Whenever our 
teachers need, they can go to their firm and study (II: 193).  
 
Employment Flexibility: Firms under this system not only secure a deeper integration of 
specific skills into the training process, but also enjoy the priority to recruit graduates over non-
collaborative firms. Given that these “targeted for a brand” trainees are still under the student 
identity, firms do not have any obligation to employ them eventually, but always have the 
priority to select students in the first place. After that, the school will introduce the rest students 
to other firms. Students are usually incentivized to work in these collaborative firms as their first 
choice because 1) these are often leading firms of the local industry, and 2) most what they have 
learnt are specific skills of this particular firm. In a day during my field research in Baiyun in 
May 2016, General Manager Li of Jiehe came and recruited five prospective graduates in that 
year. In an interview with him, he introduced to me the jobs that they will take: 
They will engage in two kinds of jobs. The first is R&D in mechanics. The second 
is to provide service in our newly built 3D printing service center for healthcare, helping 
customers to use our printers. For instance, if we receive a pattern from a hospital, they 
devise a resolution based on the pattern, program the model, and eventually print it out 
for the customer. They have to conduct the entire process (III: 75).  
 
Over-focusing on Specific Skills 
Although it seems that employers, schools, and students all favor and take pride of this 
“training for a targeted brand” approach, it is by no means an ideal skill development system. An 
important negative effect of this “training for a targeted brand” model at the societal level is that 
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they in general tend to overly focus on specific skills that individual collaborative firms need, but 
overlook industry-general skills training. I have coded the curricula of ten beauty programs under 
the GHVEA. As shown in Figure 3, all of the programs focus their curricula on firm-specific 
skills or skills with limited transferability. Further, three of the ten programs have engaged in 
even more extensive collaboration with firms under the current apprenticeship reform of the 
MOE (examined in Ch.4). As highlighted in Figure 3, these programs are even more over-
focused on specific skills than the other seven. This indicates that prevalently using this “training 
for a targeted brand” model renders skill development in public schools over-focused on firm-
specific needs.  
This inconsistency of curricula across training programs for the same specialty has led to 
incoherent skill structures of the workforce within the local industry. The GHVEA in 2016 
started to run a provincial skill competition in the beauty sector. I participated in their 
preparation process as an external observer and noted tremendous controversy among schools 
regarding what skills are essential to a beauty worker’s job and thus have to be tested in the 
competition. In a meeting I sat in in January 2016, for example, member school directors 
engaged in drastic debates regarding contents and qualification standards of the skill competition. 
I was really impressed that they even could not reach a consensus regarding issues like what are 
the basic treatment techniques of the Chinese traditional massage. On this specific issue, a 
program teacher from the Zhuhai Health School apparently stood out against other programs. 
She argued: 
Our massage training focuses on the know-hows in the lymphatic drainage service 
in aromatherapy. So we do not teach this “rubbing” treatment. The lymphatic drainage is 
to diffuse the lymph to the armpits, so we use only “pushing,” but not “rubbing.” 
(Another teacher: why do not you teach students all the basic techniques and then focus 
on the use [in different services]?) That is because we do not have those services in our 
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salons. Our training is targeted [for a specific firm], so we do not want to teach them 
many irrelevant things (Field notes, February 2016).  
 
 
Figure 3. Skill Spectrum of Ten Major Training Programs in Guangdong's Beauty Sector 
 
 
Note I: Y-axis value: standardized course credits; X-axis: a program’s aggregated courses that focus on 
each of the fives types of skills.  
Note II: General: CS, Mathematics, Chinese, and English; Industry-general: specialty-related courses 
shared by >60% (7-10) programs; Industry-transferable: specialty-related courses shared by ≥50%, but 
≤60% (5-6) programs; Limited Transferability: specialty-related courses shared by ≥2, but <50% (2-4) 
programs; Firm-specific: specialty-related courses unique to a program. Here mandatory ideological 
courses (political education) and physical education are excluded.  
 
 
In light of this, even though firms and schools, and frequently students themselves, are 
quite satisfied with the “training for a targeted brand” model, negative effects can be significant. 
Over-focusing on firm-specific skills in workforce’s training, especially during the pre-
employment phase, not only undermines workers’ employability across the local industry, and 
therefore their labor market mobility, but also increases retraining costs of firms. While 
systemically estimating the level of these impacts is beyond the scope of this study, they have 
been well demonstrated by Western countries’ experience. And there are hints already in China’s 
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beauty sector. A beauty program director commented on the Zhuhai Health School’s over-focus 
on Natural Beauty’s specific skills: 
I feel their focus is too narrow. They (the firm) have iris detectors, so they (the 
school) offer an iris examination course. But this technology is only used in Natural 
Beauty. If I do not work there, it is useless… The curricula developed based on one 
firm’s practice, I can by no means apply it to another one. They are completely 
incompatible (Anonymous, May 2016). 
 
An interviewed beauty worker said: 
Although I did not do well in my Chinese Medicine Basics course, (I took it at 
least). After I entered the workplace, every salon has different trainings for us because 
they have different products and different massage technics… This cannot be changed, 
but I feel it is very easy for me to understand those trainings. Many colleagues from other 
programs, they do not even know where each acupuncture point is located (II: 78).  
 
This indicates that “training for a target brand” might be even more problematic given 
it is within for-degree training programs, which are supposed to grant students sufficient general 
skills (e.g. the Chinese Medicine Basics course mentioned by this worker) that are indispensible 
for their future continuing education and self-learning processes. 
 
Discussion 
 
The post-socialist industrialization process has put Chinese employers in an 
“externalization dilemma.” On the one hand, the “casualization of employment” trend and 
increasing legal costs associated with permanent employment relationship have prompted 
employers to continue pursuing external and secondary labor market strategies. On the other 
hand, firms have to deal with an increasingly significant external labor market failure as the low 
and general skilled workers that the external labor markets provide have failed to cater to the fast 
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industrialization process, and high and firm-specific skills needed by employers. In particular, 
this has posed a challenge to the industrial upgrading agenda promoted by the Chinese 
government and pursued by many employers in Guangdong Province for which a pool of skilled 
labor equipped with high levels of firm-specific skills is indispensible. While the Chinese state 
has been recently attempting to tackle this problem through various reforms in the VET system 
(some important efforts will be examined in Ch.4), in this paper, I find that VET practitioners 
themselves – leading firms and schools – actually have already worked out a non-ideal but 
effective solution to the “externalization dilemma.”  
In this paper, I have documented the emergence of the “training for a targeted brand” 
model in the Chinese VET system, where vocational schools act as firms’ external training 
institutes and focus tremendous efforts on firm-specific skills per requirements of individual 
collaborative employers. I argue that this system has emerged as employers’ strategic response to 
a major external market failure – the skilled labor shortage – in which they seek to externalize 
certain internal labor market practices, shifting part of their traditionally firm-based training to 
workers’ pre-employment VET process in order to secure a flexible reserve of labor equipped 
with sufficient firm-specific skills before some of them are formally recruited as employees. My 
argument runs contrary to the classic stereotype on Chinese vocational schools, which suggests 
that schools function as no more than labor agencies that provide undifferentiated cheap labor 
without useful skills for employers as a short-term solution to seasonal labor shortage, implying 
that employers’ collaboration with vocational schools is a mere secondary labor market strategy. 
My findings, instead, indicate that through “training for a targeted brand,” vocational schools 
perform certain internal labor market functions that are beyond what pure secondary labor 
market institutions typically do.  
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In Ch.1, I have depicted a decentralized Chinese VET system and the autonomy that 
schools thus enjoy in devising and running their own training programs without constrained by 
state intervention. This freedom has laid the foundation for the emergence of the “training for a 
targeted brand” model in the Chinese VET system. In this context, VET practitioners have 
developed a targeted training system that features extensive collaboration between an individual 
school and an individual firm in developing a program, customizing its curricula for the firm’s 
specific needs, and recruiting students and carrying out trainings accordingly. Drawing on 
experience of the auto, robot, and beauty industry, I have shown that this “training for a targeted 
brand” system has been facilitated by a major skill shortage in the Chinese labor markets. 
Employers’ specific motivations vary across these industries, however. In auto, collaboration has 
been incentivized by a demand for brand-specific skills, i.e. familiarity with car models of a 
particular brand in order to be qualified for maintenance work. In robot, leading firms engaged in 
a “training for a targeted value chain” model as skilled labor shortage in buyer/user firms 
potentially impede robot manufacturers’ product market performance. In beauty, as in many 
other service industries, high labor turnover has become a major concern of employers, for 
whom a flexible reserve of skilled labor ready to work in their salons is desirable. At the same 
time, beauty firms also hope to generate skilled beauty workers and entrepreneurs so as to 
expand the market coverage of the services and products that they supply. In all cases, at the 
kernel of these employers’ mixed incentives is an important external labor market failure, in 
which employers are unable to find sufficient skilled labor they need for their specific work 
purposes from the local labor market.  
In light of this, firms have sought to establish collaborative programs with vocational 
schools, shifting a considerable proportion of their traditionally firm-based training to the pre-
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employment skill formation process. Although this collaboration risks losing the sank training 
costs given potential free riders – a major collective action problem (Streeck 1989) – leading 
firms are willing to invest tremendously in schools. I contend that this is explained by the double 
advantages that employers gain through this process. Integrating intensive firm-specific training 
into potential workers’ pre-employment stage of skill development, firms secure a reserve of 
skilled labor that are ready to work in their own workplaces, but themselves do not have to be 
committed to any employment relationships with these students.  
While western scholars have frequently associated firm-specific skills with internal labor 
market strategies (Klein, Crawford, and Alchia 1978; Williamson 1981; Williamson, Wachter, 
and Harris 1975), the China case presented here illustrates a scenario in which firm-specific 
trainings are conducted in external labor market institutions through extensive school-firm 
collaboration, in order to tackle the “externalization dilemma” firms are faced with presented at 
the beginning of this section. This concern is not unique to Chinese employers. Lepak and Snell 
(1999) in their theoretical model identified an HR strategy that employers seek to acquire less 
valued firm-specific skills in the external labor market through forming alliance and sharing 
human capital with business partners. The “training for a targeted brand” practice adopted by 
Chinese employers is under a similar rationale – i.e. the cost-efficiency and flexibility concern – 
but represents a different type of firm alliance with vocational schools. These schools act as 
external training institutes that take over part of collaborative employers’ firm-specific training, 
which saves employers tremendous costs associated with firm-based training and internal labor 
market hiring practices that would be otherwise necessary.   
But school-firm collaboration on VET is not unique to China – why would not the 
German dual system, for instance, be regarded as an employer strategy that externalizes internal 
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labor market practices? Admittedly, the German apprenticeship system also features sufficient 
employer input, but their specific skill needs are not accommodated to the same extent in the 
training process, because industry-level negotiations between employer association and labor 
unions determine the training contents in advance, and union shop stewards and works councils’ 
monitor at workplace helps prevent deviation from those stipulated training agendas (Streeck 
1987). Effects of these institutional arrangements certainly vary across programs, but such 
mechanisms in general guarantee that the training is not geared toward employers specific skill 
needs. German employer’s cooperation is therefore not driven by firm-specific skill needs, but in 
fact encouraged by a wide range of institutional incentives and obligations, as well as cost 
sharing by the state and apprentices (Culpepper 1999a). Although the Chinese “training for a 
targeted brand” system receives no comparable state support – indeed mostly out of employers’ 
voluntary participation – and there is also the threat of free-riders as noted, firms are motivated 
by the urgent skilled labor shortage, and enticed by vocational schools’ great flexibility with 
their training processes. The latter is enabled by the extremely disordered decentralized VET 
system peculiar to the Chinese context where vocational schools are free from any industry-level 
constraints regarding what to teach.  
This system hence performs both external and part of internal labor market functions at 
the same time. On the one hand, school-based training ensures flexibility – no committed 
employment relationship is imposed on collaborative firms, but they enjoy the priority to choose 
the best trainees eventually while leaving others to the external labor market (schools) without 
bearing any legal costs. On the other hand, employers’ intensive input in the training process 
secures themselves graduates that have mastered considerable firm-specific skills, whom they 
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often find it hard to acquire from external labor markets. This type of school-firm collaboration 
is hence an employer strategy of externalizing the internal labor practices.  
My findings fly in the face of existing literature that argues that Chinese vocational 
schools are running no more than temp agency businesses by trading interns as undifferentiated 
and unskilled cheap seasonal labor with firms for unjustified revenues (Smith and Chan 2015; Su 
2010-2011), implying that school-firm collaboration is a secondary labor market strategy of 
employers. It is worth noting, however, that I do not deny that some vocational schools conduct 
labor agency behaviors. I admit that a lot of vocational schools especially many with private 
ownership and from hinterland China do engage in businesses like dispatching student interns as 
well as graduates from their hometown provinces to East China factories. Indeed, in another 
paper of mine (Ch.2), I focus on the diversity within the Chinese VET system through 
identifying four types of vocational schools in China, the labor agency model as one of them – 
but that is not the mainstream in the Chinese VET system, I argue.  
That being said, this “training for a targeted brand” model is by no means an ideal VET 
system. Based on disordered decentralization and individual school-firm collaboration, this 
system differs from exemplar Western apprenticeship models where multi-employer 
coordination is instituted at the industry level to balance general and firm-specific skills. Partly 
due to the absence of effective civil society governance in China, a program under this system 
tends to be dominated by the individual collaborative firm at work, rendering training processes 
over-focused on firm-specific skills. My comparative analysis of ten major beauty programs in 
Guangdong has provided support for this argument.  
These findings hold important policy implications for the ongoing VET system reform in 
China. The Chinese government has been promoting decentralization in the VET system since 
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the mid-1980s, aiming to strengthen the ties between vocational education and industrial 
processes as if they were quite disconnected (Lai and Lo 2006). The centerpiece of this reform, 
i.e. facilitating school-firm collaboration is undoubtedly desirable, but if the state allows 
unchecked market forces to intervene in public schools’ training processes based on their short-
term needs without any effective coordination, negative impacts will inevitably ensue. In 
particular, over-focusing on firm-specific skills at the vocational education stage of the 
workforce’s skill development process will undermine workers’ employability and thus labor 
market mobility, as well as increase firms’ retraining costs in the long run. A policy implication 
here is that the state should focus on capacity building of civil society actors – employer 
associations and labor unions in particular – to cultivate civil society governance in the Chinese 
society. These entities will ideally determine industry-level skill standards that serve as 
benchmarks for individual schools to follow in devising their own programs.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have discussed the emergence of the “training for a targeted brand” model 
in Chinese vocational schools. This model features extensive individual school-firm 
collaboration and employer-dominated training processes to ensure that a collaborative firm’s 
specific skills are well integrated into workers’ pre-employment skill development process. The 
product of this model is a flexible reserve of labor that are on the one hand ready to work in a 
firm’s workplaces, and on the other hand under no committed employment relationships with 
that employer, who is thus exempt from legal and managerial responsibilities (and potential costs) 
associated with an internal labor market strategy.  
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I hence argue that this “training for a targeted brand” system is an employer strategy to 
externalize certain internal labor market practices – in particular, shifting firm-specific trainings 
to workers’ pre-employment skill formation processes – driven by the decentralized Chinese 
VET system on the one hand, and the skilled labor shortage on the other. Decentralization has 
granted Chinese vocational schools nearly full autonomy to customize their curricula and 
training processes according to market needs, making targeted training possible. But leading 
firms have been ultimately motivated by a prevalent external labor market failure, i.e. a shortage 
of skilled workers, therefore seeking collaboration with vocational schools. That way, 
technology and knowledge are transferred from the industry to vocational schools, but it is 
individual collaborative employers as opposed to any level of the state bureaucracy or any form 
of private governance that dominate vocational schools’ training processes – therefore “training 
for a targeted brand.”  
  
		
120 
CHAPTER 4 
 
SKILL FORMATION DILEMMA IN THE CHINESE APPRENTICESHIP REFORMS 
 
Introduction 
 
In both advanced and developing economies, vocational workforce skills have been 
found to be crucial for economic growth. For example, scholars ascribe the success of the 
German economy partly to its unique apprenticeship system, which has helped to create the high-
skill equilibrium that has powered the development of a competitive and much admired export 
sector (Streeck 1992). Other scholars attribute the “economic miracle” of the Four Asian Tigers 
(South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong) to the strong state role in coordinating the 
supply and demand of skills relevant to different stages of economic development (Ashton, 
Green, James and Sung 1999).  
The “economic miracle” of China during the past three decades has been largely based on 
an economic strategy characterized by low cost labor-intensive production for export. This 
strategy is now under question, however, given slowing economic growth, rising labor costs, and 
a shortage of skilled workers. Many economists suggest that China will encounter the middle-
income trap (Lin and Treichel 2012), without radical changes in its economic strategy. And, 
given the importance of the Chinese economy to the world economy, the World Bank (2013) is 
encouraging the Chinese government to facilitate the restructuring and upgrading of its industries 
to avoid the middle-income trap. Chinese policy makers have therefore articulated numerous 
policies to rebalance the Chinese economy. Increasing workforce skills thus has become a crucial 
element in this attempt at economic restructuring.  
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In this paper, I focus on the state’s recent endeavors to establish national apprenticeship 
systems. The goal of this reform is to generate a supply-side boost to industrial upgrading – i.e., 
to leverage the skill development process in order to encourage skill and industry upgrading by 
employers. Two state agencies have broad authority over the skill development in China – the 
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS) and the Ministry of Education 
(MOE). In recent years, both agencies have independently launched an apprenticeship system, 
but following drastically difference approaches. While the MOHRSS has employed a state top-
down approach to its institution building in apprenticeship training, the MOE has adopted a 
collaborative model that involves collaboration with non-state actors, including firms, vocational 
schools, and a limited number of industrial associations. I studied the early outcomes of these 
reforms in Guangdong Province – a major frontier of Chinese economic rebalancing efforts – as 
an information-rich case (Patton 1990: 181), and found considerable variation. So far, the MOE 
has successfully established ten times as many apprenticeship programs as what the MOHRSS 
has done in Guangdong. Moreover, the former’s programs are in general much welcomed by 
employers, whereas the latter’s have triggered a lot of complaints from both employers and 
vocational schools. In light of this variation, a systematic comparison and evaluation of the two 
ministries’ reform models is at the heart of my research endeavors. 
What constitutes a successful skill formation system? Economic and institutional theory 
has provided the insight that institutional arrangements should be able to effectively address 
three key problems in skill development in order to achieve desirable outcomes. The first is the 
collective action problem (Problem I). Skills are essentially public goods. While individuals are 
faced with budget constraints and uncertainty, and therefore often fail to self-fund sufficient 
training, firms too are often reluctant to pay for skill development as other firms, via labor 
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poaching, can harness these skills without bearing any cost of the training (Streeck 1989). Major 
economies typically rely on state intervention, to varying extents, to remedy this market failure 
by encouraging or obligating firms and individuals to invest in skill development.  
The second problem concerns how to best accommodate industry needs in skill 
development (Problem II). The “regulation school” provides the insight that institutional 
arrangements should be compatible with dominant modes of production in an economy (Boyer 
1987; Leborgne and Lipietz 1988). This theory, if applied to the skill formation arena, indicates 
that skill development institutions ought to be customized according to the local industrial 
structures and leading production systems. The German “dual system” of apprenticeship is an 
exemplar of employer involvement in vocational training via combining in-classroom with on-
the-job training (Culpepper 1999a). The key here is to cater to employers’ needs and arouse their 
enthusiasm for participation in the workforce’s pre-employment training process.  
Finally, training with employer participation risks being over-focused on individual 
employers’ specific needs. Human capital theory differentiates general skills from firm-specific 
skills based on the extent to which certain skills are transferable (able to be harnessed) across 
firms in a labor market (Becker 1993). When labor markets are segmented, however, such 
transfer is more problematic, partly because of mobility costs and imperfect information (Stevens 
1999). This entails effective private governance among firms at the industry level regarding skill 
standards making and curriculum development to coordinate their interests and achieve balanced 
delivery of both general and firm-specific skills (Problem III). All in all, a successful skill 
formation system entails three-level collaboration among the state, civil society organizations 
(employer associations and sometimes unions), and individual training institutes and firms, in 
order to effectively address the three theoretical problems.  
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In this paper, I found that of the two models, the approach of the MOE is more likely to 
be successful, because it involves collaboration with non-state actors in ways that would address 
the “collective action problem” in skill development (Problem I), i.e., successfully engaging 
firms in the pre-employment skill formation process, as well as better accommodate industry 
needs (Problem II) by allowing a fundamental customization of curricula and training processes 
based on individual collaborative employers’ specific needs. In contrast, I predict that the top-
down non-collaborative approach of the MOHRSS would result in failure in addressing these 
problems. That being said, both the MOE and the MOHRSS’s reforms would fail to address 
Problem III, namely achieving a balanced delivery of general and firm-specific skills, given the 
absence of effective civil society governance in China. The MOHRSS’s centralized 
apprenticeship system imposes standardized training based on the National Vocational 
Certificate System, rendering training programs over-focused on general skills. As for the MOE, 
in contrast, the ministry has granted individual programs full autonomy to develop their own 
curricula and control over training processes. The result is that trainings are dominated by 
individual collaborative firms’ skill development agendas and thus frequently over-focus on their 
specific skill needs without effective coordination across the industry. I hence argue that the 
Chinese state has been trapped in a decentralization dilemma with regard to skill development 
reform. Until effective civil society governance is formed to coordinate the VET process, the 
system will continue failing to deliver ideal skill development outcomes and confounding the 
state’s long-term upskilling agenda.  
This study enters the debate on the Chinese reform by developing a three-level 
collaborative model for understanding and furthering the reform in not only skill development 
but potentially various other socio-economic arenas. Scholarly accounts of China’s socio-
		
124 
economic reform fall into an either/or debate. That is, while most studies emphasize state 
centralization and its decisive role in leading the reform of various domains, an emerging but 
considerable stream of literature has suggested what can be broadly called a “capitalism from 
below” approach (Nee and Opper 2012) through highlighting the role of proactive grassroots 
actors, and informal networks and institutions. As a result, institution building in China is 
believed to follow either a top-down or a bottom-up approach. In this paper, I suggest an 
alternative model that state-initiated reform agendas involve fundamental diffusion of authority 
and division of labor among the state, civil society actors, and individual non-state players that 
can indeed generate more desirable outcomes. As an important policy implication, the state 
should seek to enhance the capacity of civil society organizations, including employer 
associations and labor unions, in order to facilitate the formation of civil society governance 
mechanisms that would better serve the function of this collaborative model.  
 
Literature Review 
 
Theoretically, a skill formation system must effectively address three key problems in 
order to deliver desirable outcomes: the collective action problem, the accommodation of 
industry needs, and the balance between general and firm-specific skills. These problems are 
derived from three theoretical perspectives relevant to the skill development arena: institutional 
theory, the “regulation school,” and human capital theory respectively. In this section, I first 
summarize the three theoretical perspectives, the problems they pose to a skill formation process, 
and institutional arrangements that are typically adopted in major economies for resolving these 
problems (see, Table 8). These theories altogether suggest that successful skill development 
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entails effective collaboration among the state, civil society actors, firms, and training institutes, 
based on which I have proposed a three-level collaborative model of skill development. I also 
use Germany, UK, Singapore, and the US to demonstrate successful or partially successful 
institutional arrangements and practices of collaborative skill development with regard to 
addressing each of the three problems. I propose that while the MOHRSS’s top-down model is 
inferior to the MOE’s collaborative skill formation approach, the latter will be at best partially 
successful given the absence of civil society governance tradition and capacity in China.   
 
Table 8. Theoretical Perspectives, Key Skill Development Problems, and Institutional Resolution 
Theory Institutionalism “Regulation school” Human capital theory 
Problem Collective action 
problem – skills are 
essentially public 
goods 
Accommodation of 
industry needs – skill 
formation processes 
must be compatible 
with dominant modes 
of production  
Balance between 
general and firm-
specific skills – to 
avoid over-focusing on 
individual firms’ 
specific skill needs 
Institutional 
resolution 
State intervention and 
subsidy – to oblige 
and/or incentivize cost-
sharing among firms 
and individuals 
School-firm 
collaboration – to 
engage and motivate 
firm participation  
 
Corporatist civil 
society governance – 
to widely coordinate 
firm interests 
 
 
Problem I: Collective Action Problem 
Institutional theory suggests that skills are inherently public goods. Streeck (1989) argues 
in his classic work: 
 “…successful self-interested, utilitarian behavior in market environments 
requires the presence of collective resources, common values, and shared expectations 
that rationally acting individuals cannot normally generate, protect, or restore even if they 
fully recognize their vital importance. This is because such resources are in significant 
respects ‘collective goods’ which cannot be privately appropriated and to whose 
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generation rational capitalist actors have therefore no, or no sufficient, incentives to 
contribute. As a consequence, the unbridled pursuit of self-regarding interests results in 
suboptimal outcomes not just for the community at large but also for economically 
rational individuals themselves” 
 
This situation can be illustrated by a collective action problem. As suggested by the 
classic game theory model of public lands, assume there is a public farmland shared by a 
community, where everyone in the community can farm and harvest crops that belong to 
him/herself. Without effective coordination among the community, no individual has the 
incentive to fertilize the land because, economically, assuming that everyone seeks to maximize 
his/her own wellbeing, fertilizing the land by him/herself is not a good strategy for an individual, 
as others will become free-riders and simply benefit from his/her fertilization of the land without 
bearing the costs. If everyone adopts this strategy, however, the land will eventually become 
infertile and everyone will end up worse off. The same free-riding problem exists in most public 
arenas where collective actions take place.  
In these arenas, the market logic fails to result in the best outcomes for the community, 
and a certain level and format of collective governance over individual choice is therefore 
indispensable. A significant example in the industrial relations sphere is unions and strikes, 
which Olson (1965) uses to illustrate this necessity of governance. He argues that in order for 
union actions to be effective and to avoid the free-riding problem in strikes, some form of 
compulsory membership in unions is crucial. The compulsory membership here is one type of 
governance that overrides the market logic. Likewise, in the field of skill formation, the free rider 
problem is prevalent and some collective governance is necessary. 
Here we see similar “market failure” in the skill development arena. Decisions based on 
individual trainees and firms’ “rational choice” will result in underinvestment of skills at the 
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societal level. Individual trainees and employers tend to underinvest in skills. Young workers 
that just or even have not started their careers likely do not have enough money or motivation to 
invest in human capital that they can only benefit in later stages of career, because of the 
uncertainty associated with the investment – Workers simply cannot accurately predict what 
skills will be needed in the future – which therefore leads to insufficient self-financing of skills 
(Streeck 1989). Employers also tend to insufficiently fund skills, argues Streeck, providing that 
workers are able to quit whenever they want under the regime of free employee termination. And 
once that happens, employers immediately lose the sunk investments in the training they provide. 
These possibilities make investment strategies of employers and workers much more 
complicated and unpredictable, and often below the optimal. 
In addition, the skill formation process has externalities. That is, an individual receives 
returns for others’ investment in their own human capital, and firms, who even though may not 
benefit directly through for example employing workers who own certain skills, can still 
capitalize on individuals’ investment in their human capital indirectly. For instance, if all people 
in an economy invest in human capital and the economy moves up from low-skill equilibrium to 
high-skill equilibrium where skills are better appreciated and rewarded, then every worker ends 
up better off, and firms acquire higher productivity and bonuses that the economic boom brings 
about. However, an individual’s level of investment in human capital is often based on his/her 
own cost-benefit calculation, which tends to fall below the social optimal level. All in all, 
individuals and firms’ investment in human capital based solely on market logic tends to 
insufficiently fund skills. Lucas (1988), for example, proposed a model suggesting that the US 
economy in the 1980s ought to invest almost three times as much in human capital as it did in 
order to reach the socially optimal level.  
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Therefore, certain degrees of governance, public or private, is needed in just any regime 
to encourage higher levels of investment in skills than what individuals and firms would 
otherwise have achieved based on sole market logic, and very often, there is a strong motivation 
for the state to assume that role. Specifically, to avoid the collective action problem and skill 
development failure, we need strong state regulation, and/or certain forms of private governance 
such as effective coordination that seeks to impose certain types of obligation on individual firms. 
This is comparable to the case of strikes where we need state regulation to ban (or limit) the use 
of replacement workers, and/or unions to facilitate the coordination among individual workers so 
as to reduce scabs. In other words, we need institutions to avoid free riders. This same rationale 
applies to the skill formation arena.  
Institutional resolution: state subsidy and/or intervention: The key policy issue here is 
to promote fair cost sharing among players – workers, employers, and the state – for the sake of 
sufficient investment in human capital at the firm and the societal level. And in nearly every 
major country, the state plays an indispensible role in investing time, effort, and money in skill 
development, or obliging or encouraging other players to do so. Table 9 summarizes how 
exemplar countries – Germany, UK, Singapore, and the US – have employed various 
institutional arrangements to resolve the three key problems in skill development. As shown, 
strategies that a state often uses for addressing the collective action problem are threefold. 
The first and most straightforward strategy is that the state foots (part of) the bill by itself. 
It is commonly seen in most, if not all, major countries that the state subsidizes VET in various 
ways. But it is a strategy particularly favored by liberal market economies as it entails less direct 
intervention. The governance of the state-funded VET system in the US, for example, – 
including both schools and workplace-based training programs such as apprenticeship – is 
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through strategic allocation of state funding. While the state does not directly intervene in 
program design or use mandatory mechanisms, they do rely on economic incentives, i.e. issuing 
subsidies to exert influence and control over training processes (Stone III and Lewis 2000). In 
the UK, the state subsidizes training programs but leaves standards making, qualification, and 
program development to licensed private actors (Delebarre 2016).  
 
Table 9. Exemplar Skill Development/Apprenticeship Systems 
Countries Collective 
Action Problem 
Accommodation of 
Industry Needs 
Balance between General 
and Specific Skills 
Germany State subsidy Chambers, employer 
associations, and BiBB* 
Employer associations, unions, 
and works councils 
UK State subsidy Employer-led sectoral 
skills councils 
Employer-led sectoral skills 
councils 
Singapore State subsidy 
and intervention 
State and MNCs-funded 
training centers 
State-organized multi-MNCs 
collaboration 
US State subsidy Community college-firm 
collaboration 
Lack of coordination, but some 
local centralization efforts 
* BiBB: Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training 
 
 
 
Second, the state may oblige employers and individuals to share the costs of training. It is 
not all that common, however, to see state compulsion regarding employer or individual direct 
payment for certain training in major countries. But the state may do so in indirect ways. Taxing 
is one such approach: In Singapore, for instance, employers are required to contribute the 
equivalence of 1% of the payroll of employees earning less than $1,500 per month to a special 
skill development fund, which is granted to firms that carry out training programs (Kuruvilla, 
Erickson, and Hwang 2002). The state may also make individual trainees to bear part of the costs 
through, for example, 1) allowing lower apprentice wages than the legal minimum for regular 
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workers, 2) allowing employment contracts stipulating mandatory post-training severance 
periods and liquidated damages on breaching such agreement, and 3) encouraging long-term 
employment relationships and discouraging labor poaching via all kinds of legislative 
arrangements. Some of these arrangements are seen in major European, East and Southeast 
Asian countries, as well as China in the Labor Contract Law. In Singapore, for instance, the state 
in early 1980s encouraged foreign-invested firms to set up training centers in order to secure 
technology and skill transfer to the domestic industry. And in order to incentivize firms to do so, 
they guaranteed that these firms have the right to hire the graduates before they can be selected 
by other firms (Kuruvilla and Chua 2000). 
The third strategy is institution building to facilitate private governance. In Germany, for 
example, employers have to pay compulsory membership dues to the chamber of commerce and 
industry, which is used to fund chambers’ activities including supervising apprenticeship training 
processes, and evaluating trainees ultimately. This private governance also imposes soft 
obligations on employers to fund skill development. Employers are incentivized to continue 
offering apprenticeship positions even though that may conflict with their economic interests. 
This “logic of appropriateness,” argue Finegold and Wagner (2002), is derived from the 
institutional pressure they suffer from unions, the state, and the chambers, as well as cultural and 
legitimacy consideration at the broader societal level.  
All in all, the state’s role is indispensible in solving the collective action problem in skill 
development. Given the absence of civil society governance mechanisms in an authoritarian 
regime like China, state direct intervention is probably even more crucial to the success of a skill 
development system.  
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Problem II: Accommodation of Industry Needs 
Marxist theory provides the insight that the “economic base” or mode of production 
defines the limits of variation of the superstructure – understood as a configuration of 
institutional arrangements that the ruling class uses to govern the society. And a change of the 
dominant mode of production in a society will facilitate transformation of the superstructure 
(Marx [1859] 1978). The “regulation school” has inherited this rationale of economic 
determinism, and advanced the notions of the accumulation regime and modes of regulation, the 
conjunction of which defines a mode of development. Once existing institutional forms become 
incompatible with a society’s mode of development due to technological revolutions, for 
example, a structural crisis emerges and the mode is unable to reproduce itself in the long term. 
The institutional forms then need transformation (Boyer 1987; Leborgne and Lipietz 1988).  
This theory, if applied to the skill development arena, suggests that skill formation 
institutions must be compatible with the mode of production that consists of technologies and the 
labor processes being adopted in organizations. The Fordist mass production that once 
dominated the manufacturing industry in the US, for example, was associated with many features 
of the US skill formation system – including the extensive use of general and standardized skills, 
limited firm-specific training, and a low level of skills in general – until 1970s when the 
Japanese lean production system started to challenge the Fordist model in the North American 
market. Firms has since then started to integrate post-Fordist components into their production 
process that entails flexible work organization such as teamwork, multi-tasked jobs, and worker 
participation and problem solving mechanisms. This differs from the traditional Fordist 
production based on the Taylorist rationale of scientific management, which intentionally 
separates the conception (the brain, or management) and execution (the hand, or workers) 
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(Braverman, 1974). A structural crisis thus emerged under the new circumstance, calling for a 
transformation of the skill formation system to provide workers with a new and wider array of 
skills that go compatible with the new production mode (Green, 1992).  
The German skill formation system characterized by the high-skill equilibrium (Finegold 
and Soskice 1998), as another example, was established based on the diversified quality 
production (DQP). This production system, different from either traditional Fordist production or 
flexible production, features incremental customization that allows firms to invest and also 
afford the relatively costly high-skilled German workers via the apprenticeship system (Sorge 
and Streeck 1988; Streeck 1992). Scholars see the combination of the high-skill equilibrium and 
the DQP model as what sustained the comparative advantage of German products in the global 
market until 1990s – when the global just-in-time production which entails faster innovation and 
reaction to market changes, as well as shorter production turnaround started to challenge this 
regime of production, rendering the skill formation system inappropriate (Culpepper 1999b).  
A key problem regarding skill development derived from this theory is that training 
processes should be able to engage firms, and best accommodate skill needs of the industry, to 
make sure that supply and demand sides of the labor market are matched and avoid a structural 
crisis. Institutional arrangements should cater to industry voice in skill standards making, 
curriculum development, and qualification, and encourage firm participation in the pre-
employment skill formation process in various formats. While firms may be willing to invest in 
an apprenticeship program, for instance, for one cycle – especially if it is state-subsidized or 
mandated (Problem I) – their willingness to commit continuous effort in the long run hinges on if 
the program can actually cater to their skill needs (Problem II).   
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Too much state direct intervention may have negative effects here. Especially in a 
country like China where regional variation is huge from here to there, flexibility in curricula and 
specialty development is indispensible for accommodating regional and industrial specificities. 
The centralized VET system in China had once generated the rigidity problem and renders 
training programs unable to cater to the skill needs of industry (Cooke 2005; Durden and Yang 
2006). Therefore, although state intervention potentially helps firms to overcome the collective 
action problem, employers may still have negative feedbacks about it, if it is not flexible enough 
to fulfill their demands.  
Institutional resolution: school-firm collaboration: Certain levels of authority diffusion 
is thus necessary especially in the skill development arena where the ultimate success or failure 
of a system hinges on if it best serves the industry and market needs. And in order to realize that, 
the making of skill standards and the development of curricula, specialties, and programs must 
be informed by the industry and regional market (Culpepper 1999a: 4). In major countries, 
therefore, institution design regarding skill development often involves certain forms of 
collaboration between relevant state ministries, training institutes, and firms, with a proper 
division of labor and authority among these organizations.  
The German case, for instance, well exemplifies a social partnership of skill development 
with clear division of labor among social partners and substantial diffusion of authority regarding 
institution design. In the late 1960s, the German corporatist government inherited the 
craftsmanship tradition of apprenticeship training and enshrined the dualist system into the 
training law. This system involves training of youths at both workplace and schools under 
contracts negotiated between employer associations and unions regarding the contents of the 
training, in programs lasting from three to three and a half years. Employers are approved, and 
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training processes are monitored and eventually evaluated by chambers of industry and 
commerce and of trades. And at workplace, works councils play a role – to varying extents 
though – in codetermining firm-specific issues regarding the training. The state leaves authority 
and therefore flexibility to this private governance at the workplace and industry level, but itself 
only serves to provide expertise consultancies to players in designing apprenticeship programs 
via the Federal Institute for Vocational Training (BiBB). This institutional structure has 
successfully solved the collective action problem (underinvestment in skills) by encouraging 
cost-sharing among 1) the state that pays for vocational school operation, 2) firms that pay for 
workplace training, and 3) apprentices that contribute by working at lower wage rates than 
regular workers. More importantly, apprenticeship ensures that firms’ particular skill needs are 
met on the one hand, and on the other, sectoral unions’ role in devising program contents helps 
to avoid going to the other extreme that training is too narrowly focused on the particular firm’s 
specific skills (Culpepper 1999a: 3-5).  
In probably more comparable East Asian cases, the state tends to assume a bigger role 
than in European corporatist or liberal market economies. Ashton, Green, Sung, and James (1999) 
have focused on the strong state intervention in Asian Four Tigers – Singapore, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, and South Korea – in the skill formation arena throughout their post-war industrialization, 
and its success in leading skill development in these countries. They have used a developmental 
state model of skill formation to highlight the state’s role and top-down manipulation of the 
process, which was able to not only facilitate the development of the national skill formation 
system, but also proactively shape and coordinate the demand and supply of skills in the market, 
in the absence of a strong private governance tradition in these (once) authoritarian regimes.  
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That being said, important elements of state-private actors collaboration have been 
identified in these countries based on a closer examination of these systems. Kuruvilla, Erickson, 
and Hwang (2002), for instance, ascribe the success of the post-war Singaporean economy to 
what they call a model of private-public sector collaboration of skill development, where state 
organized skill development has been able to engage foreign invested firms to establish training 
institutes since 1970s. The Singaporean government offered firms doing so preferential policies 
regarding investment and market protection, and granted them priority over other firms in hiring 
graduates from those institutes. The government later expanded this project to collaborate with 
other national governments, and accordingly, offered such preferential policies to all firms from 
those countries. This model has been able to both successfully encourage foreign firms to invest 
in skill development, ensuring that up-to-date technologies and skills are transferred to the 
Singaporean workforce, and secure sufficient high-skilled labor for those foreign-invested firms 
in Singapore.  
 
Problem III: Balance between General and Specific Skills 
Engaging firms is an important, but ought not to be the ultimate goal in skill development. 
Indeed, firm-led training risks being over-focused on individual employers’ specific and 
immediate skill needs and failing to assume a long-term skill development perspective at the 
societal level. This is derived from human capital theory advanced by Becker (1993), who sees 
skills as a unique type of capital associated with human beings. The process of skill formation, 
including education and training, is thus regarded as a form – indeed the most important form 
according to Becker – of investment in human capital. Becker further specified two types of 
human capital investment, i.e. general skills vs. (firm) specific skills. Skills that tend to benefit 
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every firm to the same extent are known as general skills, whereas those that only benefit firms 
that offer the training are specific skills. Most skills in reality, however, are what Stevens (1999) 
defines as transferable skills that can be potentially capitalized on by other firms but not to the 
extent as if they are subject to perfect market competition that “the wage is driven up to the 
marginal product.” In other words, suppose different types of skills are located on a continuum 
with one end as completely general skills, and the other end as completely specific skills, most 
skills in fact are situated in between the two ideal types. In this paper, unless specified otherwise, 
I use transferable and general skills interchangeably to denote skills that lean toward the “general 
skills” end of this continuum, and specific skills for the skills that lean toward the “firm-specific 
skills” end.  
Although it is not entirely able to separate general from specific skills in a training 
process given this continuum, employers obviously have strong incentives to focus their effort on 
training of relatively specific skills. This can be understood as an avoidance strategy to sidestep 
the collective action problem mentioned above – workers equipped with more specific skills are 
less attractive in the labor market, and thus less likely to be poached by other firms than those 
with more general skills holding other factors constant. If employers are invited to participate in 
curriculum development and carry out part of the training in the pre-employment skill formation 
process, the entire process risks being dominated by specific and immediate skill needs of 
individual employers at work.  
This poses a great challenge to not only individual trainees, but also employers 
themselves as well as the entire labor market. For one thing, over-focusing on specific skills 
undermines individual workers’ employability by making them less attractive to a broader group 
of employers in the labor market as noted. And it limits opportunities for a worker’s long-term 
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career development. For another, a workforce with a skill structure biased toward individual 
firms’ specific use undermines labor market mobility, and increases retraining costs for new 
employers. Therefore, the absence of a long-term plan in skill development at the societal level 
will eventually hurt the economy.  
Institutional resolution: civil society governance: The key here is to effectively 
coordinate firms’ interests at the industry level regarding skill standards making, curriculum 
development, qualification, and training process monitoring in order to achieve a balanced 
delivery of both general and specific skills. Major industrialized countries have employed two 
important institutions to facilitate the formation of transferable skills of the workforce. The first 
is the skill credentialing system that focuses on occupation-related standards making and 
certification for general skills mostly instituted at the industry level. These standards are used to 
guide the development of training programs and curricula, to ensure that essential skills of a 
certain occupation are covered in training. In the UK, for instance, sectoral skills councils (SSC) 
are founded at each national industry level by employers, functioning as bodies that establish 
national vocational standards and issue certificates with approved awarding organizations. Such 
a certificate attests to receivers’ employability for a particular occupation with relevant skills that 
are widely transferable and recognized in a certain national industry. These standards are used to 
guide formal institute-based training (Delebarre 2016).  
For employer-based training such as apprenticeship programs, worker voice and 
monitoring mechanisms are necessary in order to prevent the problem of over-focusing on firm-
specific skills, or abuse of apprentices in workplaces based on the will of unchecked employers. 
Civil society governance, in particular unions here often seek a role in training program 
development and process monitoring at workplace in pursuit of that balance, as they are 
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incentivized to strengthen member workers’ employability over time and across firms (Locke, 
Kochan, and Piore 1995; Olney 1994). In the German dual system, for example, an 
apprenticeship program is negotiated between employer associations and unions regarding 
training contents. And in individual firms, works councils have the right to co-determine issues 
that are workplace-specific. Here the unions and works councils help prevent program 
development and training processes from being overly firm-specific and for employers’ 
immediate use only. In terms of training process monitoring, chambers assume a role via 
apprentice evaluation, while works councils often serve as an important day-to-day monitoring 
mechanism at workplace (Streeck 1987; Culpepper 1999a).  
 
Collaborative Model of Skill Development 
Based on the discussion above, I have compiled a three-level collaborative model of skill 
development (see, Figure 4). All in all, a successful skill development system entails intensive 
collaboration among the state, civil society actors, and individual employers and training 
institutes in order to deliver desirable skill development outcomes through effectively addressing 
the three key problems: the collective action problem, the accommodation of industry needs, and 
the balance between general and specific skills.  
Evaluation criteria and predicted outcomes: I evaluate the success of a program based 
on three criteria as to measure if these three key problems in skill development are successfully 
solved: 1) employer participation, for the collective action problem, 2) employer satisfaction, for 
the accommodation of employer needs, and 3) a proper balance between transferable and firm-
specific skills, for the problem of over-focusing on firm-specific skills. Based on the discussion 
above, it is reasonable to expect that collaborative approaches adopted between the state and 
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non-state actors are more effective in addressing the first two issues than the traditional top-down, 
state-centralized model. But both models are likely to deliver poor performance regarding the 
third issue, given the lack of civil society governance in China. Table 10 summarizes these 
criteria, and indicators that I use to measure the two reform programs of the MOE (following 
collaborative approaches) and the MOHRSS (following the top-down approach), and expected 
outcomes.  
 
Figure 4. Collaborative Model of Skill Development 
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Table 10. Evaluation Criteria and Prediction 
Key problems Criteria Indicators MOHRSS: 
top-down 
MOE: 
collaborative 
Collective action 
problem 
Employer 
participation 
1) Number of programs 
established;  
2) Firms and schools 
involved, and  
3) Apprentices trained 
Fewer  More 
Accommodation 
of employer needs 
Employer 
satisfaction 
1) Sustainability of 
programs;  
2) Employer feedback 
Lower  Higher  
Balance between 
firm-specific and 
general skills 
Proper 
balance 
Curriculum consistency 
 
Over-focused 
on general 
skills 
Over-focused 
on firm-specific 
skills 
 
 
Methods 
 
I employed ethnographic field research methods. The MOE and the MOHRSS’s recent 
parallel reform efforts have provided us with an ideal comparative analytical framework where 
we can compare “apple to apple” while holding the broader socio-economic context constant. In 
order to evaluate and compare the two ministries’ reforms, I looked into how their national 
reform agendas and policies on apprenticeship are being institutionalized at the local level. I 
started my fieldwork by leveraging and studying national-level organizations in Beijing – the 
capital city of China – where I interviewed central MOE and MOHRSS officials in charge of the 
VET affairs, their think-tank organizations’ officials, as well as some academics. I made 
inquiries regarding respective ministries’ central policy-making processes, their perceptions of 
the institutional division and potential competition between the two ministries, and their response 
to problems and challenges they are faced with during reforms. These interviews also enabled 
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me to establish good connections with government officials that later offered great help for my 
field research in Guangdong.  
Next, in order to examine the institutionalization of central reform policies at the local 
level, I focused on Guangdong as an information-rich case (Patton 1990) in terms of both early 
reform outcomes and a wide range of possibilities that it is able to show. To begin with, 
Guangdong has been well known as China’s economic reform frontier during the past three 
decades. Its economic development is currently faced with greatest challenges, however, 
including skilled labor shortage and rapidly increasing labor costs and conflict, which entail 
industrial restructuring and upgrading, and therefore skill upgrading of the workforce. 
Guangdong government officials have historically proven to be particularly efficient in effecting 
economic reforms. While the apprenticeship reforms are relatively recent central initiatives and 
local governments may or may not have fully embraced these agendas, we expect to see most 
dynamic reform practices and substantial early outcomes in Guangdong.  
Second, we are more likely to see a wide range of scenarios in Guangdong regarding skill 
development. Guangdong is the biggest vocational education province in China, owning more 
VET facilities that educate a bigger workforce than any other Chinese province. Guangdong 
generates over one tenth of the national vocational school graduates on a yearly basis. Moreover, 
Guangdong shows tremendous diversity across its cities: At the kernel of the Pearl River Delta 
region (including cities like Guangdong, Shenzhen, Foshan, and Dongguan) are the most 
advanced market economies, as well as best vocational schools in China; Western and Northern 
Guangdong (such as Qingyuan, Zhanjiang, and Zhaoqing), in contrast, resembles typical 
circumstances of less developed provinces in hinterland China. While I am not claiming that 
Guangdong is a prototypical case here, it does somewhat represent the diversified scenario of the 
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entire Chinese VET system. All in all, Guangdong is a good start to evaluate the early outcomes 
of the current reform, both successes and failures, as a case rich in both dynamics and diversity.  
I compare the MOE and the MOHRSS’s recent reform efforts by focusing on 
apprenticeship training (see, Table 11) – an institutional arena with intensive competition 
between the two ministries in the current Chinese VET reform. By mid-2016 when I left the field, 
the MOE’s apprenticeship system had generated two cycles of 51 programs in 19 schools in 
Guangdong, while I was able to cover nine schools including all the seven involved in the first 
cycle of apprenticeship experimentation. The MOHRSS’s apprenticeship system had not been as 
successful; By mid-2016, they had recruited only four schools and five firms with five 
apprenticeship programs, none of which, however, had completed even the apprentice admission 
process. And I studied one of the five programs. These cases constitute the main part of my 
empirical work.  
 
Table 11. Comparative Case Analysis 
 MOHRSS: 
Top-down model 
MOE: Collaborative model 
Legitimizing Subcontracting 
Apprenticeship 
training 
“New 
apprenticeship 
system” 
“Modern 
apprenticeship 
system” 
 
 Curricula National Vocational 
Certificate System 
 Individual-program 
based 
 
 
Data 
This paper draws on three types of data generated from the field research. The first 
consists of 322 interviews with various stakeholders of the VET system. In particular, 
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apprenticeship training entails active collaboration among governments, schools, and employers. 
I have therefore first conducted 28 interviews with officials from the MOE and the MOHRSS, 
and their local branches. The central and local governments’ roles have been probed into through 
conversation, but state officials also helped me identify experimental programs, and establish 
important connections with those schools. I then proceeded to focus on school-level research, 
and collected 200 interviews with presidents, administration, teachers, students, and parents from 
25 schools including ten currently experimenting with apprenticeship training. These schools 
further introduced me to their 21 collaborative firms, where I did another 79 interviews with 
managements, firm-level union officials, and workers. These in-depth interviews constitute my 
major information resource for understanding the complex dynamics of each experimental 
program. In addition, useful supplementary information was extracted through conversation with 
officials from 12 other organizations including local official unions, think-tank organizations, 
NGOs, employer associations, and academic institutes. Some of the interviews took place during 
group meetings, which is very common in China. Individual and group interviews last two hours 
on average.  
Second, further exploring institution building approaches and interaction among relevant 
stakeholders during the process, I have engaged in tremendous participant and non-participant 
observation. I achieved this primarily through participating in two ongoing apprenticeship reform 
projects in Guangdong. Throughout late 2015 and early 2016, I served as an external consultant 
for the curriculum reform in Guangdong’s beauty sector. And during April 2016, I was invited to 
work as a translator for a team of British consultants for the MOE’s apprenticeship reform. My 
good relationship with government and school officials partly derived from these works allowed 
me later to attend many meetings, informal conversations, and dinners that are a typical way of 
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informal communication in China. These experiences granted me valuable insider information 
regarding how apprenticeship reform projects have been carried out under extensive 
collaboration among all aspects.  
Finally, a systemic examination of the complexities of these nation-wide reform projects 
is enabled also by a considerable amount of secondary data collected during fieldwork. This 
includes relevant state policies, internal documents of governments, schools, and firms, and 
internet-based resources such as background information of schools and firms that I studied, and 
important news and reports. I use these data to “triangulate” with the firsthand data collected via 
above-mentioned methods, as well as to cover information that my process tracing through 
interviews could not yield.  
 
Results 
 
Table 12 previews outcomes of the two ministries’ apprenticeship reforms in Guangdong 
by mid-2016 when I left my field. As shown, the MOE has overridden the MOHRSS regarding 
the number of programs and apprentice positions that were generated, indicating that the former 
has been more effective in addressing the collective action problem (Problem I). Furthermore, 
the MOE’s programs received positive feedbacks from employers, and by mid-2016, had started 
another cycle of apprentice recruitment. In contrast, the MOHRSS’s reform has triggered 
tremendous complaints from employers, who are unlikely to renew their programs for more 
cycles. Obviously here the MOE’s programs have turned out to be abler to satisfy employers and 
accommodate industry needs (Problem II). Finally, both reforms have failed to secure a balanced 
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delivery of general and specific skills. The MOHRSS’s programs offer exclusively general skills 
training, whereas the MOE’s programs are overly focused on firm-specific skills (Problem III).  
 
Table 12. Key Outcomes of Apprenticeship Reforms in Guangdong 
 Key problems MOHRSS MOE 
Collective action 
problem 
Schools 4 19 
Programs 5 51 
Firms 5 51 
Students/apprentices N/A* 2,350 
Accommodation of 
industry needs 
Cycles <1* 2 
Employer feedback “Triple complaints” 
Welcomed by 
employers 
Balance between general and specific skills Over-focused on general skills 
Over-focused on 
firm-specific skills 
 * Apprentice admission not completed by mid-2016 when I left the field 
 
What explains this significant variation? I find that it is derived from the two ministries’ 
drastically different skill development models adopted in reform. The MOHRSS has followed a 
state top-down model that relies overwhelmingly on detailed state policies and guidelines, quota 
management, and subsidies, as well as centralized skill standards and curricula to motivate 
employer participation and guide them through apprenticeship training processes. The MOE, in 
contrast, has adopted a collaborative approach to apprenticeship training – subsidizing and 
legitimizing existing school-firm collaborative programs at vocational schools. In this section, I 
present the two ministries’ reforms in a comparative perspective, and in particular focus on their 
top-down vs. collaborative models and the different outcomes thereby generated.  
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MOHRSS: Top-down Model 
Following the central state’s agenda of experimenting with apprenticeship training in the 
“Made in China 2025” guideline, the MOHRSS launched its “New Apprenticeship” system in 
July 2015. Its central policy offers a very detailed guideline and roadmap that seeks to direct 
firms through the institution building process. Each firm is required to offer 100 apprentice 
positions to enroll in a one or two-year program no later than September 2015, where apprentices 
receive relevant trainings for national vocational certificates that firms purchase from technical 
schools. The state will subsidize 60% of the training costs. While this subsidy has the potential to 
encourage firm participation, it has largely failed to do so in Guangdong, where the local 
government had already been subsidizing 100% of vocational certificate training for individuals 
that successfully receive a certificate at the end21 – firms now are required to pay for 40% of 
something that would otherwise be covered by workers and the local government.  
In addition, the MOHRSS uses quota to manage the process. As noted, a participant firm 
is imposed on a quota of 100 apprentices in a cycle. Also, according to the policy, participants 
have to be large and medium-sized firms in which, first, skilled workers account for over 60% of 
the workforce, and second, a comprehensive internal training system has already been 
established. This rigid central policy essentially excludes two types of firms. First, small firms 
typically cannot afford 100 apprentice positions in a cycle, and are therefore excluded. Even a 
big firm may not need as many new workers/apprentices if not under fast expansion. Second, 
firms with fewer than 60% skilled workers, or without a comprehensive internal training system 
are excluded. Such firms, if selected to enroll in the MOHRSS’s reform experimentation, 
probably cannot make the reform look as “good” as those large and high-end firms, but they are 																																																								
21 Guangdong Department of Human Resources and Social Security (2014), Administrative 
Measures on the Special Fund for Guangdong Workforce Training, Relocation, and Employment.  
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absolutely more needy and enthusiastic than the latter about state-subsidized training. In contrast, 
why would a large firm that already has a comprehensive internal training system and 60% 
skilled workers be keen on an additional training that may not be useful for them anyway? 
NVCS: Skill standards and curriculum making is much centralized as well. As noted, the 
training is tied to the National Vocational Certificate System (NVCS) run by the MOHRSS. 
Established in 1950s, the NVCS was one of the major tools that the state once used to manage 
employment and compensation in the centrally planed economy. Until the market reform in the 
1980s, a state worker’s wages and benefits were exclusively tied to the vocational certificates 
and seniority that s/he carries, no matter what firm, industry, or often area s/he works. 
With the decentralization of the market reform that seeks to break the “iron-rice bowl” 
and authorize firms with discretion to determine wages and benefits based on various factors 
such as firm profits and individual performance since the late 1970s, the centralized NVCS was 
rendered incompatible with the new labor market circumstances. In particular, the MOHRSS 
runs an overwhelming majority of vocational certificates by itself, with only a few exceptions 
where industry associations or industry-relevant state ministries are authorized to manage certain 
professional certificates and related qualification processes such as doctors and lawyers. Skill 
standards making is exclusively within the national ministry, while local Bureaus of Human 
Resources and Social Security and their approved entities – typically public technical schools – 
are responsible for carrying out qualification and related training processes.  
The NVCS has long been criticized for this centralization, and thus rigidity and 
outdatedness. To begin with, the system is too centralized to accommodate industrial and 
regional specificities. While a certain occupation may be employable in many different industries, 
essential technologies adopted and thereby know-hows required for workers likely vary across 
		
148 
these industries – welders, for example, use very different tools when they work in an auto-
manufacturing firm vs. in an electronics-manufacturing firm. Furthermore, the national system is 
unable to cater to regional difference. Most complaints I heard about the NVCS in Guangdong 
pertain to how “backwards” the standards are that it fails to catch up with the relatively advanced 
industrial status quo there. An interviewed school provost related to me: 
The MOHRSS’s vocational certificates do not really attest to someone’s actual 
level of skills, and are useless [in workplaces]. We have a certificate for food inspectors. 
Workers holding this certificate cannot do the work in factories… For example, in terms 
of setting up a laboratory, we went to a food factory last time, and set up an entire 
laboratory for them. We were very clear about what they need, but a worker working 
there cannot do this at all. Nowadays every food factory is required to employ a fulltime 
food inspector, but workers (holding this certificate) are often not really qualified for this 
job. What does this tell? Holding a vocational certificate does not represent the real skill 
level a holder has. (Author: why do you think it is so?) The MOHRSS finds a number of 
old experts and makes up a set of standards, without updating it for years. They are not 
really doing this according to industrial development. These experts are probably 
unfamiliar with industrial circumstances, so they do not really test the most important 
things [in qualification] (II: 49) 
 
In addition, major updates of most skill standards occur every five years, rendering these 
standards outdated and unable to catch up with the fast technological change in industry. While a 
VW assembler firm in Foshan, Guangdong is nowadays using robots to conduct most, if not all, 
welding work, they are least interested in hiring a welder with a national certificate that attests to 
his/her ability to operate traditional manual welding guns who, however, likely knows nothing 
about operating and maintaining a robotic welding machine.  
Urged by Prime Minister Li Keqiang, the MOHRSS has recently embarked on effort to 
reform the NVCS. A centerpiece of this reform is decentralization – to diffuse authority to 
industrial associations and let them manage relevant vocational certificates like in the case of UK 
and Germany. According to my interview with a MOHRSS official, however, the ministry is 
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reluctant to authorize these civil society actors to run certificates, unconfident about their 
capacity of doing so: 
Employer associations in China are under-developed… Traditional industrial 
associations are not real employer associations, but rather former government institutions, 
whereas those associations self-organized by firms do not have adequate capacity [to run 
vocational certificates]… We certainly hope to maximize their role, but they themselves 
are still under development. Whenever their reform is sufficient, and can really represent 
specific industries, they may be able to assume a bigger role (I: 2).  
 
In Guangdong, evidence largely supports this argument. A director of the official chamber of 
Guangdong, the Guangdong Provincial Enterprise Confederation (GEC), related to me: 
To be honest, our confederation is doing nothing with regard to education and 
training. (Author: Why?) We lack the capacity, and enough employees, and we cannot 
understand what firms need. We used to have a department of training, which was closed 
later, because they could not develop any business (IV: 15). 
 
This official also admitted that except for a few cases where certain associations are allowed by 
the MOHRSS to run some professional certificates, most employer associations in China do not 
play a role in VET. In my own research, I found only one case in Shunde District in 
Guangdong’s Foshan City where the district-level government has been establishing localized 
skill credentialing systems with support from several local industrial associations. Other than 
those, employers do not have a significant collective role or voice in skill credentialing in China. 
As a result, skill standards and curriculum making of the NVCS is likely to remain centralized 
and run by the MOHRSS in the long term.  
Now that the MOHRSS seeks to apply the NVCS to its apprenticeship system, an 
fundamental concern here is that curricula derived from these standards would fail to cater to 
industry needs (Problem II) and over focus on general skills development (Problem III). The case 
of the Toyota & Guangzhou Technician College (GZTC) apprenticeship program illustrates 
these problems.  
		
150 
Toyota & GZTC apprenticeship: Following the central policy and guideline, in October 
2015, Guangdong Department of Human Resources and Social Security (GDDOHRSS) formally 
announced five experimental apprenticeship programs with participants of five firms and four 
technical schools. GAC-Toyota (referred to as Toyota) is included.  
Toyota is a joint venture between Guangzhou Automobile Group (GAC) – a state-owned 
enterprise (SOE) – and Toyota. Established in 2014, the auto assembly firm currently employs 
9,600 workers with an annual production capacity of 380,000 cars.22 While Toyota holds 50% of 
the share, the human resource management system within the firm largely follows a typical 
Japanese MNC model that offers continuous internal training for workers. Toyota was selected 
as an experimental firm of the MOHRSS’s apprenticeship reform in Guangdong in 2015. From 
both the firm and the state’s perspective, Toyota’s participation seems inevitable. In the Chinese 
auto industry, the success of an auto firm – whether a JV, SOE, or private firm – almost always 
hinges on the local government’s overtime support in various forms, Toyota not an exception. In 
exchange, maintaining a good relationship with the local government for firms like Toyota 
entails their willingness to participate in state-initiated projects like the apprenticeship reform 
even though it may seem irrational based on short-term cost-benefit analysis. From the 
GDDOHRSS’s perspective, as a “star firm” in Guangdong and a leading firm of the local auto 
industry, Toyota’s participation will definitely make the entire project look good.  
State-subsidized training would not be too much a burden for firms, if without two major 
obstacles in this regard. The first is policy conflict between the MOHRSS and the GDDOHRSS 
regarding subsidy on NVCS training as mentioned above. Now that Toyota has budgeted 
100,000 yuan for its first cycle apprenticeship training, based on their estimation, they 
																																																								
22 http://about.gac-toyota.com.cn/visit/index.html, October 21, 2016 
		
151 
themselves will eventually fulfill a bill of about 45,000 yuan that would be otherwise 
unnecessary.  
What further annoys Toyota is the fact that they have to offer 100 apprentice positions in 
a cycle. Without significant production expansion, they would not have as many new positions to 
be filled by even ready-to-work workers in a year or two, let alone inexperienced apprentices. 
Alternatively, they decided to recruit 100 existing workers.23 This strategic solution renders 
apprenticeship training meaningless. The underlying rationale of apprenticeship training is to 
combine in-classroom with on-the-job training for apprentices unfamiliar with their prospective 
jobs to gain both general and specific skills. Existing workers, in contrast, have already been well 
integrated in the workplace, making at least the on-the-job training part formalistic.  
Toyota’s anonymous HR specialist, whom I call Ms. Wang here, was appointed to 
coordinate this apprenticeship program. Per the GDDOHRSS’s requirement, she made a detailed 
plan for the project, and budgeted 100,000 yuan for purchasing NVCS trainings from the GZTC. 
These trainings are composed of three programs/classes, each with 16 trainees, respectively on 
auto maintenance (middle-level and senior-level), and auto examination clerk (middle-level). 
According to the director of the GZTC’s NVCS training center, Ms. Chen, these trainings will 
strictly follow relevant NVCS standards, without any customization for Toyota (II: 187). While 
these trainings are exclusively focused on general skills, I cannot identify any component of on-
the-job training in their training plan.  
“Triple complaints”: The MOHRSS’s apprenticeship experimentation has triggered 
triple complaints in Guangdong. From the employers’ perspective, such general skills are useless 
																																																								
23 The MOHRSS’s central policy clearly requires that apprentices have to be newly recruited or 
appointed workers. 
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for their currently employed production system. It is worth quoting at length a section of my 
interview with Ms. Wang: 
Author: Do you think the 60% subsidy from the state is appealing? 
Wang: No. When we do something we want to know why we do it and what 
outcomes to expect. At the beginning when we were assigned the task [from the 
government], we did not know why we have to do this. Even now we are not much 
interested, but just to complete the task. Also, if our workers go to take these NVCS-
related trainings, for instance, senior-level mechanics, [they pay] about 2,000 yuan 
training fee. But according to the policy of our province, the state will refund over 3,000 
yuan. Now [under the apprenticeship program] they only reimburse 60%. We are actually 
losing money by paying 40% of it.  
Author: Why then did you still decide to do it? 
Wang: It is required by the GDDOHRSS. Their commanding document was sent 
to us… We said in private that this is a task from the state, The firm cannot really resist it. 
We also have a general manager from the Chinese partner – we are attached to the GAC, 
a state-owned firm. So we have to participate no matter if we are willing or not.  
Author: What do you think about the future of this program? 
Wang: (Shaking head) In the long run we definitely suffer a loss. But even if in 
the future the subsidy is increased to 100%, we still have to do too many things. We have 
our internal training system. Although we would also encourage our workers to go and 
get these certificates… if you ask us to organize them to get them (we are not happy), 
because these certificates are not very useful for us. So we would never force them to get 
them. Based on our own production system, we have our own training system.  
Author: Are relevant NVCS certificates recognized in the auto industry in general? 
Wang: We are happy if workers have these certificates, but they are not necessary. 
For instance, the certificate for auto maintenance, they are not really linked with real 
workplace [situations] (III: 74).  
 
Obviously, they regretted agreeing to participate. Toyota was reluctant to turn in their proposal to 
the GDDOHRSS. Indeed, none of the selected experimental firms had done so by mid-2016 
when I left the field – nine months later than what the MOHRSS’s roadmap had required.  
GDDOHRSS officials were very concerned with this situation. Local officials from both 
the MOHRSS and the MOE by and large welcomed my fieldwork in Guangdong. Partly because 
of my connections with central ministries, local officials were mostly willing to show me their 
“successful models.” The only exception was, however, the apprenticeship programs of the 
GDDOHRSS. Throughout my fieldwork during 2015-2016, I have repetitively requested to be 
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introduced to some of their experimental programs, but my GDDOHRSS contact had been 
reluctant to do so, in sharp contrast to the Guangdong Department of Education (GDDOE)’s 
reactions to my similar requests, as well as what the GDDOHRSS themselves did regarding my 
other requests. While I was fortunate enough to get access to the Toyota case via my other 
networks, the GDDOHRSS officials’ unusual quiescence about their apprenticeship reform had 
confused me until Ms. Chen, Director of Internet of Things Association of Guangdong Province 
(GDIOT), revealed the following story to me: 
The GDDOHRSS issued a subsidy policy, but no firm has applied for the funding. 
The department director was very concerned. We communicated a couple weeks ago, and 
they asked what problems their policy has that no single firm has sent in their proposal. 
The policy is simply rendered meaningless now. None of the five experimental firms had 
applied for the money. They were so anxious that they came and asked us how to adjust 
their policy to make it more acceptable (IV: 2).  
 
Apparently, the GDDOHRSS officials were very unconfident and discontented with the progress 
of their apprenticeship reform in Guangdong.  
Clearly, a lesson for them to learn here is that their top-down approach indeed had failed 
to motivate employers that are potentially most interested – small firms and start-ups that have 
rapidly growing needs for high-skilled workers but themselves, however, typically lack the 
capacity to provide systematic training for the workforce. The GDIOT has a membership of over 
600 start-ups and established firms in the IT industry in Guangdong. This association has indeed 
been running an apprenticeship-like training program with effective coordination among its 
member firms, well understanding these firms’ needs for skilled workers in the sector. They have 
been self-funding this, and expecting support from the local government throughout years, but 
the MOHRSS’s reform eventually excluded them from the subsidy. Ms. Chen continued the 
conversation: 
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So now they told us that they have realized the importance of small and medium-
sized firms. Those five experimental firms they selected are all large ones, none of which 
are very cooperative with them. Small and medium-sized firms should indeed be central 
to apprenticeship training, and they should highlight our employer associations’ role. The 
government does not give a shit, but only focus on those big firms, and do individual 
firm-school training (IV: 2).  
 
In other words, the MOHRSS could have been more successful in its apprenticeship reform if it 
had not used a rigid state top-down model of institution building, but sought to integrate such 
well-established existing programs into its own system like what the MOE has done with its own 
apprenticeship reform, to which I now turn.  
 
MOE: Collaborative Model 
On the contrary, the MOE’s apprenticeship reform has demonstrated a much more 
satisfactory scenario. The MOE initiated its apprenticeship reform in August 2014, and formally 
announced a list of experimental programs a year later – only two months earlier than the 
GDDOHRSS. But their achievements in Guangdong by mid-2016 had been much more 
successful as summarized in Table 12.  
Different from the MOHRSS, the MOE has generally adopted a collaborative approach to 
its reform. A centerpiece of this approach is decentralization and diffusion of state authority to 
non-state actors, encouraging these actors’ active participation in the reform process instead of 
simply following state-issued guidelines. The MOE’s August 2015 “Notification” regarding 
apprenticeship reform, for example, has stipulated only four general principles that require 
experimental programs to establish their own roadmaps and guidelines and “put them on record 
of local education departments.” This leaves great autonomy for firms and training institutes to 
work out their own programs based on their specific circumstances.  
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In Guangdong, the GDDOE also follows this rationale of collaboration and leaves it to 
non-state actors to develop their own programs. They established a special advisory committee at 
the provincial level with experts, scholars, and practitioners. The chair of the committee, Zhao, is 
one of my key informants. He is a successful vocational school president and an expert in 
apprenticeship training for many years. The school under his leadership has been experimenting 
with apprenticeship programs ever since 2009, way before the central reform initiatives. I 
worked closely with this advisory committee that he leads and therefore was able to observe the 
way they work and interact with schools and firms, which is in general, very non-interventionist. 
Major responsibilities of this committee is providing expertise and advice to programs whenever 
necessary, and annually reviewing the progress of each program as a soft monitoring mechanism.  
In addition, the MOE’s subsidy policy is very flexible. While the MOHRSS requires 
firms to make a detailed individual-trainee based budget, and reimburse only 60% of the total 
costs afterwards, the MOE disburses a lump-sum subsidy of 500,000 yuan (for the first cycle 
participants, and 100,000 for participants that joined from the second cycle) to each individual 
program beforehand, without requiring programs to propose detailed budgets. A program – a 
vocational school and a collaborative firm – has full autonomy to use this money to cover 
various costs shared between them and apprentices. Although nearly all interviewed schools and 
firms claimed that it is insufficient to cover all the costs, especially those that started from the 
second cycle, they did appreciate the freedom granted to them in using the money.  
These flexible central policies have laid the foundation for the MOE’s collaborative 
strategy, i.e. legitimizing existing training programs within schools and firms and incorporating 
them into the formal apprenticeship system. Indeed, most, if not all, GDDOE’s experimental 
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apprenticeship programs originated from vocational schools and firms’ unconscious institutional 
preparation overtime under what I call the “training for a targeted brand” model.  
Training for a targeted brand: The successful outcomes of the MOE’s apprenticeship 
reform rely on continuous experiments of non-state actors – most relevant here being schools and 
firms – with various innovative formats of collaborative training. This firm-school collaboration 
prevalently exists in both manufacturing and service sectors in China, especially in areas like 
Guangdong where major industries are clustered but faced with local market labor shortage 
nowadays. I have documented in detail in another paper (Ch.3) that the skilled labor shortage and 
decentralized VET system in China have together resulted in a de facto apprenticeship training 
model in Chinese vocational schools way before the recent apprenticeship reform was initiated 
by the central government. This model features a shift of traditionally firm-based skill training to 
the pre-employment phase of workers’ skill development process, mostly based in schools, via 
firms’ strategic collaboration with partner schools. Due to the absence of effective civil society 
governance in China, however, such collaborative training is exclusively instituted at the 
individual school-firm level, which is a key difference from Western apprenticeship systems that 
typically have certain forms of industry-level (or regional industry-level) or multi-employer 
coordination – thus “training for a targeted brand” only.  
The MOE’s experimental apprenticeship programs have been transformed from these 
existing targeted training programs. Given the space constraints here, I will only detail an auto-
sector program as a comparison with the MOHRSS’s Toyota case, as well as use some 
supplementary data from the beauty sector. For a full elaboration of “training for a targeted brand” 
practices in the beauty and robot industries, see Ch.3.  
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GDMEC – Jaguar-Land Rover apprenticeship: Guangdong Mechanical and Electrical 
College (GDMEC) has engaged in education and training for the auto sector for over 50 years. It 
has maintained long-term collaboration with auto firms like VW and Jaguar Land Rover over 
years. Its collaborative program with Jaguar-Land Rover dated back to 2012. The two have 
engaged in activities including co-building a practical center, curriculum and textbook 
development, teacher training, and firm dispatching of trainers to work fulltime at the school. 
The GDMEC – Jaguar-Land Rover case here represents a typical state-legitimized model of 
institution building where non-state players fit their originally legally murky24 training activities 
under the “training for a targeted brand” model into a new reform agenda of the state.  
In 2015, the GDMEC and Jaguar-Land Rover simply transformed their existing 
collaborative program into an apprenticeship program, as one of the MOE’s first-cycle 
experimental programs in Guangdong. A class of 30 apprentices were recruited in the same year, 
to enroll in a three-year program with curricula as following: First year – classroom-based 
general skills training of 900 hours; Second year – on-campus practical center-based vocation 
and firm-specific skills training of 486 hours; Third year – firm-based job-specific skills training 
of 1,020 hours (internship). The program director, Professor Yu explained the change: 
It was transformed from the old program. The only difference is that before, firms 
selected from these apprentices and employed them as formal workers later. But now 
they have to decide whom they want at the beginning, and then we train them together (II: 
103).  
 
Apprentices that I interviewed generally expressed their satisfaction with the program. 
When asked what he appreciates most about this program, an apprentice said: 
																																																								
24 In the current Chinese VET system, it is unclear if public schools are justified to engage in this 
kind of targeted training for specific firms without having the latter bear significant costs. A full 
discussion of this see, (Zhang, 2017 manuscript).  
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We in our first year studied a wide range of things. So when it comes to the 
second year, we must focus on a specific brand’s car models. We should not be like, 
seemingly to know of many cars, but indeed unfamiliar with any. We have to be specific 
if we want to be an expert. This program provides such an opportunity, and has rich 
contents. It gives us a deeper understanding of a specific brand (II: 107-114).  
 
Jaguar-Land Rover’s management also had positive evaluation on this collaborative training. The 
program has continued for six years if including the pre-2015 period, and in the summer of 2016, 
the newly named “apprenticeship program” recruited its second cycle of apprentices. Every year, 
the firm invites school teachers to pay three to four training tours at the Jaguar-Land Rover 
headquarter in Shanghai, as well as regular visits to their 4S stores in China to update their skills.  
Apparently, auto employers in Guangdong welcome the MOE’s apprenticeship reform. 
Five of the 51 experimental programs in Guangdong fall into the Auto sector. But in my other 
paper, I have shown that this “training for a targeted brand” model also prevalently exists in the 
beauty as well as the emerging robot manufacturing sector, where likewise a shortage of skilled 
labor co-exists with decentralized VET institutions.  
Over-focusing on specific skills: Prevalently using this “training for a targeted brand” 
model renders skill development in public schools over-focused on firm-specific needs, however, 
especially given that schools now enjoy nearly full autonomy in developing their own curricula 
according to collaborative employers’ needs under the current MOE’s apprenticeship reform. In 
order to get a sense of this situation, I conducted a systematic study of ten major training 
programs for beauty workers under the Guangdong Health Vocational Education Association 
(GHVEA). It turned out that all of the ten schools have their collaborative beauty firms that to 
varying extents dominate their curriculum development and training processes.  
As a result, trainings in these programs in general lean toward specific skills that 
individual collaborative firms needs. I have coded curricula of the ten training programs. As 
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shown in Figure 3 in the previous chapter, all of the programs focus their curricula on firm-
specific skills or skills with limited transferability. More relevant to the discussion here is that 
three of the ten programs have engaged in experimental apprenticeship training – including one 
that had been included in the GDDOE’s apprenticeship experimentation. As highlighted in 
Figure 3, these programs are even more over-focused on specific skills than the other seven. And 
as I have noted in the previously chapter, this inconsistency across curricula of training programs 
for the same occupation has led to incoherent skill structures of the workforce within the local 
industry.  
In light of this, even though firms and schools, and frequently apprentices themselves, are 
quite satisfied with the training under the “training for a targeted brand” model, negative impacts 
can be huge. Over-focusing on firm-specific skills in workforce’s training, especially during the 
pre-employment phase, not only undermines workers’ employability across the local industry, 
and therefore their labor market mobility, but also increases retraining costs of firms – further 
aggravating the skilled labor shortage that they are commonly faced with. While systemically 
estimating the level of these impacts is beyond the scope of this study, they have been well 
demonstrated by Western countries’ experience. And I simply lay out these hypotheses here for 
future research to test. All in all, the MOE’s reform has largely failed to address Problem III in 
my three-level collaborative model.  
 
Discussion 
 
With the central state recently shifting its reform focal point toward supply-side labor 
market policies, both the MOHRSS and the MOE have embarked on tremendous efforts to 
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reform vocational schools within their own jurisdictions by introducing the apprenticeship 
system, under an overall agenda of promoting skill upgrading of the Chinese workforce. 
Although this process of apprenticeship reform has been preceded almost simultaneously in each 
case, by mid-2016, the MOE had established 51 experimental programs in Guangdong, while the 
MOHRSS only five. More importantly, the MOE had overridden the MOHRSS regarding 
employer satisfaction – a crucial indicator of a successful skill development system. Most 
MOE’s programs had started to recruit a second cycle of apprentices by mid-2016, whereas none 
of the MOHRSS’s programs had finished their first cycle apprentice admission – Employers 
were reluctant to progress this reform. How, then, can we explain this significant variation 
between the two ministries’ similar reform agendas that are enforced at the same time? Why is 
the MOE’s reform able to generate more desirable outcomes than the MOHRSS? And what are 
the implications for understanding the Chinese economic reform in general? 
My answer to the first question is simple: The MOE has employed a collaborative model 
of skill development while the MOHRSS has adopted a top-down approach to its reform. But 
why collaboration is desirable – and indeed necessary – in skill development and potentially 
other arenas? I contend that collaborative institution building can address three key theoretical 
problems in skill development – the collective action problem, the accommodation of industry 
needs, and the balance between general and specific skills – and therefore deliver favorable 
outcomes. Skill development, as a result, entails effective collaboration among the state, civil 
society actors, and individual firms and schools. I have developed a three-level collaborative 
model to illustrate this ideal scheme as shown in Figure 4.  
I find that in the Chinese apprenticeship reform, the MOE has been able to solve the first 
two problems, but by and large failed in the third. Due to the absence civil society governance in 
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China, collaboration in the MOE’s apprenticeship programs are instituted at the very 
decentralized individual school-firm level, which is derived from the “training for a targeted 
brand” model that has been long rooted in the Chinese VET system. The MOE’s programs are 
thus rendered over-focused on specific skills needed only by individual firms in collaboration. 
The MOHRSS, in contrast, has failed to resolve all of the three problems, adopting a state top-
down approach to its reform that embodies very limited collaboration with non-state actors. I 
discuss these three problems here in turn in a comparative perspective.  
Regarding the collective action problem, the state in both top-down and collaborative 
models has the potential to solve the collection problem. But in some cases the state’s centralized 
policies may conflict with certain local policies, undermining their effects in solving the 
collective action problem. As I have shown in the MOHRSS’s apprenticeship reform, the central 
government subsidizes about 60% of the training costs for firms, which indeed conflicts with 
Guangdong’s existing local policy that already subsidizes 100% of such training. This means that 
firms enrolled in this project are indeed paying more than what they would have done otherwise 
– The centralized subsidization policy has become a de facto disincentive to firm participation in 
Guangdong. The three indicators I used to estimate employer participation – the number of 
programs established, the number of firms and schools involved, and the number of apprentices 
trained – all indicated that the MOE’s apprenticeship system has achieved better performance 
than the MOHRSS’s in this regard.  
Regarding the accommodation of industry needs, my findings suggest that collaboration 
with non-state actors will generate better outcomes as it better caters to employer needs. Here I 
used the sustainability of a program and employer feedback as indicators of employer 
satisfaction. It turned out that the MOE’s apprenticeship programs have overridden the 
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MOHRSS’s with regard to both measures. This popularity of the MOE’s programs is derived 
from the schools’ ability to customize their curricula according to whatever a collaborative 
employer needs. The MOHRSS’s reform, in contrast, does not allow that flexibility. It requires 
firms to purchase trainings based on the centrally standardized NVCS, which has proven to be 
unable to accommodate regional and industrial needs. The “triple complaints” from employers 
and the local government demonstrated the rigidity of this centralized approach.  
Last, regarding the balance between general and firm-specific skills, both the MOE and 
the MOHRSS have generated unsatisfactory outcomes for different reasons. The top-down 
model of the MOHRSS tends to over focus on general skills, which partly explains why it often 
fails to satisfy employers. The MOE’s collaborative model is faced with a seemingly 
insurmountable obstacle, i.e. the absence of civil society governance in China that is crucial to 
the success of the German apprenticeship system at suggested by the literature. As I have shown, 
the MOE’s apprenticeship programs are based on collaboration between individual employers 
and individual schools without effective coordination across programs, rendering these programs 
over-focused on specific skill needs of collaborative firms at work. My comparison of the 
curricula of ten major programs in the beauty sector including three currently under the MOE’s 
reform experiment has provided support for this argument.  
The three-level collaborative model holds important implications for understanding and 
furthering the current skill development reform in China. The literature on the Chinese reform 
has focused on either a top-down or a bottom-up approach. The former is by and large derived 
from the developmental state theory, ascribing the Chinese “economic miracle” to the state’s 
leading roles in all socio-economic aspects (see, Howell 2006 for a review). There has been, 
however, a relatively small but growing literature that highlights the role of grassroots and 
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private players – individuals, private firms, and other organizational entities – in initiating, 
coordinating, and implementing reforms in various arenas (Zhou 1996; Nee and Opper 2012). 
While these players often lack necessary political resources to effect a wider scope of change, 
they are found to have used informal institutions and networks to realize some of their goals (K. 
Tsai 2006; L. Tsai 2002, 2007). My study enters this debate by suggesting a three-level 
collaborative model of reform. This is not simply suggesting that both state and private players 
are important. They are certainly important, to be sure, but should engage in active collaboration 
with an appropriate division of labor and authority diffusion among the state, civil society actors, 
and individual players. In the skill development arena in particular, the state should assume an 
important role in solving the collective action problem, mainly through policy making and 
provision of financial support. Civil society actors’ roles should be focused on coordinating 
diversified interests across individual employers, establishing industry-level skill standards, and 
licensing other bodies to carry out related qualification processes (or themselves doing so).  
The absence of civil society governance in China, however, has rendered the current 
apprenticeship training either over-centralized or over-decentralized, trapping the Chinese state 
in a decentralization dilemma. It is now either the state or individual employers that are guiding 
the development of training programs, whereas this process should have been taken over by civil 
society actors. The two ministries’ reform models have generated drastically different outcomes, 
but neither is ideal. The MOHRSS case suggests that state centralization with regard to skill 
development is likely to fail, as it is often unable to accommodate regional and industrial 
specificities. The MOE case, in contrast, goes to the other extreme of over decentralization, as 
training processes are now geared toward individual employers’ short-term skill development 
agendas. While this market logic can at times encourage firm participation and increase their 
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satisfaction, it often fails to act on the best interests of the society. An ideal skill formation 
scenario entails a long-term and societal-level planning, but individual employer-dominated 
processes tend to focus on their own short-run specific skill needs.  
The Chinese state faces a decentralization dilemma in not only the skill development, but 
also the employment relations arena. The official union, the All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions (ACFTU) has tremendous influence within the central state in labor policy making, but 
the collective bargaining system it enforces is by and large instituted at the very decentralized 
individual firm level. Managements have incorporated firm-level unions in most Chinese 
enterprises, rendering most firm-level bargaining ineffective and meaningless (Kuruvilla and 
Zhang 2016). While the Western experience suggests that relatively centralized multi-employer 
bargaining is crucial to solving this problem, the absence of capable industry-level unions and 
employer associations in China has served as a major obstacle to the recent recentralization 
efforts of the ACFTU. This failure in turn has forced the state and the ACFTU to themselves 
assume an even bigger role, and enforce even stronger labor protective legislations, e.g. the 
Labor Contract Law in 2007, to directly intervene and centralize labor standards, many of which 
indeed should have been better negotiated at the regional industry or individual workplace level. 
The Labor Contract Law and several following central regulations have received a lot of 
criticisms about their rigidity in labor standards. One policy implication here is that the Chinese 
government should focus on capacity building of relevant civil society actors and have them 
assume certain roles that are now taken by either the state itself, or uncoordinated individual 
private actors in which case, enforcement failure and short-term behaviors often ensue. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have compared and evaluated the early outcomes of two ongoing 
apprenticeship reform efforts by the MOHRSS and the MOE in China. I have shown that the 
collaboration with non-state actors allows the MOE’s apprenticeship programs to 1) address the 
“collective action problem” in skill development, i.e. successfully engaging firms in the pre-
employment skill formation process, and 2) better accommodate industry needs through 
legitimizing existing “training for a targeted brand” programs in vocational schools that are 
based on individual school-firm partnerships. The MOHRSS’s top-down approach, on the other 
hand, has failed to either encourage employer participation or cater to their specific skill needs. 
That being said, without effective civil society governance in China, both ministries’ reforms are 
unable to secure a balanced delivery of general and specific skills. The MOHRSS’s state 
centralization renders training programs over-focused on general skills, whereas the MOE’s 
programs based on individual school-firm collaboration tend to go to the other extreme, i.e. over-
focusing on individual employers’ specific skill needs but overlooking necessary general skills 
training. I hence argue that the Chinese state has been trapped in a decentralization dilemma with 
regard to skill development reform. Until effective civil society governance emerges and 
functions to coordinate the training process, the VET system is unable to deliver ideal skill 
development outcomes – presenting a challenge to the state’s long-term upskilling agenda. 
It is worth emphasizing that although Guangdong is an information-rich case for us to 
understand these reform dynamics, it is by no means representative. While the two ministries 
generally follow drastically different approaches elsewhere too, the way their different reform 
models are played out may vary across regions with very different local political economic 
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contexts. In the Yangtze River Delta area, for instance, local firm networks are more developed 
than those in Guangdong, and employer associations are known to be relatively active in certain 
centralized collective bargaining arrangements (Friedman 2014a). While the absence of civil 
society governance, as shown, has become a major obstacle to the MOE’s collaborative model in 
generating ideal outcomes, cases in the Yangtze River Delta area may show a different, and 
potentially more coordinated scenario. Future research is therefore encouraged to explore these 
processes in various other political-economic settings.   
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this dissertation, I argue that in its attempts to reform the vocational education and 
training (VET) system, the Chinese state has become trapped in a dilemma. The state’s goal is to 
upskill the Chinese workforce during the coming decades, but it is attempting to accomplish this 
without including in the process effective private governance. Private governance should play a 
larger role in the process. Employer associations, for example, could help coordinate the 
development of coherent skill agendas at the industry level. The state initiated major 
decentralization reform during the mid-1980s, but currently the Chinese state has largely 
withdrawn from the daily operations of vocational schools. Consequently, employers concerned 
about the shortage of skilled labor have stepped in and taken over the VET process. 
The result is that individual schools enjoy nearly full autonomy to devise training 
agendas based on whatever collaborative firms need, and there is little industry-level 
coordination and no state-imposed skill standards. While a certain level of decentralization is 
desirable in VET (which inherently has to be market oriented), the peculiar and key problem of 
the Chinese VET’s decentralization process is its over-decentralization and, thus, its 
disorganization. Both western experience and my own empirical findings suggest that when 
effective private governance mechanisms that coordinate employers’ diversified interests at a 
broad scale are not present, individual employer-dominated training will over-emphasize the 
specific short-term skills that employers need and under-emphasize industry-transferable skills. 
The recent apprenticeship system reform has already shown a drastic contrast between two state 
ministries’ institution-building models. On the one hand, the Ministry of Education (MOE) has 
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continued with a decentralized and disorganized approach. On the other hand, the Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS) has sought to recentralize the system through 
enforcement of its National Vocational Certificate System (NVCS), but it has faced major 
resistance from employers. This skill formation dilemma, I predict, over the long term will 
confound the Chinese states’ upskilling agenda, which is designed to facilitate industry 
upgrading.  
Lai and Lo (2006) have documented the Chinese state’s attempt to decentralize the VET 
system since the mid-1980s, and they predict a failed decentralization reform by the turn of the 
new century. In my Introduction chapter, I note that until now this decentralization reform has 
been successfully enforced because the state has granted vocational schools unprecedented 
autonomy over specialty establishment, student admission and qualification, and curricula 
development. Taking this decentralized status quo as a starting point, the three following 
chapters provide evidence that this decentralization has progressed in a disorganized way and 
that this disorganization has generated various problems. Specifically, I find that: 1) partly due to 
decentralization, vocational schools have been characterized by substantial variation in their skill 
development patterns (Ch.2); 2) motivated by a skilled labor shortage, employers have 
dominated the vocational school training processes and have shifted part of their traditionally 
firm-based training to the VET process (Ch.3); and 3) the state is trapped in a skill formation 
dilemma and, consequently, in the absence of effective civil society governance, neither a 
decentralized model nor a recentralized reform approach has delivered ideal skill development 
outcomes (Ch.4). 
These findings hold important implications for ongoing Chinese VET system reform. The 
skill formation dilemma demonstrates that neither a top-down nor an over-decentralized 
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approach to VET is ideal. The latter sufficiently satisfies employers’ skill needs, but it tends to 
focus on their short-term specific skills only. The over-decentralized approach likely undermines 
workers’ employability and self-learning capacity, reduces labor market flexibility, and increases 
employers’ retraining costs, which further aggravates the skilled labor shortage that stands in the 
way of Chinese industry restructuring and upgrading. To more successfully pursue long-term 
upskilling of the Chinese workforce, therefore, the state should engage in civil society building. 
In particular, it should seek to activate the role of official employer associations, strengthen the 
self-organizing capacity of employers, and provide an effective institutional framework to 
coordinate industry-level skill development agendas. The Chinese state rarely lacks the capacity 
to initiate innovative reform agendas at the central level. When there is a problem in reform 
agendas it very often lies in the weak enforceability of central policies at the grassroots level, 
which is due in part to the “appropriated representation” of both workers (Friedman 2014b) and 
employers. With regard to workers, the state is concerned about the threat presented by the 
potential uncontainable force of collective labor. But skill development is of less concern: indeed, 
the importance of skill upgrading for both labor and capital is not controversial. I do hope that, 
given the pressure it suffers to upgrade industry and develop a sustainable and growing economy, 
the Chinese state will decide in the near future to loosen its control over civil society actors who 
are working to facilitate skill development.  
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APPENDIX: INTERVIEW LIST 
 
# Organization Title Name Time 
State Organizations 
I: 1 Ministry of Education (MOE) Deputy department 
head 
Anonymous November-15 
I: 2 Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security 
(MOHRSS) 
Deputy department 
head 
Anonymous February-16 
I: 3 MOE and MOHRSS Former official Chen Yu February-16 
I: 4 MOHRSS - Occupational Skill Testing Authority Former director Chen Lixiang May-16 
I: 5 Guangdong Department of Education (GDDOE) Official Zhan Zongchao November-15 
I: 6 GDDOE Department head Wu Nianxiang March-16 
I: 7 GDDOE Department head Wu Nianxiang March-16 
I: 8 Guangdong Department of Human Resources and 
Social Security (GDDOHRSS) 
Bureau head Zhang Guangli December-15 
I: 9 Shunde Bureau of Education (SDDOE) Deputy head Huang Xiangting January-15 
I: 10 SDDOE - Office of School Affairs Official Zhou Liangliang January-15 
I: 11 Dongguan Bureau of Administration Office head Zeng Lijing May-16 
I: 12 SDDOE - Special Committee for the Promotion of 
Vocational Education 
Official Mr. Li January-15 
I: 13 Guangdong Academy of Education (GDAE) - VET 
Institute 
Director Li Haidong January-16 
I: 14-16 GDAE - VET Institute Deputy director Du Yiping January-16 
Official Huang Wenwei 
Director Li Haidong 
I: 17 GDAE - VET Institute Deputy director Mr. Deng January-16 
I: 18 GDAE - VET Institute Official Huang Wenwei January-16 
I: 19 GDAE Deputy head Lao Hansheng March-16 
I: 20 GDAE - VET Institute Director Li Haidong March-16 
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I: 21-25 GDAE - VET Institute Consultant Zhao Pengfei March-16 
Official Huang Wenwei 
Consultant Mark 
Consultant Andre 
Consultant Liu Qin 
I: 26 GDAE - VET Institute Official Huang Wenwei March-16 
I: 27 GDDOE - Special Committee for Modern 
Apprenticeship 
Director Zhao Pengfei May-16 
I: 28 Guangzhou Bureau of Human Resources and Social 
Security - Occupational Skill Testing Authority 
Former director Li Zongguo April-16 
Schools 
II: 1 Guangzhou Institute of Technology （GZIT） President Fan Zhigang December-14 
II: 2 GZIT Official Mr.Zhang December-14 
II: 3 GZIT - Employment Promotion Center Director Li Renxuan January-15 
II: 4-6 Guangdong Industry Polytechnic (GDIP) - 
Personnel Department 
School president Lin Runhui November-13 
Head Chen Dongmei 
Deputy head Li Guojie 
II: 7 GDIP Deputy president Lin Runhui January-15 
II: 8 GDIP - Department of Mechatronics Chair Mr. Jie April-15 
II: 9 GDIP Deputy president Lin Runhui April-15 
II: 10 GDIP - Office of International Affairs Director (Unknown) April-15 
II: 11 Shunde Liangqiuju Vocational and Technical School 
(SDLVTS) 
President Huang Ruixiing January-15 
II: 12 Guangdong Construction Polytechnic (GDCP) President Zhao Pengfei December-15 
II: 13 GDCP Provost Zhang Zhi December-15 
II: 14 GDCP Vice president Zhao Huilin March-16 
II: 15-21 GDCP Vice president Zhao Huilin March-16 
President Zhao Pengfei 
Visitor Zhao Qiongmei 
GDDOE official Wu Nianxiang 
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GDAE official  Lao Hansheng 
GDAE official Li Haidong 
Teacher Wei Gan 
II: 22-44 GDCP Teachers and 
students 
(23 people) March-16 
II: 45-46 GDCP Teacher Wei gan March-16 
President Zhao Pengfei  
II: 47 GDCP President Zhao Pengfei May-16 
II: 48 Qingyuan Polytechnic (QYP) - Department of 
Beauty 
Director Wu Qiong December-15 
II: 49 QYP Provost Feng Xiaojun December-15 
II: 50 QYP Official Liu December-15 
II: 51 QYP Provost Feng Xiaojun December-15 
II: 52 QYP - Department of Beauty Teacher Wang Jingya December-15 
II: 53-55 QYP - Department of Beauty Teacher Wang Jingya December-15 
Teacher Ms. Huang 
Chair Wu Qiong 
II: 56-57 QYP - Department of Beauty Chair Wu Qiong March-16 
Former school 
president 
Zhao Pengfei 
II: 58-64 Guangzhou Health Science College (GZHSC) Association 
official 
Li Zhi December-15 
Peer school 
official 
Zhu Honghua 
Program director Li Huaying 
Peer school 
official 
Wu Qiong 
Firm 
representative 
Gong Lei 
Association 
official 
Ye Qiuling 
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Firm 
representative 
Su Chaoming 
II: 65 GZHSC - Department of Medical Technology Beauty program 
director 
Li Huaying January-16 
II: 66 GZHSC - Department of Medical Technology Deputy director He Bing January-16 
II: 67-74 GZHSC Association 
official 
Li Zhi January-16 
Program director Li Huaying 
Peer school 
official 
Ms. Huang 
Firm 
representative 
Gong Lei 
Assistant president Ye Qiuling 
Peer school 
official 
Mu Dan 
Natural Beauty 
manager 
(unknown) 
Department chair He Bing 
II: 75 GZHSC - Department of Medical Technology Beauty program 
director 
Li Huaying May-16 
II: 76 GZHSC - Department of Medical Technology Beauty program 
director 
Li Huaying May-16 
II: 77 GZHSC Vice president Xia Jinhua May-16 
II: 78 GZHSC Graduate (anonymous) May-16 
II: 79 Guangzhou Railway Polytechnic (GZRP) - 
Department of Information Engineering 
Director Wang Jinlan December-15 
II: 80 GZRP - Department of Information Engineering Deputy director (unknown) December-15 
II: 81-84 GZRP Students Li Li December-15 
Du Yuechuan 
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Lu Zijian 
(Unknown) 
II: 85 GZRP Teacher and class 
advisor 
Cao Lingli December-15 
II: 86-87 GZRP Students Li Li December-15 
Chen 
II: 88 Guangdong Communication Polytechnic (GDCP) - 
School of Automobile Application 
Director Guo Hailong March-16 
II: 89-90 GDCP - School of Rail Transit Students (two people) March-16 
II: 91-92 GDCP - School of Transportation Management Students (two people) March-16 
II: 93 Guangzhou Panyu Polytechnic (GZPYP) Party secretary Meng Yuanbei March-16 
II: 94 GZPYP President Zhou Hua March-16 
II: 95-97 GZPYP - Official of International Affairs Director Song Meimei March-16 
Official Zhou Hua 
Teacher Lu Feiyue 
II: 98-101 GZPYP Students Wang Huadong March-16 
Liu Rutian 
Su Guoliang 
Chen Jianchang 
II: 102 GZPYP Official He March-16 
II: 103 Guangdong Mechanical and Electrical College 
(GDMEC) - School of Automobile 
Deputy dean Mr. Yu March-16 
II: 104 GDMEC - School of Automobile Deputy dean Mr. Yu March-16 
II: 105 GDMEC - School of Automobile Teacher Mr. Wang March-16 
II: 106 GDMEC - School of Automobile Teacher Mr. Deng March-16 
II: 107-114 GDMEC - School of Automobile Students (eight people) March-16 
II: 115 Guangdong Polytechnic of Science and Technology 
(GDPST) - Guangzhou College 
Director Zhang Bo March-16 
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II: 116-117 GDPST - School of Mechatronics Assistant president Wang Hongmei March-16 
President Chen Douxue 
II: 118 GDPST Vice provost Zhu Xiaoping  
II: 119 GDPST Vice president Ma Guangzhi  
II: 120-123 GDPST Students (four people) March-16 
II: 124-129 GDPST President Chen Douxue March-16 
Vice provost Zhu Xiaoping 
Vice president Ma Guangzhi 
Teachers (three people) 
II: 130 GDPST Student Luo Weijian April-16 
II: 131-137 GDPST Students (seven people) April-16 
II: 138 Guangdong Vocational College of Post and Telecom 
(GDVCPT) 
Vice provost Dai Hao March-16 
II: 139 GDVCPT - Department of Economics and Business Chair Tan Suifeng March-16 
II: 140 GDVCPT President Chen Yuhuan March-16 
II: 141-143 GDVCPT Vice president Chen Zhangnan March-16 
Assistant president Jiang Wenli 
Official Chen Dongming 
II: 144-148 GDVCPT Vice president Chen Zhangnan March-16 
Department chair Tan Suifeng 
Program director Kuang Canbin 
Teachers (two people) 
II: 149-152 GDVCPT Consultant Mark March-16 
Consultant Andre 
State official Zhao Pengfei 
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State official Li Haidong 
II: 153 Shunde Vocational and Technical School (SDVTS) - 
Department of Automobile 
Teacher Ma Tao April-16 
II: 154 Guangzhou Vocational School of Light Industry 
(GZVSLI) 
President Feng Suixin April-16 
II: 155 GZVSLI - Department of Auto Manufacturing Chair Mr. Liang April-16 
II: 156-59 GZVSLI President Feng Suixin April-16 
Department chair Mr. Liang 
Officials (two people) 
II: 160 Shenzhen Polytechnic (SZP) - School of Applied 
Chemistry and Biotechnology 
Vice dean Lin Feng May-16 
II: 161 SZP - School of Applied Chemistry and 
Biotechnology 
Vice dean Lin Feng May-16 
II: 162 SZP - School of Management Student (unknown) May-16 
II: 163 Dongguan Electromechanics Engineering School 
(DGEES) 
Vice president Huang Yutang May-16 
II: 164 DGEES Provost Zhang Junrong May-16 
II: 165 DGEES - Institute of Robots Teacher Wei May-16 
II: 166 Zhuhai Health School (ZHHS) Teacher Ms. Li January-16 
II: 167 ZHHS - Department of Beauty  Chair Zhu Honghua January-16 
II: 168 Zhaoqing Medical College (ZQMC) - Department of 
Nursing 
Chair Chen Xiaoxia January-16 
II: 169 ZQMC - Department of Beauty Teacher (unknown) January-16 
II: 170 Zhanjiang Health School (ZJHS) - Department of 
Beauty 
Teacher Ms. Pan January-16 
II: 171 ZJHS - Department of Beauty Teacher Ms. Pan January-16 
II: 172 Guangzhou Conghua Technical School (GZCHTS) President  Wu Jingping January-15 
II: 173 GZCHTS Vice president Huang Wei January-15 
		 177 
II: 174 Guangdong Lingnan #1 Technical College of 
Industry and Commerce (GDLNCIC) - Department 
of Mechatronics 
Former chair Zhang Songwen April-16 
II: 175 GDLNCIC - Department of Automobile Director Li Baoquan April-16 
II: 176 GDLNCIC - Department of Interior Design Student (unknown) April-16 
II: 177-179 GDLNCIC - Department of Mechatronics Students (three people) April-16 
II: 180-181 GDLNCIC - Department of Mold Manufacturing Students (two people) April-16 
II: 182-184 GDLNCIC Parents (three people) April-16 
II: 185 GDLNCIC Prospective 
student 
(unknown) April-16 
II: 186 Guangzhou Technician College (GZTC) President Li Zongguo April-16 
II: 187 GZTC - Center of Occupational Skill Trainig and 
Testing 
Director Chen Haixia April-16 
II: 188 GZTC - Department of Automobile Chair Cai Yifan April-16 
II: 189 Guangdong Machinery Technician College 
(GDMTC) 
Vice president Liu Hailin April-16 
II: 190 GDMTC WorldSkills 
Competition 
Champion 
Zhong Shixiong April-16 
II: 191 Baiyun Technician College of Business and 
Technology (BYTCBT) - VET Institute 
Director Zhao Shunling April-16 
II: 192 BYTCBT - Department of Tourism Vice chair Chen Yu April-16 
II: 193 BYTCBT - Department of Mechatronics Chair Mo Xingsheng May-16 
II: 194 BYTCBT - Department of Mechatronics Teacher Mr. Zeng May-16 
II: 195 BYTCBT - Department of Mechatronics Program director Mr. Shen May-16 
II: 196 BYTCBT - Department of Mechatronics Career advisor Wang En May-16 
II: 197 BYTCBT - Department of Architecture Student (unknown) May-16 
II: 198 BYYCBT Dormitory 
houseparent 
(unknown) May-16 
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II: 199 Beijing Union Cadre School (BJUCS) Vice president Guo Feng November-15 
II: 200 BJUCS Teacher Fan Lina November-15 
Firms 
III: 1 Gree Electric Appliances, Inc. Recruiting 
manager 
Xie Zhongshuai January-15 
III: 2-3 Hong Kong Yagelo Cosmetics Group President Ye Qiuling December-15 
General manager Gong Lei 
III: 4 Horizontal Information Technology, Inc.  Chief engineer Miao Huaqiao January-16 
III: 5 Natural Beauty Group Firm teacher Ms. Li January-16 
III: 6-8 Hong Kong Yagelo Cosmetics Group President Ye Qiuling January-16 
General manager Gong Lei 
Training institute 
director 
Shen Zeyu 
III: 9 Ellehuis, Co., Ltd. - Training Center Director Fu Runhong January-16 
III: 10-12 Ellehuis, Co., Ltd. Class advisor Chen Min January-16 
Salon manager Yao Liangtao 
Worker Lin Yaqiong 
III: 13 Ellehuis, Co., Ltd. Salon manager Chen Min (another) January-16 
III: 14 Ellehuis, Co., Ltd. Class advisor Chen Min January-16 
III: 15 Ellehuis, Co., Ltd. President Yao Wenfeng March-16 
III: 16-18 Ellehuis, Co., Ltd. President Yao Wenfeng March-16 
Vice president Wen Jian 
CHO Fu Runhong 
III: 19 Ellehuis, Co., Ltd. Salon manager Yao Liangtao March-16 
III: 20 Ellehuis, Co., Ltd. Worker Lin Yaqiong March-16 
III: 21 Ellehuis, Co., Ltd. - Training Center Deputy director Liao Meiling March-16 
III: 22 Ellehuis, Co., Ltd. Worker Su Jielan March-16 
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III: 23-24 Ellehuis, Co., Ltd. Workers (two people) March-16 
III: 25-26 Ellehuis, Co., Ltd. CHO Fu Runhong March-16 
Collaborative 
school president 
Zhao Pengfei 
III: 27 Guangzhou Otis, Inc. Former HR 
director 
Cheng Weiji March-16 
III: 28 Tiandi Huayu Logistics Group HR director Liu Gang March-16 
III: 29 Tiandi Huayu Logistics Group HR officer (unknown) March-16 
III: 30 Zhongtian Group #7 Construction Corporation General engineer Chen Ning March-16 
III: 31 Zhongtian Group #7 Construction Corporation Manager Wu Shaoping March-16 
III: 32-38 Zhongtian Group #7 Construction Corporation Workers (seven workers) March-16 
III: 39 Guangzhou Seagull Kitchen and Bath Products Co., 
Ltd. 
HR manager Teng Chuntang March-16 
III: 40 Guangzhou Seagull Kitchen and Bath Products Co., 
Ltd. 
Training manager Ms. Yang March-16 
III: 41 Guangzhou Seagull Kitchen and Bath Products Co., 
Ltd. 
Trainer Mr. Zhu March-16 
III: 42-43 Guangzhou Seagull Kitchen and Bath Products Co., 
Ltd. 
HR manager Teng Chuntang March-16 
Training manager Ms. Yang 
III: 44 Zhuhai Europe-Asia Auto Tech Co., Ltd. Vice president Mi Tianxiang March-16 
III: 45 Zhuhai Europe-Asia Auto Tech Co., Ltd. President  Liu Xiaobing March-16 
III: 46-47 Zhuhai Europe-Asia Auto Tech Co., Ltd. President Liu Xiaobing March-16 
Vice president Mi Tianxiang 
III: 48-53 Zhuhai Europe-Asia Auto Tech Co., Ltd. Industrial 
association 
officials 
(three people) April-16 
Industrial 
association official  
Wei Tongwei 
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President Liu Xiaobing 
Vice president Duan Haifeng 
III: 54 Guangdong STS Telecom Tech, Inc. Manager Chen Qun March-16 
III: 55 Guangzhou Telecom 10000, Inc. Training manager Zhong Xuxia March-16 
III: 56-61 Guangzhou Telecom 10000, Inc. Manager (unknown) March-16 
Training manager Zhong Xuxia 
School official Tan Suifeng 
Workers (three people) 
III: 62-64 Guangzhou Telecom 10000, Inc. Training manager Zhong Xuxia March-16 
School president Chen Zhangnan 
Manager (unknown) 
III: 65 Guangzhou Telecom 10000, Inc. Training manager Zhong Xuxia April-16 
III: 66 Guangxin Communications Services Co., Ltd. Manager Zhu Wanfang March-16 
III: 67 Jabil Electronics (Guangzhou), Inc. HR manager Xian Xingxian March-16 
III: 68 FAW-VW Automotive (Foshan) Co., Ltd Workshop head 
and union 
committee member 
Kong Degao April-16 
III: 69 FAW-VW Automotive (Foshan) Co., Ltd Workshop head 
and union 
committee member 
Kong Degao April-16 
III: 70-72 Lenuan Heating Appliances Co., Ltd. Vice president Tian Guangfa April-16 
Factory head Kong Xinhua 
Assistant president Wang Xufang 
III: 73 Guangzhou Radio Group Union chair Yang Guohua April-16 
III: 74 GAC-Toyota Motor Co., Ltd. HR official (anonymous) April-16 
III: 75 Guangzhou Jiehe Electric Tech, Inc. General manager Li Yiqi May-16 
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III: 76 Guangzhou Jiehe Electric Tech, Inc. Sales manager Tan Deting May-16 
III: 77 Guangzhou Jiehe Electric Tech, Inc. Technician (unknown) May-16 
III: 78-79 Dongguan Janus Co., Ltd Training center 
director 
Hu Bo May-16 
Training center 
manager 
Hu Shifei May-16 
Other Organizations 
IV: 1 Internet of Things Association of Guangdong Training center 
director 
Chen Yuqi December-15 
IV: 2 Internet of Things Association of Guangdong Training center 
director 
Chen Yuqi March-16 
IV: 3 Chinese Academy of Labor and Social Security - 
Vocational Training Department 
Research associate Chen Yujie December-15 
IV: 4 Chinese Academy of Labor and Social Security - 
Vocational Training Department 
Director Xu Yan February-16 
IV: 5 Beijing Normal University - Institute of Vocational 
and Adult Education 
Professor Zhao Zhiqun December-15 
IV: 6 Beijing Normal University - Institute of Vocational 
and Adult Education 
Professor Zhao Zhiqun May-16 
IV: 7 Guangdong Health Vocational Education Association  President Li Zhi December-15 
IV: 8 Shunde Association for the Promotion of Vocational 
Education 
Deputy secretary 
general 
Zhang Juncheng January-16 
IV: 9 Huizhou Beauty and Cosmetic Association President Ye Qiuling January-16 
IV: 10 South China University of Technology Professor Li Min March-16 
IV: 11 Guangzhou Federation of Trade Unions Former chair Chen Weiguang March-16 
IV: 12 British Council (Beijing) Educational 
project manager 
Liu Qin March-16 
IV: 13 British Council (Guangzhou) Educational 
project manager 
Lin Xiao April-16 
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IV: 14 Shunde E-Commerce Association Department 
manager 
Chen Zhaoyong April-16 
IV: 15 Guangdong Enterprise Confederation - Employer 
Service Department 
Deputy director Li Baifan April-16 
		 183 
REFERENCES 
 
Abraham, K.G., 1990. Restructuring the Employment Relationship: The Growth of Market-
mediated Work Arrangements. In K. G. Abraham & R. B. McKersie, eds. New 
Developments in the Labor Market: Toward a New Institutional Paradigm. Boston, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Althauser, R.P., 1989. Internal Labor Markets. Annual Review of Sociology, 15, pp.143–161.  
Althusser, L., 2006. Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses. In A. Sharma & A. Gupta, eds. 
The Anthropology of the State: A Reader. Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 86–111. 
Ashton, D., Sung, J. & Turbin, J., 2010. The Evolution of Education and Training Strategies in 
Singapore, Taiwan and S. Korea: A Development Model of Skill Formation. Journal of 
Education and Work, 15(1), pp.5–30. 
Ashton, D. et al., 1999. Economies, Education and Training for Development in East Asia: The 
Political Economy of Skill Formation in Newly Industrialised Economies, London: 
Routledge. 
Ashton, D. et al., 2010. The Evolution of Education and Training Strategies in Singapore, 
Taiwan and S. Korea: A Development Model of Skill Formation. Journal of Education and 
Work, 15(1), pp.5–30. 
Barney, J., 1991. Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage. Journal of 
Management, 17(1), pp.99–120. 
Becker, G.S., 1993. Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special 
Reference to Education 3rd ed., Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press. 
Boyd, B.K., Bergh, D.D. & Ketchen, D.J., 2010. Reconsidering the Reputation-Performance 
Relationship: A Resource-Based View. Journal of Management, 36(3), pp.588–609.  
Boyer, R., 1987. Technical Change and the Theory of Regulation, CEPREMAP Discussion 
Paper No. 8707. Paris. 
Braverman, H. 1998. Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth 
Century. New York: NYU Press. 
Cappelli, P., 1995. Rethinking Ennployment. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 33(4), 
pp.563–602. 
Chan, K.W., 2010. A China Paradox: Migrant Labor Shortage amidst Rural Labor Supply 
Abundance. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 51(4), pp.513–530.  
		 184 
Chen, T., 2015. gaodeng jiaoyu xueke zhuanye mulu: wenti yu luoji (Catalogue of Disciplines 
and Specialties in Higher Education: Problems and Logic). Journal of Southwest Jiaotong 
University, 16(3), pp.43–49. 
Child, J., 1994. Management in China During the Age of Reform, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Cooke, F.L., 2005. Vocational and Enterprise Training in China: Policy, Practice and Prospect. 
Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 10(1), pp.26–55. 
Corley, K., & Gioia, D., 2000. The Rankings Game: Managing Business School Reputation. 
Corporate Reputation Review, 3, pp.319-333.  
Crouch, C., Finegold, D. & Sako, M., 1999. Are Skills the Answer? The Political Economy of 
Skill Creation in Advanced Industrial Societies, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Culpepper, P.D., 1999a. Still a Model for the Industrialization Countries? In P. D. Culpepper and 
D. Finegold, eds. The German Skills Machine: Sustaining Comparative Advantage in a 
Global Economy. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, pp. 1–36. 
Culpepper, P.D. 1999b. The Future of the High-skill Equilibrium in Germany. Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 15(1): 43–59.  
Davis-Blake, A. & Uzzi, B., 1993. Determinants of Employment Externalization: A Study of 
Temporary Workers and Independent Contractors. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38(2), 
pp.195–223. 
Delebarre, J., 2016. Apprenticeships Policy, England 2015, House of Commons Library Briefing 
Paper. 
Doeringer, P.B. & Piore, M.J., 1971. Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis, 
Lexington, MA: Heath Lexington Books. 
Dougherty, K.J. & Bakia, A.F., 1999. The New Economic Development Role of the Community 
College, New York: Community College Research Center. 
Durden, G.R. & Yang, G., 2006. Higher Vocational Education in China: A Preliminary Critical 
Review of Developments and Issues in Liaoning Province. Journal of European Industrial 
Training, 30(8), pp.622–638.  
Farrell, D. & Grant, A.J., 2005. China’s Looming Talent Shortage. McKinsey Quarterly, (4), 
pp.70–79.  
Feldman, M., Francis, J. & Bercovitz, J., 2005. Creating a Cluster While Building a Firm: 
Entrepreneurs and the Formation of Industrial Clusters. Regional Studies, 39(1), pp.129–
141. 
		 185 
Finegold, D. & Soskice, D., 1988. The Failure of Training in Britain: Analysis and Prescription. 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 4(3), pp.21–53. 
Finegold, D. & Wagner, K., 2002. Are Apprenticeships Still Relevant in the 21st Century? A 
Case Study of Changing Youth Training Arrangements in German banks. Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, 55(4), pp.667–685. 
Friedman, E. 2014a. Economic development and sectoral unions in China. Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review 67(2): 481-503. 
Friedman, E., 2014b. Insurgency Trap: Labor Politics in Postsocialist China, Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press. 
Friedman, E. & Lee, C.K., 2010. Remaking the World of Chinese Labour: A 30-year 
Retrospective. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 48(3), pp.507–533. 
Furth, D., 1985. Education and Training after Basic Schooling, Paris: OECD. 
Gallagher, M.E. & Dong, B., 2011. Legislating Harmony: Labor Law Reform in Contemporary 
China. In S. Kuruvilla, C. K. Lee, & M. E. Gallagher, eds. From Iron Rice Bowl to 
Informalization. Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press: Ch.3. 
Gallagher, M.E., Lee, C.K. & Kuruvilla, S., 2011. Introduction and Argument. In S. Kuruvilla, 
C. K. Lee, & M. E. Gallagher, eds. From Iron Rice Bowl to Informalization. Ithaca & 
London: Cornell University Press, pp. 1–14. 
Green, A., 1991. The Reform of Post‐16 Education and Training and the Lessons from Europe. 
Journal of Education Policy, 6(3), pp.327–339. 
Green, F. 1992. On the Political Economy of Skill in the Advanced Industrial Nations. Review of 
Political Economy, 4: pp.413–435.  
Hall, P. & Soskice, D., 2001. An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism. In P. Hall & D. 
Soskice, eds. Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative 
Advantage. Oxford: OUP. 
Hashimoto, M., 1979. Bonus Payments, on-the-Job training, and Lifetime Employment in Japan. 
Journal of Political Economy, 87(5), pp.1086–1104. 
Hashimoto, M., 1981. Firm-Specific Human Capital as a Shared Investment. American 
Economic Review, 71(3), pp.475–482.  
Hashimoto, M. & Yu, B.T., 1980. Specific Capital, Employment Contracts, and Wage Rigidity. 
The Bell Journal of Economics, 11(2), pp.536–549. 
		 186 
Helmke, G. & Levitsky, S., 2004. Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research 
Agenda. Perspectives on Politics, 2(4), pp.725–740. 
Howell, J., 2006. Reflections on the Chinese State. Development and Change, 37(2), pp.273–
297. 
Hurst, W., 2009. The Chinese Worker after Socialism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Klein, B., Crawford, R., & Alchian, A., 1978. Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and the 
Competitive Contracting Process. Journal of Law and Economics, 21(2), pp.297-326.  
Knoke, D. & Ishio, Y., 1994. Occupational Training, Unions, and Internal Labor Market. 
American Behavioral Scientist, 37(7), pp.992–1016. 
Kochan, T.A., Katz, H.C., & McKersie, R.B., 1986. The Transformation of American Industrial 
Relations, New York: Basic Books.  
Kong, W., 2015. On the Problems of Chinese Professional Qualification Certificates System and 
Countermeasures (Woguo Zhiye Zige Zhengshu Zhidu De Wenti Yu Duice). Journal of 
Henan Institute of Science and Technology, 8, pp.10–14. 
Kuruvilla, S. and Chua, R., 2000. How Do Nations Increase Workforce Skills? Factors 
Influencing the Success of the Singapore Skills Development System. Global Business 
Review, 1(1), pp.11–47. 
Kuruvilla, S., Erickson, C.L. and Hwang, A., 2002. An Assessment of the Singapore Skills 
Development System: Does it Constitute a Viable Model for Other Developing Countries? 
World Development, 30(8), pp.1461–1476. 
Kuruvilla, S. and Zhang, H., 2016. Labor Unrest and Incipient Collective Bargaining in China. 
Management and Organization Review, 12(1), pp.159–187. 
Kwan, F., 2009. Agricultural Labour and the Incidence of Surplus Labour: Experience from 
China during Reform. Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, 7(3), pp.341–
361. 
Lai, M. & Lo, L.N.K., 2006. Decentralization and Social Partnership: The Development of 
Vocational Education at Shanghai and Shenzhen in China. Educational Research for Policy 
and Practice, 5(2), pp.101–120. 
Leborgne, D. and A. Lipietz. 1988. New technologies, new modes of regulation: some spatial 
implications. Society and Space 6: 263-280.  
Lepak, D.P. & Snell, S.A., 1999. The Human Resource Architecture: Toward a Theory of 
Human Capital Allocation and Development. Academy of Management Review, 24(1), 
pp.31–48. 
		 187 
Li, Y. & Sheldon, P., 2010. HRM Lives inside and outside the Firm: Employers, Skill Shortages 
and the Local Labour Market in China. The International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 21(12), pp.2173–2193. 
Li, Y. & Sheldon, P., 2014. Collaborations between Foreign-invested Enterprises and China’s 
VET Schools: Making the System Work amid Localised Skill Shortages. Journal of 
Vocational Education & Training, 66(3), pp.311–329.  
Lieberman, M.B. & Montgomery, D.B., 1988. First-Mover Advantages. Strategic Management 
Journal, 9(S1), pp.41–58. 
Lin, J.Y. and Treichel, V., 2012. Learning from China’s rise to Escape the Middle-Income Trap: 
A New Structural Economics Approach to Latin America. The World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper, 6165.  
Liu, D., 2016. liudong shehui de zhixu (Order in a Fluid Society), Beijing, China: Minzu 
University of China Press. 
Liu, X., 2015. How Institutional and Organizational Characteristics Explain the Growth of 
Contingent Work in China. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 68(2), pp.372–397. 
Locke, R., 1992. The Demise of the National Union in Italy: Lessons for Industrial Relations 
Theory. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 45(2), pp.229-249. 
Locke, R., Kochan, T. and Piore, M., 1995. Reconceptualizing Comparative Industrial Relations: 
Lessons from International Research. International Labour Review, 134(2), pp.139–161. 
Loveridge, R. & Mok, A.L., 1979. Theories of Labor Market Segmentation: A Critique, Boston 
and London: Martinus Niihoff. 
Lucas, R.E., 1988. On the Mechanics of Economic Development. Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 22, pp.3–42.  
Lüthje, B., Luo, S. & Zhang, H., 2013. Beyond the Iron Rice Bowl: Regimes of Production and 
Industrial Relations in China, Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag. 
Marx, K., [1859] 1978. Preface to “A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy”. In R. 
Tucker (ed.) The Marx-Engels Readery. New York: Norton, pp.4-5.  
Monks, J., & Ehrenberg, R.G., 1999. U.S. News & World Report’s College Rankings: Why Do 
They Matter? Change, 31(6), pp.42-51.  
Murphy, R. & Johnson, D., 2009. Education and Development in China: Institutions, Curriculum 
and Society. International Journal of Educational Development, 29(5), pp.447–453. 
		 188 
Nee, V. & Ingram, P., 1998. Embeddedness and Beyond: Institutions, Exchange and Social 
Structure. In M. Brinton & V. Nee, eds. New Institutionalism in Sociology. New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation, pp.19-45. 
Nee, V. & Opper, S., 2012. Capitalism from Below: Markets and Institutional Change in China, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Ngok, K. & Guo, W., 2008. The Quest for World Class Universities in China: Critical 
Reflections. Policy Futures in Education, 6(5), pp.545–557. 
Olney, S.L., 1994. Unions in a Changing World: Problems and Prospects in Selected 
Industralised Countries, Geneva: International Labour Office. 
Olson, M., 1965. Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Osterman, P., 1982. Employment Structures within Firms. British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 20(3), pp.349-361. 
Osterman, P., 1987. Choice of Employment Systems in Internal Labor Markets. Industrial 
Relations, 26(1): pp.46-67. 
Osterman, P. & Batt, R., 1993. Employer-Centered Training for International Competitiveness: 
Lessons from State Programs Abstract Paul Osterman. Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management, 12(3), pp.456–477. 
Parker, E. & Rogers, J., 1999. Sectoral Training Initiatives in the US: Building Blocks of a New 
Workforce Preparation System? In P. D. Culpepper & D. Finegold, eds. The German Skills 
Machine: Sustaining Comparative Advantage in a Global Economy. pp. 326–362. 
Patton, M.Q., 1990. Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.  
Peters, K., 2007. Business School Rankings: Content and Context. Journal of Management 
Development, 26(1), pp.49-53.  
Pfeffer, J. & Salancik, G.R., 1978. The External Control of Organizations: A Resource 
Dependence Perspective, New York: Harper and Row. 
Pfeffer, J. & Fong, C. T., 2002. The End of Business Schools? Less Success than Meets the Eye. 
Academy of Management Learning and Education, 1, pp.78-95.  
Piore, M.J., 2002. Thirty Years Later: Internal Labor Markets, Flexibility and the New Economy. 
Journal of Management and Governance, 6(4), pp.271–279. 
Reich, M., Gordon, D.M. & Edwards, R.C., 1973. A Theory of Labor Market Segmentation. 
American Economic Review, 63(2), pp.359–365. 
		 189 
Rosenfeld, S.A., 2000. Community College/Cluster Connections: Specialization and 
Competitiveness in the United States and Europe. Economic Development Quarterly, 14(1), 
pp.51–62.  
Schnarr, A., Yang, S. & Gleissner, K., 2008. Vocational Education and Training and the Labour 
Market: A Comparative Analysis of China and Germany, International Center for Technical 
and Vocational Education and Training.  
Sheldon, P. & Li, Y., 2013. Localized Poaching and Skills Shortages of Manufacturing 
Employees among MNEs in China. Journal of World Business, 48, pp.186–195.  
Smith, C. & Chan, J., 2015. Working for Two Bosses: Student Interns as Constrained Labour in 
China. Human Relations, 68(2), pp.305–326. 
Sorge, A. and Streeck, W., 1988. Industrial Relations and Technical Change: The case for an 
Extended Perspective. In R. Hyman and W. Streeck (eds.) New Technology and Industrial 
Relations, Oxford: Blackwell.  
Stevens, M., 1999. Human Capital Theory and UK Vocational Training Policy. Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 15(1), pp.16–32.  
Stone  III, J.R. & Lewis, M. V, 2010. Governance of Vocational Education and Training in the 
United States. Research in Comparative and International Education, 5(3), pp.274–288. 
Streeck, W. 1987. The Role of the Social Partners in Vocational Training and Further Training 
in the Federal Republic of Germany. Berlin: CEDEFOP. 
Streeck, W., 1989. Skills and the Limits of Neo-Liberalism: The Enterprise of the Future as a 
Place of Learning. Work, Employment & Society, 3(1), pp.89–104.  
Streeck, W. 1992. Social Institutions and Economic Performance: Studies of Industrial Relations 
in Advanced Capitalist Economies. London: Sage. 
Su, Y., 2010-2011. Student Workers in the Foxconn Empire: The Commodification of Education 
and Labor in China. Journal of Workplace Rights, 15(3–4), pp.341–362.  
The World Bank, 2013. China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society. 
Working paper. 
Thelen, K., 2004. How Institutions Evolve, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Tsai, K.S., 2006. Institutions and Endogenous Institutional Change. World Politics, 59, pp.116–
141. 
Tsai, L.L., 2002. Cadres, Temple and Lineage Institutions, and Governance in Rural China. The 
China Journal, 48, pp.1–27. 
		 190 
Tsai, L.L., 2007. Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in 
Rural China. American Political Science Review, 101(2), pp.355–372. 
Warner, M., 1993. Human Resource Management “with Chinese Characteristics”. International 
Journal of Human Resource Management, 4(1), pp.45-65. 
Williamson, O.E., Wachter, M.L. & Harris, J.E., 1975. Understanding the Employment Relation: 
The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange. The Bell Journal of Economics, 6(1), pp.250–278. 
Woronov, T.E., 2012. Doing Time: Mimetic Labor and Human Capital Accumulation in Chinese 
Vocational Schools. South Atlantic Quarterly, 111(4), pp.701–719.  
Xiao, J. & Tsang M. C., 2004. Determinants of Participation and Nonparticipation in Job‐related 
Education and Training in Shenzhen, China. Human Resource Development 
Quarterly, 15(4), pp.389-42.  
Xu, F., 2008. The Emergence of Temporary Staffing Agencies in China. Comparative Labor 
Law and Policy Journal, 30(431), pp.431–461. 
Xu, S., 1993. History of Development and Reform of Chinese Technical Schools (Zhongguo 
Jigong Xuexiao Fazhan Yu Gaige De Lishi Huigu). Vocational Education Research, 
1994(4), pp.4–7. 
Yang, R. & Welch, A., 2012. A World-Class University in China? The Case of Tsinghua. Higher 
Education, 63(5), pp.645–666. 
Zhou, K.X., 1996. How the Farmers Changes China: Power of the People, Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press. 
Zhou, X., 1993. Unorganized Interests and Collective Action in Communist China. American 
Sociological Review, 58(1), pp.54–73. 
Zhou, Y., 2012. The State of Precarious Work in China. American Behavioral Scientist, 57(3), 
pp.354–372.  
 
 
